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CHAPTER 1   
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
There is broad agreement that greater prosperity is achieved by ensuring a stable and 
open macroeconomic environment, by building accountable and inclusive public 
institutions, and by investing in social services (Ritzen et al., 2000). Institutions are 
particularly important for mediating the impact of policy reform. In turn, policy 
reforms can affect institutions by changing organizational structures, roles, and 
responsibilities, or rules and incentives, as well as by altering market incentives, 
changing the behaviour of economic agents and interest groups and ultimately, 
distribution and poverty reduction. Furthermore, institutions are important for 
coordination and administration of economic development, learning and innovation, 
and for income redistribution and social cohesion (Chang, 2005). The study of the 
relations between central and local governments as well as with their partners in the 
delivery of services is particularly important is this regard (Rutherford, 1994; World 
Bank, 2003). 
 
According to Linder (2002) modern society is based on three subsystems: the 
economy, regulated by the market; institutions, regulated by state law; and, the social 
system, regulated by values and norms. These subsystems work together to transform 
a society from traditional to modern. Linder further notes that decentralisation leads to 
new institutions of government that contribute to the transformation of society.  
Decentralisation has been also been observed by Shah et al (2004) for its positive 
influence in reforming the public sector in developing countries in support of 
economic development and provision of basic services, that is, public services that are 
basic for human survival, including primary health care, safe water and sanitation and 
basic education (Hall, 2003; World Bank, 2004). 
 
In this context, decentralisation has “quietly become a fashion of our time” (Manor, 
1999). It is being considered or attempted in an astonishing diversity of developing 
and transitional countries - by solvent and insolvent regimes, by democracies (both 
mature and emergent) and autocracies, by regimes making the transition to democracy 
and by others seeking to avoid that transition, by regimes with various colonial 
inheritances and by those with none. It is being attempted where civil society is 
strong, and where it is weak. It appeals to people of the left, the centre and the right, 
and to groups which disagree with each other on a number of other issues (Dillinger, 
1994). Out of 75 developing countries with a population of more than five million in 
1999, 63 were actively pursuing decentralisation policies (Lee and Gilbert, 1999). 
 
Why the current interest? 
 
On why the currently high interest, Manor (1999) notes that some post war command 
states see decentralisation as a means of shifting power to local governments – 
particularly to accelerate poverty reduction through the delivery of basic services, an 
objective that the centre finds difficult to achieve. Some politicians in central 
governments also see decentralisation as a means of off-loading expensive tasks onto 
others lower down the public administration hierarchy. Some donor agencies also see 
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decentralisation as a means of shifting their emphases away from large-scale 
development programs to more modest, micro level projects into which grass roots 
communities could be drawn as participants, in the hope of making development more 
sustainable. Other donor agencies also see decentralisation as consistent with the 
introduction of market reforms in economic management and as a way of introducing 
administrative reforms in the public service, particularly with the advent of new 
public management in promoting partnerships (Temmes, 2005). 
 
World Bank (1997) on the other hand points to the “resource crunch” of developing 
countries as one of the main reasons – that economic difficulties which regimes faced 
in the 1980s (and compounded by political failures) created a crisis that led to 
ambitious reforms including the adoption of decentralisation.  
 
Van Dijk (2006) further provides a summary of factors that support the intensification 
of decentralisation. These include the continued weaknesses of central government in 
meeting local needs, particularly the often insensitivity of central government 
investments to local circumstances, uncoordinated actions of central government 
agencies, abuse of controls over local government, weakening of municipal financial 
viability by withholding approval to changes in tax assessments; and, the 
conditionality of aid agencies in their bid to promote democracy and deregulation.  
 
For a variety of interest groups – from planners and business managers to church 
administrators, decentralisation is sought after because of the strong belief in the 
principle of subsidiarity, which holds that a larger and greater body should not 
exercise functions which can be carried out efficiently by one smaller and lesser, but 
rather the former (larger body) should support the latter (smaller body) and help to 
coordinate its activity with the activities of the whole community or country (Mele, 
2004).  
 
A word of caution 
 
In spite of the high level of interest, there are those who argue strongly against 
decentralisation as well as those who call for caution. Prud’homme (1995) argues 
strongly against it, going as far as issuing a warning on the “dangers of 
decentralisation”. He contends that decentralisation (in its pure form) can be the 
“mother of segregation” due to regional disparities that may arise from assignment of 
fiscal responsibilities from central to local governments. Citing examples of “fiscal 
perversity” by sub-national governments in Argentina, Prud’homme further argues 
that decentralisation can jeopardise macro economic stability. 
 
Davey (1992) asks for pragmatism, citing the “practical realities that work against 
rapid and full decentralisation”, including: (a) the need for central government to 
ensure equalisation and economic regulation across local government areas and 
regions; (b) the scale of many interventions beyond a particular local government 
area; and, (c) the pull of vertical political linkages. Cohen and Peterson (1997) also 
observe difficulties in reforming institutions that have been established by decades of 
colonial rule, numerous aid agency experiments, informal patterns of administrative 
behaviour, and uneven implementation of whatever approaches to decentralisation 
that countries tried in the past.  
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In addition, difficulties in implementation of laws have raised concerns regarding the 
pace of decentralisation. In many developing countries, while the law sets the base for 
decentralisation, it does not determine its operation. On the ground, the exercise of 
legal powers for decentralisation is influenced by a wider political climate, as well as 
a balance of power within society as a whole, both outside the framework of 
decentralisation (Litvack, 1998). 
 
Wunsch and Olowu (1990) note that despite the wave of decentralisation reforms 
sweeping through developing countries, many central governments continue to retain 
a major role in local development - through their holding on to some functional 
responsibilities, control of investment finance and professional skills, and through 
their legal powers over the operation of local authorities. Litvack (2000) mentions 
accusations against central government agencies – that they are undermining 
decentralisation by ensuring a slow pace of implementation of needed reforms. 
 
Thus, many developing countries are struggling with making decentralisation work, 
perhaps due the lack of operational instruments, or the notion that centralisation and 
decentralisation are an “either-or” phenomenon. In particular, several developing 
countries are unlike many developed ones, yet to come to grips with the “pragmatism” 
of how to balance central-local relations in a manner that improves the provision of 
basic services (Cohen and Peterson, 1999).   
 
In western countries, there is evidence of a variety of approaches to address the 
concerns of both the centre and city. In the anglo-saxon model, local authorities have 
their own property, budgets and staff, together with devolved functions, which they 
perform exclusively. If central or state governments perform other tasks at local level, 
they do so through branch organisations, which are parallel to and separate from 
municipal apparatus. Local governments are also equipped with a variety of tools for 
cooperating with central government agencies (Davey, 1992). Other traditions, 
particularly franco or ottoman, generally treat local government as part of an 
integrated hierarchy of government.  The Netherlands for example has a mix of 
central-local relations, with active participation of central government in local 
economic development (Van Dijk, 2006). 
 
Thus, many developed countries have ensured that centralisation and decentralisation 
are not treated as "either-or" conditions for local development. They understand the 
need for and have developed instruments for a climate of “cooperation” by both 
central and local government agencies in the provision of basic services (Cohen and 
Petersen, 1996). Samoff (1990) further observes that “there is no absolute value in 
either central direction or local autonomy. Both are important…at different moments. 
Both must coexist.” Slatter (1989) further argues that decentralisation only makes 
sense when it leads to greater social or territorial equality, which is often not the case. 
Silverman (1992) recognises that “most system-wide institutional arrangements are 
characterised by the coexistence of elements of types of decentralisation, together 
with other highly centralised functions” or a “hybrid” system. Mawhood (1987) refers 
to a “mixed” system of public administration.  
 
Van Dijk (2006) also notes the relevance of strong and innovative partnerships 
between the various levels of government and with the non-state sector in effective 
local governance. Cohen and Peterson (1999) also argue that if decentralisation takes 
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the form of pluralism, that is, involving different layers of government and non state 
institutions, it has more positive influence on the performance of service delivery 
systems than if it takes the form of monopoly1.  
 
McLure (1996), in disputing Prud’homme’s work on the “dangers of 
decentralisation”, also points out that the “centralisation-decentralisation dichotomy is 
a false one”. Systems of public administration are usually characterised by a 
combination of both.  
 
Yet, for developing countries like Ghana, several challenges remain about how to 
balance central-local relations in a way that improves the delivery of basic services. 
These challenges include how to define incentives for central governments to be more 
supportive of local government provision of basic services; and, how to enhance the 
competence of local governments to perform decentralised functions, including cases 
where the scale of interventions transcends the boundaries of local government. 
Another challenge is in respect of how to define incentives for local governments to 
promote pluralism in the delivery of services. A bigger challenge is to ensure that 
pluralism yields the desired fruit of improved service delivery. 
 
Concerns also remain regarding the place of pluralism in service provision. Helmsing 
(2000) raises doubts about whether plural arrangements for service delivery really 
exist in developing countries. Pluralism presupposes the existence of partially self-
organising firms (or NGOs or CBOs) and their networks. Have these really emerged 
in developing countries? If yes, what are their internal dynamics, taking into account 
the likelihood of considerable inequalities among various actors? Do local 
governments have the regulatory capability to steer service delivery networks? Are 
they delivering services at lower cost and higher quality than conventional public 
sector delivery? 
 
In this study we take up the challenge of exploring the reality of central-local 
relations, vis-à-vis what the law says in the provision of basic services in a developing 
country, Ghana; and whether central-local relations are characterised by pluralism. 
We further examine whether plural central-local relations, where they exist, perform 
better than monopoly arrangements in the delivery of basic services, with emphasis on 
water and sanitation.  
 
 
1.2 The Problem in Ghana 
 
While it is argued that decentralisation reforms in Ghana predate independence in 
1957, the most recent wave, and perhaps the most far-reaching reform began in the 
1988-1992 period. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana indicates that the objective of 
Ghana’s current decentralisation policy is devolution of decision-making powers for 
the provision of basic services from central government and its agencies to local 
government or District Assemblies (Republic of Ghana, 1992). The Constitution and 
related legislation seek to achieve devolution through political, spatial, administrative 
and fiscal decentralisation, and the establishment of local governments as planning 
authorities (Republic of Ghana, 1993; Republic of Ghana, 1994; MLGRD, 1996; 
                                                          
1 The concept of pluralism in institutional design and performance is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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MLGRD, 1999).  The reform places the responsibility for management of districts 
(local government territories) in the hands of local governments.  
 
Thus, by law, responsibility for provision of basic services, including water, waste 
management, basic education, primary health care and infrastructure for small 
enterprises, appears to have been devolved to District Assemblies. However, the 
reality of decentralisation appears to be different.  
 
The reality of central-local relations in Ghana 
 
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the process of implementing 
decentralisation reforms appears to have resulted in a shift from the original objective 
of devolution. The District Chief Executive or Mayor of a local government area is 
appointed by the President of the country and not elected, a phenomenon that has 
tended to undermine local accountability (Laryea-Adjei, 2001). Central government 
agencies, rather than District Assemblies control most of the recurrent budget for the 
delivery of basic services. This situation, together with resistance from top civil 
servants has slowed down the transfer of staff from ministries to District Assemblies.  
Alhassan and Arthur (2004) also cite the centralised implementation of the country’s 
expenditure planning approach, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), 
as a key constraint. The principal fiscal instrument for decentralisation, the District 
Assembly Common Fund (or 5% of national tax revenues) also has significant 
portions earmarked by central government (MLGRD, 2002).  
 
In addition, there are laws and policies that do not promote the devolution objective of 
the Constitution regarding the provision of basic services. Provision of basic health 
and education have for example, been backed by laws which do not support 
devolution. National policy on the provision of water in urban areas is also not 
consistent with the powers assigned to District Assemblies by law. Thus, various 
types of central-local relations are emerging in the provision of basic services. In this 
context, this study ascertains the extent of decentralisation and pluralism in central-
local relations and the ensuing performance in terms of improved provision of water 
and sanitation services in Ghana.  
 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
The objectives of the study are as follows:    
 
1. Examine the evolution of decentralisation in Ghana. 
2. Identify and examine central-local relations in provision of water and sanitation in 
urban and semi-urban districts and the extent to which plural arrangements are 
used for the delivery of services.  
3. Assess the performance of the different type(s) or combination of types of 
decentralisation in urban and semi-urban districts 
4. Explore factors for performance in designing decentralised provision of water and 
sanitation. 
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1.4 Hypotheses 
 
Our first hypothesis is that decentralisation in practice in Ghana does not reflect what 
is specified by the country’s laws and referred to by Rondinelli (1981)2 as devolution, 
but rather a mixture of deconcentration and delegation.  This hypothesis will be 
tested for Ghana in general and for the water and sanitation in particular. The 
underlying notion is that decentralised decision-making can contribute considerably to 
improving the provision of water and sanitation. 
 
The literature also notes that decentralisation sometimes leads to pluralism (Van Dijk, 
2006; Helmsing, 2000). Cohen and Peterson (1999) also draw attention to another 
manifestation of decentralisation, which they refer to as distributed institutional 
monopoly. Pluralism refers to a situation where decentralisation ensures that roles are 
shared by two or more organisations or institutions. Distributed monopoly refers to a 
situation where roles are distributed spatially (from the centre to the local government 
level), but concentrated in one organisation or institution3. 
 
Our second hypothesis is that when pluralism emerges at the decentralised level of 
government, it yields better performance than the case of distributed monopoly.  
 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 
To test the hypotheses, the research will seek to provide answers to the following 
questions: 
 
1. What is the reality in Ghana, vis-à-vis the law on decentralisation in the provision 
of basic services, with emphasis on water and sanitation?  
2. What is the performance of the different types or combination of types of 
decentralisation in the provision of water and sanitation in urban and semi-urban 
districts?  
3. Are plural arrangements for the provision of water and sanitation, where they 
exist, yielding better results than monopoly arrangements? 
4. What explains the differences in performance, if any?  
 
 
1.6 Scope of the study 
 
The study focuses on provision of water and sanitation by various levels of 
government, with a special emphasis on local government. Water and sanitation are 
selected because of their demonstrated influence on public health and poverty 
reduction. Increased access to safe water for example, contributes to improvements in 
health outcomes and increases the productivity of a local economy. Improved 
sanitation contributes to a reduction in the burden of disease and to the attraction of 
more tourists (Sachs et al., 2004). Furthermore, water and sanitation are selected for 
study because of a legally defined role of local government in their provision.  
                                                          
2 Rondinelli (1981) classifies the various types of decentralisation as devolution, delegation and 
deconcentration. These concepts are discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  
3 Detailed discussion of concepts of pluralism and distributed monopoly can be found in Chapter 2. 
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In terms of geography, this study focuses on two districts of Ghana which have 
similar spatial and socio-cultural characteristics: Tamale and Savelugu-Nanton. 
Tamale is selected because it is the leading urban centre in the deprived northern 
section of Ghana, hence providing an opportunity to test the recommendations of the 
study in larger urban centres in the future. Unlike the Tamale municipality, Savelugu-
Nanton has a mix of rural and urban populations. This offers the opportunity to 
compare provision of water and safe sanitation in both urban and semi-urban settings. 
Chapter 5 provides more information on the criteria for selecting districts for this 
study. 
 
 
1.7 Organisation of Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the study and covers the problem statement, 
objectives, hypothesis and scope of the study. Chapter 2 focuses on concepts of 
decentralisation and as it influences the provision of basic services. 
 
The law and practice of decentralisation in Ghana since the colonial era in 1844 are 
reviewed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 continues a review of the literature with an 
emphasis on the characteristics of water and sanitation, and the implications for 
service delivery.  
 
The Research Strategy is discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents background 
information on Ghana and the two study districts. 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 present an analysis of primary data on central-local relations in the 
provision of water and sanitation in the two districts. Chapter 9 makes a comparison 
of the dimensions of central-local relations in the provision of water and sanitation in 
the districts.  
 
Chapter 10 provides an analysis of the performance of the two districts in providing 
water and sanitation. A case study approach is used to review the features and 
performance of a pluralist arrangement in service provision in Chapter 11. The study 
is concluded in Chapter 12 with a discussion of how the findings of the research relate 
to the theoretical frameworks that underlie the design of decentralisation reforms.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
2.0 CONCEPTS OF DECENTRALISATION  
 
We review in this chapter the concepts that guide the design and analysis of 
decentralisation. The objective is to provide a basis for the analytical framework of 
the study, which is the subject of Chapter 5. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The literature is unanimous about the importance of studying decentralisation. This is 
because it affects everything from the effectiveness to efficiency of service delivery, 
social safety nets and poverty alleviation programmes, to macroeconomic stability 
and the development of the financial sector (Litvack and Seddon, 1999). 
 
Progress has been made over the past few decades in defining the concept of 
decentralisation and in identifying its various forms of manifestations.  Though 
considerable ambiguity in the use of the term by both academics and professionals 
still exists, the literature appears to endorse a number of definitions4. 
 
The works of Cheema, Nellis, Rondinelli and Silverman in the 1980s and 1990s 
provide direction and clarity on the definition of decentralisation5.  A summary 
definition from this school outlines decentralisation as “the transfer of authority and 
responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate or 
quasi-independent government organisations or the private sector” (Rondinelli, 
1999). Bosset and Beauvais (2002) add to the definition by highlighting the variety of 
mechanisms used to transfer fiscal, administrative, ownership and/or political 
authority to alternate institutions.  
 
Generally, the literature has with time, moved to consensus on the key elements of 
decentralisation. These are transfer of authority (that is power, by law) for (specified) 
public functions; transfer of responsibility (that is roles and tasks) for public 
functions; transfer of resources; and transfer is from a higher level of government to a 
lower level or from a level of government to a quasi-independent government 
organisation or the private sector (Cohen and Peterson, 1997; Rondinelli, 1999). 
 
In support of the deepening of decentralisation, Helmsing (2000) further emphasizes 
the “enablement” role of local governments. According to him, the “enablement” role 
requires local government “to facilitate and regulate” the overall framework within 
which other actors can make their most effective contribution to delivery of basic 
services as well as public demands. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 See Conyers (1986).  
5 Particularly: Cheema and Rondinelli, eds. (1983); Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, (1984); Silverman 
(1992); and Rondinelli (1999).  
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2.2 Purpose of Decentralisation 
 
According to Davey (1992), decentralisation has political and economic objectives. 
The political objective relates to the sharing of power through political education, 
maintaining political stability in especially ethnically or culturally heterogeneous 
societies (where communities feel a strong sense of discrimination or disadvantage) 
and promotion of local democracy (as a defence against autocracy in many cases). 
Ethiopia, Russia and Columbia are cases were decentralisation has been used to 
reduce the tendency by perceived disadvantaged regions to secede (World Bank, 
2002)6. Ghana is a case where decentralisation was revived in the late 1980s to 
promote local democracy (Republic of Ghana, 1987). In the UK, decentralisation has 
ensured local control over supervision of elections, education and the police7. 
According to Linder (2002) countries facing cultural, ethnic, linguistic, tensions 
usually adopt a federal political system to expedite decentralisation, particularly the 
political form of decentralisation - usually through the participation of sub-national 
units in decision-making processes at the national level. 
 
The economic objective relates to identifying local priorities, potentialities and 
resources for appropriate resource allocation; redistribution for the benefit of deprived 
populations; promotion of participation; and reduction of the cost of providing 
services (ESCAP, 2000). 
 
 
2.3 Analysis of Decentralisation 
 
The study reviews three analytical frameworks for decentralisation, namely the Type-
Function Framework (TFF), Administrative Design Framework (ADF)8 and the 
Enablement Framework (EF)9. 
 
2.31 Type-Function Framework 
 
The Cheema-Nellis-Rondinelli-Silverman school postulates features of the Type-
Function Framework (TFF)10. The TFF analyses decentralisation according to forms 
and types. By this approach, decentralisation is classified by forms on the basis of 
objectives: political, market, fiscal, spatial and administrative. The combination of 
forms results in types of decentralisation11.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 For discussion of this subject see World Bank (2000).   
7 See Davey, op. cit. 
8 Classified as such by Cohen and Peterson (1999); World Bank (2002) shares elements of this 
classification. 
9 Our own classification, after the subject of Helmsing’s inaugural address as professor of local and 
regional planning at the Faculty of Geographical Science, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands in 
2000; UNDP (1997); Litvack (1998). 
10 The predominant framework for this analysis was pioneered by Rondinelli (1981) 
11 Cohen and Peterson (1999) argue that these three types of administrative decentralisation cover all 
others (like principal agency) that are emphasised by some aspects of the literature. 
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2.311 Forms of decentralisation 
 
a) Political decentralisation 
 
“Political” forms of decentralisation are typically used by political scientists interested 
in democratisation and civil societies to identify the transfer of decision-making 
power to lower level governmental units or to citizens or their elected representatives. 
According to Rondinelli (1999), political decentralisation aims to give citizens and 
their elected representatives more power in public decision-making. It is about 
pluralistic politics and representative government, particularly at the local level. It is 
also about democratisation - giving citizens or their representatives more influence in 
formulating and implementing policies.  
 
Advocates of political decentralisation assume that decisions made with greater 
participation will be better informed and more relevant to diverse interests in society 
than those made only by national political authorities.  The concept implies that the 
selection of representatives from local electoral jurisdictions allows citizens to better 
know their political representatives and allows elected officials to better know the 
needs and desires of their constituents. 
 
Political decentralisation often requires constitutional or statutory reforms; 
strengthening of legislatures; creation of local political units; encouragement of 
effective public interest groups; and, development of pluralistic political parties 
(Ayee, 1995). 
 
b) Market decentralisation 
 
“Market” forms of decentralisation are generally used by economists to analyse and 
promote actions that facilitate the creation of conditions allowing goods and services 
to be produced and provided by market mechanisms sensitive to the revealed 
preferences of individuals. The emphasis is on functions that governments transfer to 
the private sector in the provision of basic services (Litvack and Seddon, 1999).  
 
According to World Bank (2002) market decentralisation, in the form of privatisation 
and deregulation, shifts responsibility for functions from the public to the private 
sector regarding functions that had been primarily or exclusively the responsibility of 
government. The scope of market decentralisation is increasingly being expanded to 
include community groups, co-operatives, private voluntary associations, and other 
nongovernmental organisations. Privatisation and deregulation usually accompany 
economic liberalisation policies. 
 
Privatisation: Privatisation can range in scope from private sector involvement to 
complete divestiture (Van Dijk and Schulte Nordholt, 1994)12.  Privatisation can mean 
allowing private enterprises to perform functions that had previously been in the 
domain of government and ranges from various levels of private sector involvement 
to full divestiture. There is a wide range of levels of private sector involvement and of 
ways in which such functions can be organised, including financing public sector 
programmes through the capital market, with adequate regulation or measures to 
                                                          
12 See also World Bank, Toolkit for Privatisation, http://rru.worldbank.org/Toolkits/ 
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ensure that the central government does not bear the risk for this borrowing, and 
allowing private organisations to participate in the provision of infrastructure. Private 
sector involvement can also mean transferring responsibility for providing services 
from the public to the private sector through the divestiture of state-owned enterprises 
(World Bank, 1994)13. Various options in private sector involvement are discussed in 
Chapter Four and Annex 4.1, with particular reference to water supply and sanitation 
services.  
 
Deregulation: Deregulation reduces the legal constraints on private sector 
involvement in service provision or allows competition among private suppliers for 
services previously provided by the government or by regulated monopolies (Van 
Dijk, 2006). 
 
The benefits of market decentralisation are emphasised by Litvack and Seddon 
(1999). They include improved allocative efficiency - by allowing the mix of services 
and expenditures to be shaped by local user preferences; improved productive 
efficiency through greater cost consciousness at the local level; service delivery 
innovation through experimentation and adaptation to local conditions; improved 
quality, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy owing to user oversight and 
participation in decision-making; and, greater equity through distribution of resources 
toward traditionally marginal regions and groups. 
 
c) Fiscal decentralisation 
 
Financial responsibility is a core component of decentralisation. If local governments 
and private organisations are to carry out decentralised functions effectively; they 
must have adequate revenues – raised locally or transferred from the central 
government – as well as the authority to make expenditure decisions.  
 
Bahl and Linn (1992) and World Bank (2002) each discuss some of the following 
forms of fiscal decentralisation: 
 
• Self-financing or cost recovery through user charges 
• Co-financing or co production, in which users participate in providing services 
and infrastructure through monetary or labour contributions 
• Expansion of local revenues through property, sales or other local taxes or indirect 
charges (for example, betterment taxes) 
• Intergovernmental transfers of general revenues from taxes collected by the 
central government to local governments for general or specific uses 
• Authorisation of municipal borrowing and mobilisation of resources, including 
loan guarantees by central government. 
 
Rondinelli (1999) observes that in many developing countries, local governments or 
administrative units possess the legal authority to impose taxes, but the tax base is so 
weak and dependence on central government subsidies so ingrained that no attempt is 
made to exercise that taxation authority. 
 
 
                                                          
13 See also World Bank, Toolkit for Privatisation, http://rru.worldbank.org/Toolkits/ 
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d) Spatial decentralisation 
 
“Spatial” decentralisation is a term used by regional planners and geographers 
involved in formulating policies and programmes that aim at reducing excessive 
urban concentration in a few large cities by promoting regional growth poles that have 
potential to become centres of manufacturing and agriculture marketing (Lo and 
Salih, 1976). 
 
The literature emphasises that the geography of centralism is the geography of 
underdevelopment. Statistics on growth indicate that the world’s ten largest cities will 
be in poor countries and their inhabitants will be inadequately served by municipal 
authorities with limited administrative and fiscal capacities (Van Dijk, 2001, UNCHS, 
1998). Cohen and Peterson (1999) argue that a policy of centralisation is not capable 
of providing basic needs to a burgeoning urban population, much less support a 
productive infrastructure that can promote economic growth and social welfare. 
Moulaert and Demaziere (1994), McGuirk (1994) and Harris (1995) document how 
globalisation has encouraged more spatial decentralisation. Removal of trade and 
custom barriers, harmonisation of immigration policies, and dominance of the market 
economy in international relations have eroded the strength of national boundaries. 
The result has been increased competition among cities across national boundaries, 
thus enabling decentralisation within cities14. 
 
e) Administrative decentralisation 
 
According to Cohen and Peterson (1997) administrative decentralisation seeks to 
redistribute authority and responsibility for providing public services among different 
levels of government. It is the transfer of responsibility for specified public functions 
from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, 
subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or 
corporations, or area-wide, regional, or functional authorities (World Bank, 2000).  
 
The TFF points out that administrative decentralisation usually means the transfer of 
the following responsibilities: planning, budgeting, staffing, programme and project 
implementation, information management and operation and maintenance (Cohen and 
Peterson, 1999). 
 
The multi-dimensionality of forms of decentralisation 
 
The different forms of decentralisation just described are in practice often found 
together. The multi dimensional nature of decentralisation is portrayed by Parker 
(1995), who argues that the various forms of decentralisation need to be combined in 
order to realise desired development outcomes. Parker suggests a conceptual model, 
the soufflé theory, which incorporates the essential elements of political, fiscal, and 
administrative decentralization as they combine to realise desired outcomes.  
 
Decentralisation is compared with a soufflé that requires just the right combination of 
milk, eggs, and heat to rise. A successful programme of decentralisation should 
                                                          
14 This occurrence of this phenomenon in Europe is also well documented by Commission of the 
European Communities (1993).  
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therefore include the right combination of political, fiscal, and administrative 
elements to improve development outcomes.  
 
Parker emphasises decentralization as a multi-dimensional process that proceeds with 
successes and setbacks. Decentralisation initiatives will therefore be subject to a 
continuous process of modification reflecting changes in social, political and 
economic conditions. There is therefore the need to include all dimensions of 
political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation.  
 
The soufflé theory recognises the impossibility of designing a single strategy for 
decentralisation, and instead illustrates the importance of different decentralisation 
components (forms) and suggests factors that appear to have either a beneficial or 
detrimental effects on development outputs and outcomes. Parker further proposes 
normative criteria for analysing development outcomes of decentralisation, including: 
(i) effectiveness, that is, providing minimum standards of service delivery cost- 
effectively, and targeted toward disadvantaged groups; (ii) responsiveness of 
decentralised institutions to the demands of local communities, at the same time as 
meeting the aims of broader public policy; and (iii) sustainability, as indicated by 
political stability, fiscal adequacy and institutional flexibility. These criteria will also 
be used in this study. 
 
Parker further discusses factors that appear to have a positive impact on development 
outcomes, including: enhanced participation; greater resource mobilisation; more 
institutional capacity-building; and increased accountability. 
 
2.312 Types of Decentralisation 
 
Types of decentralisation are the manifestation of a combination of forms. The 
literature converges on three types of decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation, 
and devolution. 
 
Deconcentration  
 
Deconcentration is the redistribution of functions to non central government levels 
within sector ministries or other sector-specific national agencies (World Bank, 1993). 
It is often considered the weakest type of decentralisation and is used most frequently 
used in unitary states. Within this category however, policies and opportunities for 
local input vary. Deconcentration can merely shift responsibilities from central 
government officials in the capital city to those working in regions, provinces, or 
districts, or it can create strong field administration or local administrative capacity 
under the supervision of central government ministries (Rondinelli, 1999). Despite 
geographical dispersion of ministry offices and central government employees 
stationed in branch offices, deconcentration centralises power within central 
government organisations (World Bank, 1993). 
 
Delegation  
 
Delegation is a more extensive form of decentralisation. It involves the transfer of 
responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions (for 
planning, implementing, or maintaining sector investments, etc.) to semi-autonomous 
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organisations not wholly controlled by the government, but ultimately accountable to 
it. Governments delegate responsibilities when they create public enterprises or 
corporations, housing authorities, transportation authorities, special service districts, 
semi-autonomous school authorities, regional development corporations, or special 
project implementation units. Usually these organisations have a great deal of 
discretion in decision-making. They may be exempt from constraints on regular civil 
service personnel and may be able to charge users directly for services. 
 
Examples of delegation to semi-autonomous government agencies, especially 
parastatal organisations, abound in Africa. To the extent that state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are allowed substantial autonomy with regard to operational decision-making, 
the relationship between such enterprises and the governments which own them are 
understood to be delegated. It is also sometimes the case that functions are delegated 
to an entity, which in turn, deconcentrates responsibility for internal managerial and 
administrative systems to its own subordinate units.  
 
In addition to commercially oriented parastatal organisations, semi-autonomous 
agencies sometimes take the form of special purpose local government units; such as 
Water, Electricity, or Education Districts, transport authorities, wildlife reserves, and 
so forth. Nevertheless, where such districts are created, only the most limited powers 
are normally assigned.  
 
Another, more particular form of delegation, limited to the implementation phase, has 
come to be known as enclave projects. Such projects are mostly dependent on donor 
funding and cease to exist once funds run out. An example is Ghana’s Northern 
Region Integrated Development Project (NORRIP) established in the 1970s, funded 
by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for provision of basic 
services in the deprived north of Ghana, and is now living only in name, due to the 
expiration of CIDA’s support. 
 
The Principal Agency Model 
 
Delegation can be analysed in terms of principal-agent relationship15. The principal 
agency model is useful in explaining the array of actors in a pluralist service delivery 
arrangement (Cohen and Peterson, 1997; Beauvais and Bosset, 2002; Bosset, 1998). 
The model can be visualised spatially as the principal being an administrative agency 
at the centre, which delegates, through legislation or a contract, to a local level 
governmental or private sector institution, the agent, the authority to deliver a service 
to citizens, the clients. Beauvais and Bosset (2002) and Bosset (1998) add to the 
discussion on principal agency relationships through their Decision Space model (see 
Box 2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Drawn from business theories. Lipsey et al. (1990) discuss the benefits and disadvantages of 
principal-agent relationships in business, particularly the reduction of profits when ownership and 
control are separated, than in a perfect world where principals act as their own agents. 
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Box 2.1: The Decision Space Approach (DSA) 
 
Bossert (1998)16 describes the Decision Space Approach (DSA) as focusing on a range of choices in 
the decentralisation process through a comparative analytical tool called the Decision Space Map. In 
this perspective, the central government (or central government agency) as principal sets the goals and 
parameters for policy and programmes. This principal then grants authority and resources to local 
agents – municipal and regional governments, deconcentrated field offices, or autonomous institutions 
– for implementation of its objectives.  
 
The DSA acknowledges that local agents often have their own preferences for the mix of activities and 
expenditures to be undertaken, and respond to a local set of stakeholders and constituents that may 
have different priorities than the national-level principal. Local institutions, therefore, may have 
incentives to evade the mandates established by the central government. Moreover, because agents 
have better information about their own activities than does the principal, they have some margin 
within which to de-emphasise centrally defined responsibilities and pursue their own agendas. The cost 
to the principal of overcoming this information ‘asymmetry’ is often prohibitively high. Within this 
context, the central government seeks to achieve its objectives through the establishment of incentives 
and sanctions that effectively guide agent behaviour without imposing unacceptable losses in efficiency 
and innovation. Diverse mechanisms are employed to this end, including monitoring, reporting, 
inspections, performance reviews, contracts, grants, etc. 
 
One of the mechanisms that the principal may use to influence the agents is to selectively broaden the 
formal decision-space or range of choice of local agents, within the various functions of finance, 
service organisation, human resources, targeting and governance. The central principal voluntarily 
transfers formal authority to the agents in order to promote its policy and objectives. The degree and 
nature of this transfer differs by case, and shapes the functioning of the principal-agent relationship and 
the characteristics of the decentralised system as a whole. 
 
Use of the DSA allows a review of the range of choice over different functions that local governments 
have. It allows comparisons of the extent of decentralisation in-country and between countries. 
Nevertheless, the DSA does not provide sufficient focus on the central government level, and what 
reforms are required there. A total picture of tasks and roles is required to analyse how decentralisation 
should proceed at various levels of government. 
 
Source: Bosset and Beauvais (2002); Bosset (1998) 
 
In the context of decentralisation, principal agency denotes a form of 
intergovernmental relationships in which responsibilities for performing executive 
functions are assigned by one level of government to another on its behalf. Thus, 
central government entities can serve as principal agents of local governments or vice 
versa. If for example, District Assemblies in Ghana serve as principal agents of 
Central Government, they would be exercising responsibilities on behalf of the higher 
authority (World Bank, 1993). 
 
Under the principal agency model, local governments often retain some scope for the 
exercise of limited discretion, largely through their technical staff, with regard to 
specific operational matters; and the option of negotiating the nature of their 
responsibilities and the scope of their limited discretion in that regard. 
 
In some cases, local governments are, in their entirety, no more than agents of central 
governments. The central government appoints executive officers to manage the 
activities of each local government. In such cases, local governments exercise 
executive functions, but not legislative functions. Ambiguity in central-local relations 
                                                          
16 Bossert T. (1998) provides in-depth analysis of the Decision Space Approach to central-local 
relations. 
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can also arise when the legal assignment of responsibilities explicitly emphasises the 
exercise of discretionary authority by local government, but the structure of incentives 
is skewed toward support of principal agency. 
 
Devolution  
 
Devolution is the transfer of authority for decision-making, finance and management 
to quasi-autonomous units of local government with corporate status. Devolution 
usually transfers responsibilities for services to municipalities that elect their own 
mayors and councils, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to 
make investment decisions. In a devolved system, local governments have clear and 
legally recognised geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and 
within which they perform public functions. It is this type of decentralisation that 
underlies most political decentralisation. 
 
The essence of devolution is discretionary authority. In devolved systems, 
responsibilities for a range of operations encompassing more than one sector are 
assigned to local governments. The range of sectoral responsibilities is one factor that 
distinguishes devolution from deconcentration. To the extent that local governments 
have discretionary authority, they can do essentially what they decide to do; bound 
only by broad national policy guidelines and regulations, their own financial, human 
and material capacities, and the physical environment within which they must operate. 
 
An essential characteristic of discretionary authority is that the oversight role of 
Central Governments is limited to ensuring that local governments operate within 
very broad national policy guidelines; at least with respect to those functions for 
which local governments have the authority to exercise discretion. 
 
Hybrid of Types 
 
A mixture or hybrid of types of decentralisation is observed in many countries (World 
Bank 1993, 2002). The hybrid is not a type of decentralisation but a description of 
historical reality in countries that have experimented with different forms of 
decentralisation interventions since independence, resulting in a mixture of types in 
the delivery of particular public sector tasks.  
 
Thus, system-wide institutional arrangements are characterised by the coexistence of 
elements of all types of decentralisation, together with other highly centralised 
government functions. Even within individual sectors, responsibility for government 
decision-making can be distributed in many ways. Some decisions may be centralised 
(e.g. minimum curriculum standards for primary schools and qualifications of 
teachers). Other decisions may be devolved (e.g. location and structural 
characteristics of schools; employment and promotion of teachers; supplemental 
curriculum outside centrally mandated standards). Yet other decisions may be 
deconcentrated (e.g. inspectorate responsible for ensuring adherence to minimum 
curriculum or teacher qualification standards). Some decisions may be delegated (e.g. 
textbook production).  
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Alternative to the TFF is the Administrative Design Framework (ADF), which will be 
discussed now. The ADF brings the analysis of roles and tasks, and their sequencing 
to the fore in the discussion of decentralisation. 
 
2.32 Administrative Design Framework 
 
2.321 Objectives and Components of the ADF 
 
Cohen and Peterson (1997; 1999) are lead proponents of the Administrative Design 
Framework (ADF). The ADF proposes the examination of central-local relations in 
terms of concentration of organisational and institutional roles that implement public 
sector tasks. The central proposition is that providing allocative tasks through 
pluralist, rather that a monopolist design promotes accountability.  
 
The ADF identifies three states that determine the concentration or distribution of 
roles in service delivery: 
 
a) Institutional Monopoly, or centralisation, where roles are concentrated at the 
spatial centre in an organisation or institution 
b) Distributed Institutional Monopoly, or decentralisation to local level governmental 
institutions or private sector firms and organisation through deconcentration, 
devolution, and/or delegation, but where roles are distributed spatially and 
concentrated in one organisation or institution 
c) Institutional pluralism, or decentralisation through deconcentration, devolution, 
and/or delegation, but where roles are shared by two or more organisations or 
institutions, which can be at the spatial centre, distributed, or a combination of 
both. 
 
The ADF argues that the purpose of the public sector is reflected in three objectives 
set out in the literature on public finance: stabilisation, distribution, and allocation17. 
Stabilisation is highly centralised, while allocation is open to be decentralised. 
Effective decentralisation therefore requires that all three objectives be mutually 
supportive.   
 
The focus of the ADF is essentially on roles and sequence of roles that together define 
a strategy for central-local relations. Roles are specific actions (such as monitoring, 
auditing, etc.) that need to be implemented by an organisation or array of 
organisations to carry out a task. Roles allow mapping of tasks from a single 
organisation to many. Roles can be shared by two or more organisations and they can 
be managed by one organisation. Roles thus define the strategy for central-local 
relations as being one of either pluralism or (distributed) monopoly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 See Musgrave, R. A. (1959). 
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2.322 The Analytical Framework of the ADF 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the combination of spatial and role dimensions in the analysis of 
decentralisation. 
 
Figure 2.1: Role and Spatial Dimensions of the ADF 
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Figure 2.1 leads to the following classification, which is basic to the ADF: 
 
i. Quadrant I represents centralisation or institutional monopoly, where roles are 
not shared, but instead are monopolised within one central public institution. 
 
ii. Quadrant III represents distributed institutional monopoly, where roles are not 
shared, but responsibility for roles is spatially distributed. Included in this 
quadrant are the TFF’s deconcentrated and devolved types of decentralisation. 
 
iii. Quadrants II and IV represent institutional pluralism, where roles related to a 
specific task are shared by two or more governmental institutions and/or 
private sector firms or community organisations. Institutional pluralism can be 
spatially centralised as in Quadrant II or decentralised as in Quadrant IV. 
 
The ADF demonstrates that administrative systems are not monolithic. A spatially 
centralised governmental institution can have a monopoly over some roles while 
sharing other roles with spatially centralised or decentralised governmental 
institutions. Over time, dynamic combinations in role performance are possible. 
Further it is possible to have two or more designs (quadrants) for the delivery of roles 
related to the execution of a specific public sector task. For example, establishing a 
financing role at the local level for a particular public sector task may require a priori 
improvement in the central government’s regulatory role of governing capital 
markets. 
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The ADF further proposes a variety of sequences in decentralisation design, 
including:  
 
a) Sequence 1: Quadrant I to Quadrant III: from centralised role and structure to 
spatially decentralised structure but centralised role. Countries implementing 
deconcentration have gone through this sequence and its problems. 
 
b) Sequence 2: Quadrant I to Quadrant II: from centralised role and structure to 
decentralised role and centralised structure.  Examples are found where countries 
have devolved or delegated specific roles related to specific particular stabilisation 
and distribution tasks to other to other central institutions.  
 
c) Sequence 3: Quadrant III to Quadrant IV: from centralised role and decentralised 
structure to decentralised role and structure. This illustrates the situation when 
specific roles related to spatially decentralised tasks are administratively delegated 
to private sector firms or community organisations. This is commonly found in 
large financially distressed urban areas.  
 
d) Sequence 4: Quadrant I to Quadrant IV: from centralised role and structure to 
decentralised role and structure (Cohen and Peterson, 1996).  
 
Roles in Decentralisation 
 
The ADF further outlines the following roles that are necessary to ensure effective 
decentralisation: 
 
a) Leadership – particularly political commitment in the early stages of reform when 
the benefits are not widely valued and are viewed by many as threatening to, or 
when the reform is stalled at critical moments. Leadership lays the groundwork 
for other more task-related roles. 
 
b) Policy/strategy formulation – a vision of preferred outcome coupled with practical 
steps to achieve that vision.  
 
c) Planning – pluralist planning processes are critical to the success of 
decentralisation. Roles for various stages of the planning process can be shared 
among central government, local government, private sector and community 
organisations, depending on the sequence of decentralisation reform. 
 
d) Regulation – Regulation is essential for succeeding in institutional pluralism at 
both central and decentralised levels of government. 
 
e) Oversight/monitoring/management – a role that is frequently shared between 
spatially centralised and decentralised structures. The oversight/monitoring role 
depends on the relative capacity and authority at different levels. Task 
administration is an important role for lower levels of government.  
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f) Financing – depending on the sequence of reform by central government, local 
government, private sector, community organisations and households or a 
combination of these.  
 
g) Brokerage – the brokerage role is where both central and devolved local level 
governmental institutions attempt to harness both market and civil society 
organisations by delegating roles related to the provision of goods and services18. 
The brokerage role is a major defining feature of institutional pluralism. For a 
successful brokerage role, local governments require considerable 
complementarities in the other roles, particularly, leadership, financial 
mobilisation, task management and administration. 
 
Performance criteria 
 
The ADF proposes normative criteria, which allow assessment of performance of a 
system, including: (i) accountability (holding public servants responsible for 
outcomes), (ii) efficiency (the positive relationship of resource outputs to inputs), and 
(iii) effectiveness (a measure of the appropriateness of outputs and outcomes in 
meeting demands of communities as well as the broader aims of public policy)19. 
 
2.333 Pluralism in central-local relations  
 
In its pluralist approach, the ADF defines central-local relations to include 
government, private sector and community organisations, acknowledging that the 
distribution of tasks and roles in pluralist arrangements indicates the need for effective 
partnerships. Partnerships, as a form of pluralism, have the potential of reducing and 
spreading risks associated with investment in local development; they enable different 
sectors to gain access to skills and resources of each other, a combination that 
provides synergy, reduces transaction costs and enhances social responsibility. 
Partnerships also provide additional resources to local governments coping with 
increased responsibilities. When properly implemented, the interface between local 
government and other actors in service provision will diffuse power to the extent that 
no single actor is able to dominate (Mackintosh, 1992; Awortwi, 2002).  
 
Successful partnerships in the provision of basic services have been noted to be 
guided by certain principles (Beauvais and Bosset, 2002; Van Dijk, 2002; Helmsing, 
1997)20. These include political oversight and laws needed to promote accountability. 
Competition is also documented as key to the success of partnerships, whether in 
bidding or in execution of roles and tasks (Crampes and Estache, 1998). In addition, 
transparency measures are essential, including open selection processes, open 
procedures on who awards contracts, certifies completion of work, and authorises 
payment (Awortwi, 2002).   
 
The capacity of local government to manage partnerships is critical to the success of 
pluralist arrangements at the decentralised level of government. Professional staff 
with skills in negotiations, monitoring, and contract management as well as strong 
monitoring, reporting, performance tracking and learning systems are required for this 
                                                          
18 Elaborated extensively by Osborne and Gaebler (1993). 
19 See Cohen and Peterson (1996) for more detailed discussion. 
20 See also Awortwi (2002) and Batley (1996). 
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purpose (Edward, et al., 2001). In addition, the economic and technical capacity of 
partners should meet the challenge adequately. 
 
Furthermore, Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995) emphasise that the economic 
characteristics of the service should inform the nature of partnerships. Regarding 
water and sanitation, characteristics of externalities, economies of scale and merit 
good are particularly essential in ensuring that partnerships lead to the achievement of 
universal coverage in the shortest possible time. (See Chapter 4 for discussion on the 
economic characteristics of water and sanitation).  
 
2.33 The Enablement Framework 
 
The Enablement Framework (EF) is elaborated by Helmsing (2000)21 about the need 
for local governments to focus on an enabling role in the provision of basic services 
as well as in the realization of other development objectives. Helmsing (2000) 
develops further these propositions with a strong focus on the role of community 
organisations in local governance.  
 
He sums up issues that have emerged in the rethinking of government in the 1990s, 
including: (a) which institutions are best suited to identify demand (voting, the 
market, bureaucracies, NGOs or CBOs); (b) the number of ways in which public 
services can be delivered by a variety of actors, given government failure, 
technological changes for reducing market failure, and organisational and managerial 
innovations that permit unbundling of services; (c) demands by organised groups in 
society and of citizens in general to participate in the public decision making; (d) 
appreciation of indigenous institutions through which communities organise basic 
services; and, (e) the increasing strength of the NGO/CBO non-profit sector in 
strength in the delivery of basic services; (f) limitations of the of the new public 
management approaches in addressing only issues of efficiency (such as by greater 
involvement of the private sector in service provision)22. and not the wider 
dimensions of local governance. Thus the EF is complementary to the ADF in several 
ways; and, particularly complements the notion of pluralism with its strong emphasis 
on the role of community organizations in service provision. 
 
A central concept of the EF is the role of government as an 'enabler'. Rather than 
engaging in direct intervention and deliver (public) services, government is to 
facilitate and regulate the framework in which other actors (or service providers) can 
make their most effective contribution. This new role poses new demands on 
governments. The question is not so much more or less government but a qualitatively 
different one (UNDP, 1997). The new type of governments should create legal, 
regulatory and financial frameworks and institutional arrangements in which private 
enterprises, households and community groups can play an increasing role in meeting 
and basic service needs. Eliminating or mitigating market failures are key features of 
government's enabling role (World Bank, 1991). In the perspective of the EF, 
explicitly grounding the state in indigenous institutions would strengthen external 
responsiveness and accountability of officials and create dynamism in both state and 
civil society institutions.  
                                                          
21 Similar ideas can be found in Litvack (1998), Evans (1996) and World Bank (1991), World Bank 
(1994). 
22 Caiden (1996) discusses in detail views from the New Public Management school.  
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Enablement concerns a fundamentally different way in which government conducts 
its affairs. Instead of self-contained, hierarchical bureaucratic processes, mediated by 
more or less democratically elected politicians, enabling governments seek to involve 
other actors in the formulation and/or implementation of government policies and 
programmes. An enabling strategy should allow each actor to perform its role in the 
most efficient way possible, leaving governments to leverage its limited resources and 
ensuring balanced presentation of both market and community enablement. Increased 
interaction between public and other actors is expected to generate synergy.  
 
With regards to community role in service provision, enabling practices could range 
from contracting out, community planning, community leadership, community self 
help to community participation in local government.  
 
The EF emphasizes that decentralisation is about the emergence of complex networks 
of multiple (and unequal) actors. Governance therefore needs systemic co-ordination 
by negotiation, both horizontal and vertical, for steering the development of the 
network. This remains a role for government. Thus, decentralisation has ceased to be 
a local government affair and has turned into a local governance issue. 
 
In an attempt to operationalise the concept of EF, Helmsing (2000) proposes the 
assessment of the degree of enablement around a wide range of issues, including:  
 
(a) Legalisation of enablement in government;  
(b) Recurrent and investment co-financing of community organizations in the 
provision of basic services;  
(c) Local government budget provisions, including transfers to community 
organisations;  
(d) (Co-) management of public funds; 
(e) formal administrative coordination mechanisms;  
(f) Community planning practices (commitment of resources and  place of 
community action plans  in LG planning);  
(g) Stimulation of community participation and management in local 
administration. 
 
2.4 Strengths and Challenges of the TFF, ADF23 and EF 
 
Cohen and Peterson (1997; 1999) discuss the strengths and challenges of the TFF and 
ADF. First both analyse the forms and types of decentralisation. Both frameworks also 
focus on organisational structures (for example, central and local governments) and 
functions.  However there are differences. The central issue for the ADF is not so 
much the spatial relationship of structures as is the case with the TFF, but the role 
relationships among different levels of government and private sector organisations 
relative to a public sector task. The ADF views decentralisation as limiting the 
monopoly of roles. It focuses less on the importance of spatial distance between 
structures.  
 
The TFF is useful in identifying the institutional location of transferred powers. 
Nevertheless, it does not tell much about the range of choices that is granted to the 
                                                          
23 This section relies extensively on Cohen and Peterson (1997) and Rondinelli (1999). 
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decision-makers at decentralised levels. The TFF tends to view decentralisation as one 
event that transfers power at one time and does not strongly portray the usual dynamic 
relationship of changing powers between the centre and the periphery. 
 
The TFF leads analysts to consider the types of decentralisation as end-states and to 
give inadequate attention to the process. Furthermore, the TFF fails to emphasise the 
fact that devolution and delegation in particular, must draw on an array of institutions 
and organisations that can carry out roles related to public sector tasks being 
decentralised, and that such reforms can only be achieved through a long process that 
involves recombining governmental and non-governmental institutions and 
organisations in ways that carry out roles efficiently, effectively and accountably. 
 
Another observation by Cohen (1999) is the insensitivity of the TFF to distinctions or 
variations in the managerial, technical and financial capacity of institutions to which 
public sector tasks have been decentralised. As a result, unrealistic assumptions are 
often made about the personnel and financial capacity of non-central and private 
sector institutions and organisations. Again, the TFF does not devote much attention 
to roles that have to be in central hands. It does not devote much attention to the 
possibility of such roles being shared by a range of institutional and organisational 
role players.  
 
Nevertheless, the TFF by its emphasis on types and forms, as well as on 
organisational structures and location lays the foundation for analysing 
decentralisation. 
 
Regarding the ADF, a challenge is the possibly high coordination costs in institutional 
pluralism. A second challenge is how to ensure the required strength and interest of 
civil society organisations and private sector firms to collaborate in the delivery of 
services, particularly in countries with a weak private sector. A third challenge is how 
to identify and strengthen complementary roles at the centre to keep decentralisation 
on track.  
 
Nevertheless, the use of the ADF to analyse decentralisation has several advantages, 
including the insight given into the level of accountability and other normative criteria 
that a given strategy can be expected to generate; the greater focus on roles for the 
provision and production of public services24 that an emphasis on institutional 
pluralism enables; and the required focus on distribution of roles to effectively and 
efficiently carry out a particular public sector task.  
 
Moreover, the reality of the hybrid type of decentralisation reveals the need for a 
more flexible approach to the analysis of central-local relations. As Rondinelli (1999) 
puts it: “centralisation and decentralisation are not either-or conditions. In most 
countries an appropriate balance of centralisation and decentralisation is essential to 
the effective and efficient functioning of government. Not all functions can or should 
be financed and managed in a decentralised fashion.”  
 
                                                          
24 See Osborne and Gaebler (1993) for argument that government needs to ensure provision of basic 
services through for example, regulation, and not their actual production, which could be left to non 
state actors. 
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According to Cohen (1999), what appears to be the central point for analysis is 
therefore not just the type, but which tasks and roles are to be performed. This issue is 
the subject for discussion in subsequent chapters. 
 
Helmsing (2000) also discusses the challenges of the Enablement Framework. 
Empirical findings from 23 urban communities in seven countries show that it is 
easier to become more enabling in the planning sphere but that it is comparatively 
more difficult to change local government administrative and financial practices, as 
well as to manage multi-actor based delivery of basic services. Not all actors and the 
networks they form necessarily have a democratic character and capture and respond 
to collective preferences and priorities. Furthermore, service networks may not 
represent all relevant groups and interests. Moreover, competition in and for markets 
may not always exist. 
 
These bring to the fore several questions: Have self-organising networks in the 
delivery of services really emerged in low-income countries, for which government 
can provide enabling services? What are their dynamics of such networks, taking into 
account the likelihood of considerable inequalities among various actors? Do local 
governments have the regulatory capability to steer the service delivery networks? 
Are partnerships resulting in more improved service delivery – at for example, lower 
cost and higher quality than conventional public delivery? 
 
2.5 Summary of Issues in the Analysis of Decentralisation 
 
In spite of various perspectives, there is consensus in the literature on factors that 
need to be considered in the analysis of decentralisation. First, is the forms that 
decentralisation take, particularly with regards to political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation. (The study treats spatial decentralisation as the manifestation of the 
three forms in space.) Privatisation is also a key component and is discussed as part of 
pluralism under administrative decentralisation or as part of discussions on market 
reforms.  
 
Second, is the analysis of types of decentralisation. The study focuses on the three 
main types of decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation and devolution.  
 
Third, is the examination of clarity in the definition and distribution of roles in service 
delivery. Where there are constraints with immediate distribution of roles towards the 
objective of decentralisation, sequencing, particularly how roles will be shared over 
(specified) time to reduce monopoly in service provision should be evident in a 
country’s plan.  
 
Fourth, is the analysis of decentralisation beyond distribution of roles in the 
government set-up to include the existence of pluralism - whether (local) government 
is working together with the private sector and civic groups to provide services; and 
the extent to which it is feasible for government to play an enabling rather than a 
direct production role in service delivery. 
 
Finally, the analysis of decentralisation should look at performance in the provision of 
services. Several criteria reflect better performance, including changes in 
effectiveness, efficiency and accountability.   
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CHAPTER 3  
 
3.0 DECENTRALISATION IN GHANA: EVOLUTION AND CURRENT 
FORM 
 
In this chapter, we review the evolution of decentralisation in Ghana from the colonial 
era, which began in 1844 to present times. In addition, we use secondary sources to 
discuss progress with implementation of latest wave of decentralisation in the country. 
The objective is to provide the country context of the research in terms of 
decentralisation, and to provide a basis for further analysis in subsequent chapters.  
 
3.1 Evolution of the Local Government System in Ghana25 
 
Prior to colonialism, kings and chiefs ruled nations and kingdoms in West Africa. The 
present day Ghana was for example, dominated by several kingdoms, which had their 
borders extending to what today are Ghana’s neighbours. Famous among them were 
the Mole-Dagbani in the north, Ashanti in the middle belt and Ga, Ewe and Ahanta in 
the south. Colonialism introduced the local government system, around trading towns 
(Axim, Cape Coast and Accra to start with). This has evolved into several directions 
to date (Arhin, 1979; Yakubu, 2001; Awoonor, 1990).  
 
The evolution of the local government system can be classified into five (inter-woven) 
phases: (a) The Colonial or pre-independence era, 1844-1951, (b) Era of the First 
Government of Ghana, 1951-1965, (c) Era of Review, 1966-1974, (d) Further 
Decline, 1974-1988, and (e) the Current Era, 1998-2002 (MLGRD, 2002; Nkrumah, 
2000; Ayee, 1988; MLGRD, 1996; Nkrumah, 1998). 
 
3.11 Colonial or pre-independence era (1844-1951) 
 
A take-over by the British in 1844 brought changes in governance in what was then 
referred to as the Gold Coast26. A Municipal Ordinance established municipalities in 
the coastal towns of the Gold Coast in 1859. Introduction of indirect rule in 1878 
expanded local government to include a “legal” basis for chiefs to carry out some 
limited local government functions (including judicial, legislative and rating 
activities) within the so-called Native Authorities (or chiefdoms), but under the 
direction and control of British Government Agents and Provincial Commissioners.   
 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the policy of indirect rule (through chiefs) was 
variously modified to enable the local councils include the appointment of 
professional and technical persons from the local areas; the local councils to be 
constituted of two-thirds elected representatives and one-third appointed chiefs; make 
the paramount chiefs, presidents of the local councils; and, re-demarcate the areas of 
                                                          
25 This Chapter is dependent on several sources including: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Constitutions of the 
Republic of Ghana; various laws: Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462); Civil Service Law, 1993 
(PNDC Law 327); the National Development Planning Commission Act, 1994 (Act 479); the National 
Development Planning Systems Act 1994 (Act 480); the Local Government (Urban, Zonal and Town 
Councils and Unit Committees) (Establishment) Instrument of 1994, LI 1589; and the District 
Assemblies’ Common Fund Act, 1993 (Act 455); World Bank (1993), MLGRD (1996) and Laryea-
Adjei (2001). 
26 The British-controlled territories excluded parts of the Volta Region and northern sections of the 
present day Ghana (Awoonor, 1990). 
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jurisdiction to make them economically viable. In 1943, a new Ordinance established 
elected town councils for the four largest cities, namely, Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-
Takoradi and Cape Coast.  
 
3.12 Era of the First Government of Ghana (1951-1965)  
 
The era was initially characterised by a two-tier local government structure consisting 
of 280 district, municipal, urban and local councils. The multiplicity of local 
jurisdictions, each with relatively small populations, was viewed by many officials as 
a weakness. The system was therefore changed in 1961 to a one-tie system of 140 
larger district councils. By early 1966, the local government system consisted of three 
City Councils, three Municipal Councils, 22 Urban Councils and 115 Local Councils. 
 
A Local Government Service Commission was created in 1958, with the 
responsibility of hiring, firing and paying local government employees. Those 
responsibilities were transferred to a newly established Ministry of Local 
Government. Central Government took over responsibility for collecting property 
taxes on behalf of local government. Central Government’s funding for local 
government was successively reduced and transfers from the centre to local 
governments suffered increasingly long delays. Centralisation deepened at the end of 
the era. 
 
3.13 Era of Review (1966-1973) 
 
This era was an extended period of transition characterised by three different sets of 
enquiry into the features of decentralisation in the country (that is, the Akuffo-Addo 
Commission of 1966, the Mills-Odoi Commission of 1967 and the Siriboe 
Commission of 1968). Subsequently, the decentralised system was reformulated into a 
four-tier structure consisting of Regional, District and Local Councils and Town and 
Village Development Committees.  The District Councils (40 in number) were made 
the main focus of local government, with rating, administrative and executive powers 
for local level development and governance.  Local Councils that had two-thirds 
elected members and one-third as appointed chiefs worked together with about 3960 
Town and Village Development Committees to implement development activities. 
Central government agencies nevertheless continued to control human and financial 
resources that were meant for local governments. 
 
In effect, a clear distinction between central and local government institutions was 
maintained from the immediate post independence era to 1973 (Nkrumah, 2000). 
There were two different systems: one based in the capital city Accra with 
deconcentrated branches at the local level and the other separate and distinct, based in 
well-defined localities and referred to as Local Government (a blurred form of 
delegation). Central government bodies at the local level dealt with national matters. 
They had less clearly defined powers in terms of local responsibilities, but had a much 
better presence because of their de facto position as bodies of central government and 
their access to qualified staff and funds. Decision-making took an unduly long time as 
it was placed in the hands of the centre.  
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District Councils that had been set up and vested with authority specifically for local 
matters operated at the local level parallel to deconcentrated agencies and their 
ministries. Their functions were blurred with those of the deconcentrated agencies. 
They barely had resources or skills to operate. The large number and therefore small 
sizes of local councils made it difficult to raise enough revenue to finance service 
delivery. Popular participation in local councils was not emphasised. Thus, local 
government bodies created an image of ineptitude and incompetence; an image still 
exploited by opponents of decentralisation (Nkrumah, 2000).  
 
3.14 Further decline (1974-1988) 
 
The era started with another Commission of Enquiry, the Okoh Commission, which 
endorsed the recommendations of the previous Mills-Odoi Commission. The Local 
Government Administration (Amendment) Decree, NRCD 258 was instituted in 1974.  
 
The 1974 local government system sought to abolish the distinction between local and 
central government at the local level and create one common monolithic structure 
(District Councils). The law provided for the decentralisation of the following sectors: 
Administration, Agriculture, Education, Survey and Town Planning, Social Welfare 
and Community Development, Public Health, Engineering, Fire Service and Sports. 
Furthermore, some hitherto small local councils were merged to create larger districts, 
resulting in the creation of 65 District Council areas. The regional level of 
government was strengthened as the start of decentralisation, a feature that 
jeopardised eventual devolution to districts. 
 
Attempts at the fusion of central and local governments and decentralisation of 
specific services resulted in devolution to the regional level. Decision-making was 
done at the regional level. Again, implementation was planned for mostly at the 
regional level, but with the support of districts. 
 
Popular participation at the local level was not emphasised in the 1974 model. Two-
thirds of Councillors were government nominees and one-third represented traditional 
authorities. Also, the attempt to integrate all agencies of line ministries at the local 
level under the authority of the district administration met difficulties. The Ministry of 
Local Government (MLG) was then significantly weaker than the line ministries, 
which continued to maintain their own units at the local level. Six changes of 
Ministers between 1972 and 1977 weakened the capacity of the MLG to implement 
the reforms. Two functions assigned to the MLG in 1974 (revenue sources, and 
statistics, research and programming) were taken away in 1978. The primary 
responsibility of the MLG continued to be general administration, an inspectorate 
unit, and property tax valuation. The result was a weak ministry of local government 
relative to other central government ministries, which made actual operational role of 
local governments peripheral to the deconcentrated operations of central government 
line ministries. Even with their limited scope, the discretion of local governments was 
limited by excessive controls exercised by the MLG. 
 
Thus, until the current phase of reforms which started in 1988, decentralisation has 
not been operational on a sustained basis in Ghana since its introduction in the mid 
nineteenth century. Apart from the 1951-1965 period, where some political and fiscal 
authority were devolved from central to the local level, management of towns and 
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cities have largely been in the hands of the centre. A major feature of decentralisation 
reforms prior to 1988 was the numerous review Commissions, whose 
recommendations were largely shelved. The exception was the 1974 reform, which 
tried to implement devolution, albeit, in the context of an extremely weak MLG, the 
coordinating body and subsequent conflicting legislation on service provision 
(MLGRD, 1999). 
 
 
3.2 The Current Era of Reform (1988-2004)27 
 
The Government of Ghana started a new wave of reform in 1988 based on lessons 
from the 1970s.  In 1988, the Government embarked on the implementation of a new 
policy to decentralise the system of Government with the enactment of the Local 
Government Law, 1988 (PNDC Law 207).  The thrust of the law was to devolve 
power and resources to the district level and to promote popular participation in 
governance (Ayee, 1995). The Civil Service Law of 1993 (PNDC Law 327) 
subsequently designated the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
as the secretariat for overseeing the implementation and monitoring of the 
decentralisation process. Furthermore, the main features of the decentralisation policy 
were enshrined in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, specifically in Chapter 6 (Directive 
Principles of State Policy) and Chapter 20. The legal basis for the implementation of 
decentralisation was further strengthened by revising PNDC Law 207 into the Local 
Government Act (Act 462 of 1993), which sought more clearly to define the functions 
of local governments. 
 
3.21 Features of Decentralisation in the Current Era 
 
Provisions of the 1992 Constitution establish the policy objectives for decentralisation 
in Ghana and the means to achieve them. They are classified under the main forms of 
decentralisation, as follows: 
 
Overall objective 
 
a) “Local government and administration … shall, as far as practicable, be 
decentralised” (Article 240 [1]); 
 
b) “A District Assembly shall be the highest political authority in the district, and 
shall have deliberative, legislative, and executive powers” (Article 241[3]). 
 
c) “Parliament shall enact appropriate laws to ensure that functions, powers, 
responsibilities and resources are at all times transferred from the Central 
Government to local government units in a coordinated manner” (Article 
240[2a]); 
 
d) Parliament to ensure that local governments have the capacity to “plan, initiate, 
coordinate, manage and execute policies in respect of all matters affecting the 
people within their areas, with a view to ultimately achieving localisation of those 
activities.” To that end, “a sound financial base with adequate and reliable 
                                                          
27 Based on Republic of Ghana (1992), Constitution of the Fourth Republic, Accra; PNDC Law 208; 
Local Government Act of 1993, Act 462; National Development Planning (Systems) Act of 1994. 
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sources of revenue” shall be established of local governments and as “as far as 
practicable, persons in the service of local government shall be subject to the 
effective control of local authorities” (Article 240[2b,c,d]). 
 
Political features 
 
e) “To ensure the accountability of local government authorities, people in 
particular local government areas shall, as far as practicable, be afforded the 
opportunity to participate effectively in their governance” (Article 240 [2][e]);  
 
f) The President, in consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest 
groups in the district shall appoint not more than thirty per cent of all the 
members of the District Assembly (Article 243[d]); 
 
g) The President shall appoint a District Chief Executive for every district with the 
prior approval of not less than two-thirds majority of members of the Assembly 
present and voting (Article 243[1]); 
 
h) The member or members of Parliament from the constituencies that fall within the 
area of authority of the District Assembly [shall be] members [of the District 
Assembly] without the right to vote (Article 242[b]); 
 
Fiscal features 
 
i) Parliament shall annually make provision for allocation of not less than five per 
cent of the total revenues of Ghana to the District Assemblies for development 
(Article 252[2]) 
 
j) Parliament shall by law prescribe the functions of the District Assembly and the 
levying and collection of taxes, rates, duties and fees (Article 245) 
 
k) “a sound financial base with adequate and reliable sources of revenue” shall be 
established of local governments (Article 240). 
 
Administrative features 
 
l) Parliament shall enact laws and take steps necessary for further decentralisation 
of the administrative functions and projects of the Central Government but shall 
not exercise any control over the District assemblies that is incompatible with 
their decentralised status or otherwise contrary to the law (Article 254) 
 
m) Parliament shall by law provide for the taking of such measures as are necessary 
to enhance the capacity of local government authorities to [carry out their 
responsibilities] (Article 240[2b]); 
 
n) Parliament may by law make provision for the redrawing of the boundaries of 
districts or for reconstituting the districts (Article 241[2]); 
 
o) Parliament to ensure that local governments have the capacity to “plan, initiate, 
coordinate, manage and execute policies in respect of all matters affecting the 
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people within their areas, with a view to ultimately achieving localisation of those 
activities.” To that end, “…as far as practicable, persons in the service of local 
government shall be subject to the effective control of local authorities” (Article 
240[2b, c, d]). 
 
3.22 Structure of the Current Local Government System in Post 198828 
 
The structure of the current local government system is as follows: 
 
Central government level 
 
Key organisations at the centre that impact directly on the cross-sectoral operations of 
District Assemblies are: Office of the President, Parliament, Ministry of Local 
Government & Rural Development (MLGRD), National Development Planning 
Commission (NDPC), Ministry of Finance (MoF), Public Services Commission 
(PSC), Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS) and sector ministries. 
 
The roles of the President and Parliament have been described in previous sections. 
Roles of other central government agencies regarding decentralisation are as follows:  
 
a) The MLGRD is responsible for:  
 
(i) developing policies and legislation with respect to local government;  
(ii) supervising and monitoring of local administration;  
(iii) monitoring the implementation of Act 462; including assisting District 
Assemblies in drafting bye-laws and vetting such bye-laws;  
(iv) auditing of District Assemblies;  
(v) providing guidelines to District Assemblies with respect to 
procurement, property tax rates, etc.  
(vi) issue Guidelines for the utilisation of the DACF; facilitating the 
provision of offices and residential accommodation for District 
Assemblies. 
 
b) The NDPC is responsible for:  
 
(i) leading development policy and plan preparation for the country;  
(ii) advising the President of development issues;  
(iii) issuing Guidelines for the preparation of district and sector plans;  
(iv) provides technical support in the training of district planners;  
(v) monitors implementation of plans. 
 
c) The MoF is responsible for the management of the economy. It is thus 
responsible for planning for revenue and expenditures (within the adopted 
development policy). The MoF is also responsible for timely transfer of the 
DACF and ceded revenue to District Assemblies. 
 
                                                          
28 Based on MLGRD (1996); National Development Planning (Systems) Act of 1994. 
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d) Other sector ministries (Works, Education, Health, etc.): The role of other 
ministries in planning is in the preparation of sector plans, which the NDPC is 
supposed to harmonise with district plans into the national plan (Act 480). 
 
e) The PSC and OHCS share the responsibility over all government positions and 
staff.  
 
Regional level of governance 
 
Unlike former times, the role of the region is limited to coordination of district plans 
and monitoring use of monies allocated to District Assemblies by central government 
(see Table 3.1). Each region is managed by Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs), 
which comprise the Regional Minister, representatives of the Regional House of 
Chiefs, District Chief Executives in the region and Presiding Members of District 
Assemblies in the region. Central governments departments at the regional level are 
considered departments of the RCC. 
 
Table 3.1:  Roles of the various levels of Government  
 
Level of 
Government 
Political Authority Roles 
Centre/National Presidency, Cabinet, 
Ministerial Institutions and 
Public Sector Commissions 
(e.g. NDPC) 
National sector policy formulation,  
programming and budgeting, rating, 
standard setting and monitoring, sector 
evaluation, national projects 
Region  Regional Co-ordinating 
Council 
Harmonisation, co-ordination and 
monitoring of district plans 
District District Assembly Local level planning within context of 
national policies; rating; basic service 
delivery promulgating bye-laws to regulate 
process of development 
Town  Urban, Zonal, Town/Area 
Councils 
Day-to-day administration and 
management of services 
Unit  Unit Committee Mobilisation for participation in 
implementation and enforcement 
 
District Assemblies 
 
District Assemblies are of three types: 
 
(i) Metropolitan Assemblies, which are one town/city District Assemblies serving 
population of over 250,000 (1984 figures29). There are four Metropolitan Assemblies: 
Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale. 
(ii) Municipal Assemblies, which are one town/city District Assemblies with a population 
of between 95,000 and 250,000 (1984 figures).  
(iii) District Assemblies, which serve a population of 75,000 (1984 figures).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 Classification of Metropolitan/Municipal/District Assemblies by population size is based on the 1984 
census data. Government is yet to adjust to the 2000 population census data. 
 45
The District Assembly is made up of:  
 
(i) The Assembly or legislature, comprising two-thirds elected and one-third appointed 
members. Assembly sessions are chaired by the Presiding Member;  
(ii) The Executive Committee, which implements resolution of the Assembly, exercises 
the planning function of the District Assembly and sees to the administration of the 
Assembly. The Executive Committee is chaired by the District Chief Executive 
(mayor) and comprises Assembly members. Heads of Departments may be invited to 
meetings, but with no voting rights.  
(iii) Sub Committees support the Executive Committee. They are the Development 
Planning, Social Services, Works, Finance, Justice and Security, and any other that 
the Assembly may add.  
(iv) Departments of the Assembly, which are responsible for actual service delivery 
 
Section 10[3] of Act 462 states the functions of District Assemblies as follows:  
 
• be responsible for the overall development of the district and shall ensure the 
preparation and submission through the Regional Coordinating Council for 
approval30 of the development plan to the NDPC and budget to the Minister of 
Finance for the district; 
• formulate and execute plans, programmes and strategies for the effective 
mobilisation of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district; 
• promote and support productive activity and social development in the district and 
remove obstacles to development; 
• initiate programmes for the development of basic infrastructure and provide 
municipal works and services in the district; 
• be responsible for the development, improvement and management of human 
settlements and the environment in the district; 
• in cooperation with national and local security agencies, be responsible for the 
maintenance of security and public safety in the district; 
• ensure ready access to the courts and public tribunals in the district for the 
promotion of justice; 
• initiate, sponsor or carry out such studies as may be necessary for the discharge of 
any of the functions conferred by the Act or any other enactment; and 
• Perform such other functions as may be provided under any other enactment. 
 
Sub district structures 
 
Sub district structures have been established to promote popular participation and 
effective performance of the functions of the District Assembly (see Figure 3.1). They 
are as follows: 
 
(i) Sub Metropolitan Councils: these are immediately below Metropolitan 
Assemblies 
                                                          
30 “Approval” of development is interpreted as checking for harmony with national priorities and not 
refusing District Assemblies central grants for implementation. The disbursement of the DACF is not 
linked to the “approval” of district plans. In fact, the concept of “approval” of district plans by the 
NDPC is yet to be made explicit. See NDPC (2002). 
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(ii) Town/Area Councils: Town Councils normally serve settlements with 
population between 5,000 and 15,000. Town Councils in Metropolitan 
Assemblies are markedly different in size, sometimes exceeding 
50,000. Area Councils are below the District Assembly, serving a 
number of settlements/villages which are grouped together but whose 
individual settlements have a population of less than 5,000. 
(iii) Zonal Councils: these are in Municipal Assemblies for which the 
establishment of Town/Area Councils will raise problems of 
administrative structures. Zonal Councils are based commonality of 
interests, population of 3,000 and identifiable streets and landmarks as 
boundaries. 
(iv) Urban Councils: these are located in ‘ordinary’ District Assemblies 
and cater for settlements with population above 15,000 and which are 
cosmopolitan in character. 
(v) Unit Committees: Unit Committees for the base structure of the local 
government system. A unit is normally a settlement or a group of 
settlements with a population of between 500 and 1,000 in rural areas, 
and a 1,500 in urban areas. Unit Committees are supposed to mobilise 
communities for self-help projects. They are also required to support 
registration of births and deaths and revenue generation. 
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Figure 3.1: The Local Government Structure in Ghana (MLGRD, 1996) 
 
Region: 
Monitoring role 
REGIONAL CO-ORDINATING COUNCILS (RCCs) 
¾ Covers all MMDAs and sub-district structures in 
a region 
¾ Monitor, co-ordinate and evaluate the 
performance of the District Assemblies in the  
region 
¾ Monitor the use of all monies allocated to the 
District Assemblies by any agency of the central 
government 
¾ Review and co-ordinate public service generally 
in the region. 
METROPOLITAN 
ASSEMBLY 
¾ Pop. : Over 250,000 
¾ One-Town/City 
¾ Contains Sub-Metropolitan 
District Councils 
¾ Administrative, Legislative, 
Executive, Planning and Rating 
Authority
MUNICIPAL 
ASSEMBLY 
¾ Pop. : 95,000 – 
250,000 (1984) 
¾ One-Town 
¾ Administrative, 
Legislative, Executive, 
Planning and Rating. 
DISTRICT ASSEMBLY 
¾ Pop. : 75,000-95,000 (1984) 
¾ Contains Urban/ Town/Area 
Councils 
¾ Administrative, Legislative, 
Executive, Planning and 
Rating Authority. 
SUB-METROPOLITAN 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 
¾ Administrative, and Revenue 
collection 
¾ 25% Revenue retention 
arrangement 
¾ Revenue sharing with District 
Assembly 
¾ Annual Estimates preparation. 
 
 
TOWN/AREA COUNCILS 
Suburbs of the Sub-
Metropolitan District 
¾ Pop. : Over 15,000 
¾ Administration 
¾ Enforcement 
¾ Mobilisation  
ZONAL COUNCILS 
Zones or parts of the one – 
Town Assemblies 
¾ Mobilisation  
¾ Enforcement  
URBAN/TOWN/AREA 
COUNCILS 
¾ Settlements with population over 
15,000 
¾ Town Council : (No. 250) 
settlements with population of more 
than 5,000 but less than 15,000 
¾ Area Council : (No. 826) Groups of 
villages and smaller towns which 
are geographically contiguous with 
population less or more than 5,000 
¾ Administration 
¾ E f t
UNIT COMMITTEES  
¾ Parts of Towns, Zones or 
Whole Villages  
¾ Pop. : 500 – 2,000 
¾ Mobilisation  
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3.23 What type of decentralisation is advocated for? 
 
Provisions of the 1992 Constitution, listed above, suggest a framework almost akin to 
devolution of decision-making responsibilities to District Assemblies, “for all matters 
regarding people of their districts” (MLGRD, 1996; MLGRD, 1999). The 
Constitution establishes a framework for local control over human and financial 
resources that are necessary for development at that level. The exception is in political 
decentralisation where central control is exercised in the appointment of the mayor 
and a third of councillors. This remains an issue in Ghana, a subject for subsequent 
discussion. 
 
Various Acts of Parliament have been enacted to define the scope of this proposed 
type of decentralisation in Ghana and to facilitate its implementation. 
 
a) Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) – specifies the design of the local 
government system 
b) Civil Service Law, 1993 (PNDC Law 327) – that provided guidance on 
administrative linkages and personnel management; 
c) National Development Planning Systems Act 1994 (Act 480) – described 
the features of the national decentralised planning system;  
d) National Development Planning Commission Act, 1994 (Act 479) – 
established the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) to 
operate and manage a decentralised planning system, where the national 
plan was based on harmonised district and national priorities;  
e) Local Government (Urban, Zonal and Town Councils and Unit 
Committees) (Establishment) Instrument of 1994, LI 1589 – established 
political and administrative structures at the sub-district level;  
f) District Assemblies’ Common Fund Act, 1993 (Act 455) – provided 
guidelines for the management of a central grant of 5% of national tax 
revenues transferred local governments, a requirement of the 1992 
Constitution.  
 
Thus, reforms are anticipated at levels of both central and local governments to 
promote decentralisation. Popular participation is also anticipated through sub-district 
structures and representation at decision-making meetings. Sharing of resources 
between the centre and local governments is catered for by the 1992 Constitution. 
Unlike the previous era, the authority of District Assemblies in planning, law making, 
rating and service delivery are clearly stated in Acts of Parliament. The role of the 
Region is redefined to avoid undermining of the authority of District Assemblies. 
 
It appears therefore that bottlenecks in the implementation of decentralisation reforms 
since 1988 are therefore not due to the absence of laws. Gaps in decentralisation 
therefore point to challenges with implementation of the law. 
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3.3 Progress with Decentralisation So far31  
 
Based on secondary sources of data, the study assesses progress with decentralisation 
since 1988 according to the three main forms, that is, political, administrative and 
fiscal decentralisation. 
 
3.31 Political Decentralisation 
 
The implementation of political decentralisation has been the most emphasised since 
reforms started in 1988. Political decentralisation has involved the establishment of 
local government structures and the promotion of advocacy or popular participation at 
the various levels of decision making (MLGRD, 2002).  Popular participation is 
promoted through the election of all Unit Committee members as well as two-thirds 
of the District Assembly. Urban, Zonal and Town/Area Councils consist of 
representatives of MMDAs, Unit Committees, and thirty per cent appointees. 
Elections are supposed to be non-partisan, though not so in practice. Legislative 
powers have also been provided to District Assemblies – to issue by-laws. 
 
However, the appointment of the mayor by the President of the country has been 
questioned as undermining local participation and accountability (Laryea-Adjei, 
2001). There appears to be a trend of mayors responding more to central government 
requests than local demands. Local level spending patterns have thus been so aligned. 
NDPC (2002b) also point to a significant gap between district plans that are approved 
by District Assemblies and their actual expenditures. A second challenge is the 
determination of a manageable level of participation. It has been administratively and 
financially difficult to establish all of the required 16,000 Unit Committees.  A third 
challenge is how to move beyond governmental structures of participation, that is, in 
having (equally) structured participation of the private sector and civil society 
(MLGRD, 2002).  
 
3.32 Administrative Decentralisation 
 
Administrative decentralisation has been planned to involve restructuring of central 
government agencies, transferring defined functions and their related powers and 
resources to the local government, and ensuring integration of sectoral programmes, 
resources and assets into the District Assembly system so as to promote co-ordinated 
development and efficient resource utilisation. 
 
The Local Government, 1993, Act 462, places 22 central government departments 
under District Assemblies as 16, 13 and 11 departments for Metropolitan, Municipal 
and District Assemblies respectively.  MLGRD (1996) further states the intention of 
central government to establish a Local Government Service. The Local Government 
Service will be responsible for employment and related matters of employees of 
District Assemblies. Staff of the 22 decentralised departments are required to be 
transferred to the Local Government Service. In addition, central government 
agencies are supposed to be restructured to focus on policy formulation, monitoring 
and evaluation. The planning function of regions has also been reduced to 
coordination, monitoring and evaluation.  
                                                          
31 This section relies on findings in: MLGRD (2002) and Laryea-Adjei  (2001). 
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Despite these “intentions” of central government, implementation of administrative 
decentralisation has been slow. The Local Government Service is yet to be 
established. Restructuring of ministries and central government agencies to facilitate 
transfer of staff is yet to be done (MLGRD, 2002).   
 
The effect of the delay is that staff at the local government level have two masters: 
their parent ministries and the District Assemblies. Allegiance to parent ministries is 
stronger because of incentives of career progression and receipt of funds for recurrent 
expenditures from the centre. Again the inconsistency that existed in the law and 
undermined decentralisation in the 1970s exists. Delivery of Education, Health and 
Forestry services are supported by laws that emphasise deconcentration, quite 
contrary to the devolution of the Constitution and the Local Government Law (Act 
462). Additionally, qualified staff can usually not be attracted to work at the local 
level, due to poor support services and negative image that local councils acquired in 
the past.  
 
Decentralised development planning and management of public-private partnerships 
are other components of administrative decentralisation in Ghana. The National 
Development Planning Systems Act of 1994, Act 480 and the Local Government Act 
of 1993, Act 462, define a new decentralised planning system. Within the new 
planning system, District Assemblies have been established as planning authorities, 
with clear responsibilities for development planning at their level. The laws have 
nevertheless, attempted to fuse preparation of district plans with that of the national 
plan.  
 
The various laws on decentralisation also make room for public-private partnerships 
in service delivery and in economic development. District Assemblies, are by a 
Guidelines from the MLGRD, required to set aside 20% of the DACF to support 
small enterprise development. Public-private partnerships are not the norm in service 
provision. Cases are however emerging in the provision of markets (shopping 
centres), water and urban and semi-urban districts and sanitation (Laryea-Adjei, 
2001).  
 
3.33 Fiscal Decentralisation 
 
Fiscal decentralisation in Ghana requires the transfer of discretion over both capital 
and recurrent expenditures to District Assemblies in areas provided for by law. 
Progress has been limited to capital projects in restricted areas, through a 
constitutional provision on the District Assembly Common Fund. A constitutional 
provision ensures the transfer of at least 5% of total national revenues to local 
government according to a set of criteria put together by a Fund Administrator 
(Republic of Ghana, 1992). The District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) is 
currently based on 5% of national tax revenues. The allocation is based on a revenue 
sharing formula prepared by the Administrator of the District Assemblies’ Common 
Fund and approved by Parliament annually. The formula is based on population 
pressure on services in the district, local revenue efforts and current standard of 
living.  
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In addition, 10% of income tax, a tax collected by the central government Internal 
Revenue Service, is required to be ceded to District Assemblies.  Act 462 further 
devolves a number of ‘smaller’ taxes to District Assemblies – including taxes on 
property, entertainment, advertising, betting, use of markets and lorry parks, operation 
of commercial vehicles, etc.  This last set of revenues is currently classified into 
Internally Generated Revenue (IGF). In addition, District Assemblies are allowed to 
contract loans or overdrafts in Ghana within the limit of ¢ 20 million, but with 
approval by the Minister of Finance (MLGRD, 1996). 
 
Attempts at fiscal decentralisation show significant weaknesses.  Discretion of local 
government over the use of the DACF is limited, in that about half of the Fund is 
earmarked by the MLGRD, mainly for capital projects. The remaining half is 
generally used as matching funds for donor projects, more capital projects and 
recurrent expenses of the central administration of the District Assembly32. 
 
Recurrent budgets for the delivery of basic services are largely held by parent 
ministries, who disburse to their respective departments at the local level. Key 
departments such as Education, Health, Agriculture and the Treasury are examples 
(MLGRD, 2002). 
 
The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002)33 acknowledges the need to accelerate 
fiscal decentralisation in the following areas: (i) transfer of recurrent budgets by 
sector ministries to District Assemblies; (ii) implementation of composite budgeting 
at the district level; harmonisation of the vertical Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) with the DACF; massive capacity building for staff of District 
Assemblies in financial management, operation and maintenance and internal audit.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Thus, secondary sources indicate that despite achievements of promoting popular 
participation, establishing a central grant for district development (the DACF) and 
attempts at streamlining planning, there is a slow pace towards administrative and 
fiscal decentralisation. Political decentralisation is also constrained by an 
unmanageable requirement for participation. What pertains now appears to be more of 
a hybrid of delegation, with the mayor receiving instructions from central 
government, and deconcentration, which is particularly strengthened by laws to 
provide health and forestry. Devolution is promoted by the 50% of the DACF that is 
not earmarked. But local control over staff does not exist (World Bank, 1993). 
 
We will in subsequent chapters provide a detailed assessment of progress with 
decentralisation, particularly with regards to the provision of two basic services, water 
and sanitation. We will also examine the apparent blur in the distribution of 
responsibilities for the provision of water and sanitation. Additionally, we will assess 
how roles are shared in service provision, whether towards monopoly or pluralism. 
 
                                                          
32 Ibid. 
33  See Republic of Ghana (2002). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4.0 PROVISION OF WATER AND SANITATION: CONCEPTS  
 
We review in this chapter, the literature on water and sanitation, with a focus on the 
implications of the characteristics of the sector for improved service delivery. The 
objective is to relate the characteristics of water and sanitation to institutional 
arrangements for their delivery in a decentralised framework in subsequent chapters. 
 
4.1 Background: role of government in provision of basic services 
 
Public services are regarded as those for which government has a direct responsibility 
in its provision, including services that are basic to human survival. They include 
basic education, primary health care, (drinking) water, sanitation and municipal 
transport. This study adopts this definition for that of basic services, a term used to 
refer to public services that are basic for human survival, including primary health 
care, safe water and sanitation and basic education34. 
 
4.11 The global water and sanitation problem 
 
Rapid population growth and urbanisation has placed considerable stress on over-
utilised water and sanitation systems35 (UNCHS, 2001). The magnitude of the needs 
of the sector is overwhelming – more than one billion people worldwide (one-sixth of 
the world’s population) lack access to potable water near their homes, and over two 
billion (two-fifths of the world’s population) are without adequate sanitation. Overall, 
substantial investment and innovations in technology are required accelerating 
access36 (WHO and UNICEF, 2000). Nevertheless, getting the right institutional 
arrangements for delivery is perhaps the greatest challenge for under-served countries. 
Without this, the Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportions of people 
without and sanitation by 2015 and 2020 respectively are not likely to be met37 (UN, 
2001). Achieving the Millennium Development Goal means increasing access to safe 
sanitation of 2.2 billion additional people (397,000 per day) and improved water 
services for 1.5 billion more people (292,000 people per day). The implied 
infrastructure costs are enormous – about US$23 billion per year (World Bank, 
2002b38). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 A subject extensively discussed by the literature. See for example David Hall’s 2003 article on 
Public Services Work!, and Roth, G. (1987). 
35 Rate of growth of the urban population. This is estimated at 5.1% for least developed countries 
(UNCHS, 2001). The urban population was one-third of the world’s population in 1950. This is 
expected to reach half by 2050 (UNCHS, 2005). 
36 See WHO and UNICEF (2000). 
37 Millennium Development Goals are targets set by members of the United Nations and adopted by the 
G8 and leading funding agencies to significantly improve living standards, particularly in poor 
countries by 2015. For more information see: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.html 
38 See World Bank (2002b). 
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Table 4.1: Household access to services in different world regions (%) 
 Water Sewerage 
Africa 48.4 30.9 
Asia-Pacific 65.9 58.0 
Arab states 79.1 63.5 
Latin American  83.7 65.9 
Transition countries 91.1 89.6 
Highly Industrialised Countries 99.6 99.7 
Ghana 78% for urban areas 
46% for rural areas 
20% for safe sanitation 
Source: UNCHS (2001); GoG (2002); GoG (2004)  
 
The price of water is highest in African urban areas (average of about $1.40 per 1000 
litres. Households in Transition economies pay about $0.25; those in Asia-Pacific pay 
about $0.3339). In many African cities, households in informal settlements are not 
connected to the network and must rely on water from vendors at up to 200 times the 
tap price. At times the price of water may rise to very high levels and can take a 
significant proportion of the household budget40. 
 
The cost in human suffering is enormous. Diarrhoea, polio, cholera, guinea worm, 
bilharzia, typhoid are but a few infections, introduced or spread by inadequate and 
polluted water supply and poor sanitation. Under five mortality41 is for example, 
higher in countries with poor household access to water42. In Africa, high under five 
mortality of 12.6% for girls and 15.3% for boys correlate with the 50% access to safe 
water, through the impact of waterborne diseases on the health of children43. In Africa 
people are more likely to die before 40 years of age due to low access to water and 
sanitation. In Ghana 70% of reported diseases are due to water and sanitation 
inadequacies (MoH, 2001).  
 
Inefficient centralized, supply-driven public sector monopolies are widely blamed for 
the failure to provide access to safe water and adequate sanitation (World Bank, 2002; 
Roth, 1987).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 See www.urbanobservatory.org  
40 Discussed in UNCHS (2001).  
41 The probability of a child not surviving fifth birthday. 
42 See www.unicef.org/programme/wes 
43 See UNCHS (2001). 
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Box 4.1: How do Water and Sanitation Affect Health? 
 
Water supply, sanitation and health are closely related. Poor hygiene, inadequate quantities and quality 
of drinking water and lack of sanitation facilities cause millions of the world’s poor to die from 
preventable diseases each year. Women and children are the main victims. 
 
Water and sanitation are linked in many ways: 
• Contaminated water that is consumed may result in water borne diseases, including viral hepatitis, 
typhoid, cholera, dysentery and other diseases that cause diarrhoea; 
• Without adequate quantities of water for personal hygiene, skin and eye infections, particularly 
trachoma, spread easily; 
• Drinking water supplies can contain high amounts of harmful chemical, such as arsenic and nitrates 
that can cause serious disease. 
 
Inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene account for a large part of the burden of illness and death in 
developing countries: 
 
• After malnutrition, lack of clean water and sanitation is the second most important risk factor in 
terms of the global burden of disease; 
• About 4 billion cases of diarrhoea per year cause 1.5 million deaths, mostly among children under 
five; 
• Intestinal worms infect about 10% of the population of developing countries, and can lead to 
malnutrition, anaemia and retarded growth; 
• 300 million people suffer from malaria 
 
Research indicates that improved hygiene (especially use of water and soap to frequently clean hands) 
and sanitation in particular, have an overwhelming influence on health outcomes, including reductions 
in morbidity and mortality and increases in child growth.  
 
Sources: World Bank (2002b); UNICEF Water and Environmental Sanitation44; World Bank Water 
and Sanitation Programme45; WHO Water, Sanitation and Health46; Sanitation Connection: an 
Environmental Sanitation Network47 
 
Centralized, supply-driven services 
 
Traditionally, water and sanitation services have been delivered via a deconcentrated 
system. Field offices established within intermediate and local jurisdictions have been 
staffed with civil servants (usually engineers) from the central ministry responsible 
for water services. Engineers have devised schemes based mainly on technical 
considerations such as viability of the water source and area/population to be served 
rather than seeking advice from intended users. Staff have managed systems with 
little effort to identify or address users’ preferences. Not surprisingly, this approach 
has created few incentives for users to assist government in maintaining or financing 
water services. Subsequently, as argued by World Bank (2002), the (over) dominance 
of government in financing and management has been the major cause of low access. 
 
Problems in the public sector have led to the increasing acceptance that wider 
participation of the non state sector is needed in the provision of water and sanitation 
services. Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995) classify these problems into technical and 
operational, commercial and financial, human and institutional, and environmental. 
                                                          
44 http://www.unicef.org/programme/wes  
45 http://www.wsp.org 
46 http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/index.htm 
47 http://www.sanicon.net/titles/topicintro.php3?topicId=2  
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Technical and operational problems include irregular maintenance and lack of 
preventive maintenance, resulting in high unaccounted for water of 40%-50%, 
compared with 10%-20% in well-managed systems in industrial countries. 
Commercial and financial problems include limited consumption metering and poor 
consumer records, which result in commercial losses. Further, laws in some countries 
do not promote efficient tariff setting, and tariff structures and/or the application have 
worked against the poor. Human and institutional problems include excessive staff 
and low productivity of public water companies, political interference and lack of 
clear regulatory responsibility. Environmental problems include ineffective alternative 
disposal systems – for example, cesspools and septic tanks, which in many cases 
contaminate shallow underground aquifers.  
 
4.2 Economic characteristics of water and sanitation 
 
The economic characteristics of water and sanitation determine the nature of 
government’s role in service provision. Water and sanitation are not public goods in 
the sense that they are not non-exclusive as their benefits and costs can be excluded to 
users. They are also not non-chargeable – charges can be assigned to users (Martins 
and Sluiter, 1999; Lipsey, et al., 1990). 
 
Despite the absence of public goods characteristics, water and sanitation share some 
economic features that require a role for the public sector in their provision. These 
include the following: 
 
a) The sector has important externalities, mostly related to the public health and 
environmental effects. In such cases, there is the need to promote sector 
investments over and above what a private operator may wish to do because the 
socioeconomic benefits are larger than the apparent financial benefits. In 
particular, the importance of achieving full coverage of water supply and 
sanitation services must be emphasised by government policy (Idelovitch and 
Ringskog, 1995; World Bank, 2002).  
 
A further externality peculiar to water is its scarcity. If the quantity of water were 
not replenished at the rate equal to that at which was removed, each individual 
drawing water would reduce the quantity available to others. Government, in such 
instances should deal with externality by prohibiting drilling or licensing or 
levying a charge that matches the cost of an alternative. The case of underground 
water is particularly challenging. Because underground water does not belong to 
anybody, it is usually treated as a free good and tends to be overused. In the 
absence of ownership, underpricing is inevitable, too much of the resource is used 
and shortage is inevitable.  
 
In the case of both urban and rural supplies, the absence of property rights in 
water precludes private sector intervention and increases difficulties in allocating 
the scarce resource. Inadequate sanitation also poses a real health hazard. Thus the 
existence of externalities in water and sanitation delivery calls for mechanisms 
that would promote more, rather than less, non state involvement. 
 
b) Water has features of a natural monopoly; that is, it is uneconomic to duplicate the 
water and sewerage network in the city streets. As a result, one service provider 
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has such a dominant position that competition is difficult to achieve. Regulation 
by governments is therefore necessary to protect consumers against abuses of 
monopoly powers. 
 
c) The water and sanitation sector is capital intensive. In the US, the ratio of 
investments in fixed assets to annual tariff revenue is on the order of 10:1 as 
compared with 3:1 for telecommunications and 4:1 for electric power.  The higher 
ratio for water supply and sanitation makes it more difficult to attract private 
sector participation with responsibility for financing investments because the 
payback period is long. 
 
d) Economies of scale in networked systems: An example is in the distribution of 
water where using existing pipelines to reach more people can result in cost 
reduction. A number of processes involved in the supply of water are associated 
with decreasing costs, particularly the distribution and purification. Facilities for 
collection, treatment, and disposal of waterborne sewage also exhibit scale 
economies.  
 
e) Merit goods: There is evidence that water and sanitation are merit goods, in the 
sense that people who receive supplies of safe water benefit from it to a greater 
extent than they themselves believe. Increased availability of water has fostered 
sanitary practices and reduced diseases (MoH, 2002).  
 
Most arguments regarding the economic characteristics of water and sanitation 
therefore go in favour of a larger public responsibility, particularly in regulation, 
investment and supervision; however, these do not exclude an active role by the 
private sector and communities, particularly in investment, operation and 
maintenance.  
 
4.3 Dublin Principles for service provision 
 
Worldwide, the failures of centralized service delivery, exacerbated by a decreasing 
supply of water in some regions have created considerable pressure for 
decentralization, including market decentralisation. The International Conference on 
Water and the Environment, held in Dublin in 199248 issued three new principles, 
"The Dublin Principles," to rejuvenate adequate provision of water: 
  
a) The "Ecological Principle", requiring holistic water management; 
b) The "Institutional Principle", requiring participatory water management 
including devolution of responsibility "to the lowest appropriate level" and 
greater involvement of NGOs, the private sector, and women; and,  
c) The "Instrument Principle" requiring that water should be managed as an 
economic resource.  
 
These principles have revolutionalised management of the sector by optimising 
contribution of the private sector (for and not-for profit) in financing and 
management, as well as brought to the fore the need for an integrated management of 
water and sanitation – from the household, city to the national level.  
                                                          
48 For full discussion see http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/WATER.htm 
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4.4 Government and the Market 
 
Provision of basic services should be guided by failures of both government and the 
market49. Government failure is evident when public agencies are more responsive to 
political pressures than to consumer preferences, as when regulation protects the 
industry or a vocal pressure group, rather than the customer. Government failure is 
also evident when information available about the provision of a service is restricted 
to a selected few well-connected people. 
 
Markets are also not always able to allocate resources efficiently where substantial 
externalities exist and are not reflected in the charges of private suppliers. 
Nevertheless, Nickson (1996) mentions three arguments in favour of privatisation of 
the provision of water: 
 
i. The efficiency argument: private sector efficiency is said to derive from 
management flexibility, freedom of action, greater financial discipline and 
accountability to market forces.  
ii. The fiscal argument: privatisation can potentially improve the overall fiscal 
balance of the public sector, by reducing subsidies to loss-making utilities and 
government borrowing requirement by requiring the private sector to finance 
capital expenditure. 
iii. The equity and economic stability argument: privatisation can potentially 
improve equity in water supply by introducing full cost rates to existing 
(subsidised) clients, thereby providing revenue for network expansion to 
poorer urban areas. Expansion of the distribution network will lead to lower 
water costs for poorer citizens who were previously dependent on high-cost 
supply from vendors. 
 
World Bank (2002) indicates that water, in particular is increasingly being managed 
as an economic, rather than a social good. Decentralization – in various – forms has 
been a useful tool to support this new approach. Governments and other reformers are 
now trying to link service levels and costs to realistic prices. They provide incentives 
that increase the efficiency of water resource allocation, reduce costs, and increase 
sustainability of water service systems.  
 
4.5 Decentralisation of provision water and sanitation  
 
The literature50 recognizes the view that lower level governments offer advantages of 
being closer to the beneficiary population, and hence better ability to identify citizens’ 
preferences. Also, they have the flexibility to respond to local conditions. Consumers 
may therefore be better convinced to pay more for improved services in such 
circumstances. Evidence from new decentralized approaches confirms that users are 
willing to pay for water services that are tailored to their needs (Shwartz and Van 
Dijk, 2004). However, a critical factor is that the scale of technology that is applied 
should be within the management capability of decentralised levels of government51. 
In this regard, two main trends in decentralization of water services have emerged: 
                                                          
49 Drawn from: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/WATER.htm 
50 Ibid.  
51 Drawn from: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/WATER.htm 
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delegation and devolution. In many cases, both are accompanied by private sector 
participation (PSP) 52.  
 
4.51 Delegation of water management 
 
Under the delegation model, governments transfer water management to public or 
semi-private water companies. These companies are responsible for providing 
services within a specified region. Delegation has in general not led to improved 
performance by the public sector53.  
 
4.52 Devolution to subnational governments and users  
 
Small-scale rural and urban water supply/sanitation is often devolved to local 
governments54. Responsibilities vary with local capacity: strong local governments 
can undertake activities ranging from interaction with communities to technical 
planning to supervising construction. Other local governments might focus more on 
interacting with communities while relying on staff from central or intermediate 
governments for technical support. Sometimes stronger urban municipalities provide 
services to neighbouring rural areas (Euromarkets, 2005)55.  
 
The International Water and Sanitation Centre (2002)56 notes that a new push towards 
participatory management processes has enabled decentralization to user groups. User 
groups, referred to as Water Users’ Associations (WUAs) or Water and Sanitation 
Committees (WSCs), are common to rural water supply and sanitation. Box 4.2 
outlines the elements of community management systems. 
 
Box 4.2: Elements that Distinguish Community Managed Systems from other Models for Service 
Provision  
 
The following four elements can be identified to some extent or other in community managed systems: 
• Collective community control of the system  
• Collective community operation and maintenance of the system  
• Collective community ownership of the water supply system  
• Collective community contribution to costs (operating and capital)  
 
IRC (2002) notes that the essence of community management lies in control rather than operation and 
maintenance, because control covers the decision making powers that puts a community truly in 
charge. The IRC argues that ownership is at the root of successful community management. 
Frequently, what it refers to is a ‘sense of ownership’ brought about by contributions to planning, 
construction or capital costs. If communities have no legal status or legal ownership their ‘sense of 
ownership’ will soon be exposed and will evaporate.  
 
Cost recovery is one of the most debated topics in the sector. Ensuring that communities are capable of 
collecting, managing, and using revenues is an essential part of ensuring sustainability. Whoever pays, 
it is critical that all costs, implementation, operation and maintenance, and eventual replacement are 
clearly identified and that responsibility for meeting them is clearly assigned.  
 
Source: IRC (2002)  
                                                          
52 Drawn from: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/WATER.htm 
53 Saghir et al (2000) draw several examples from North Africa and the Middle East.  
54 See http://www.irc.nl/manage/index.html for examples. 
55 Euromarkets (2005) discusses such cases, particularly in Germany. 
56 http://www.irc.nl/manage/whatisit/elements.html 
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4.53 Private sector participation  
 
Though not a recent phenomenon (see Box 4.3), private sector participation (PSP) in 
the provision of water and sanitation is attracting the attention of many governments. 
Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995) summarise what the objectives of PSP should be: 
 
a) For the public sector: to expand the water supply and sewerage systems in 
order to increase population coverage; expand sewage treatment in order to 
reduce water pollution and public health hazards; and provide better quality 
service. 
b) For the private sector: ensure improved management higher efficiency; and 
acquire the needed capital for investments. 
 
Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995) further note a number of risks which need to be 
managed for a successful PSP. These include:  
 
a) For the public sector that services supplied by the private sector will not be in 
accordance with the desired standards; and cost of such services will be much 
higher than that currently charged by the public entity. 
b) For the private sector: commercial (cost recovery, profit making); financial 
(currency devaluation and convertibility of local to foreign currency); 
technical (insufficient knowledge about state of installations, the need for 
replacement, etc.); legal (how contractual disputes will be resolved; change of 
government policy, etc.).  
 
Roth (1987) and Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995) review options for private sector 
participation to include various degrees of public ownership (from management 
contracts, lease contracts, franchising, concessions, to consumer cooperatives) and 
various degrees of private ownership (including Build Own Operate Transfer, Reverse 
Build Own Operate Transfer, joint ownership and outright sale). Details of these 
arrangements are presented in Annex 4.1. 
 
Box 4.3: Private provision is not recent 
 
Private provision of piped water existed in London and Paris in the 18th century, and spread rapidly in 
Europe and America in the mid 19th century. English private companies were the first to be granted 
“concessions” in other countries (in Berlin in 1856 and in Cannes in 1866). French companies also 
turned to foreign markets for water supply concessions and became active all over the world, but 
especially in Spain and in North and West Africa. In the 20th century, French private water companies 
became the most advanced, technically and commercially, both within and outside of the country. 
 
Under the French system, water supply companies have a local monopoly, but a public authority 
determines tariff. The public authority (a municipality) often builds and operates the system with its 
own resources. It can be managed either by the public authority’s own staff, or by an autonomous 
board which is a separate local entity owned by the public authority. When a private sector operator is 
employed, the three most common arrangements are the management contract (gérance), the 
concession system, and the affermage system. 
 
Vending of non piped water is particularly as old as the concept of a town. Vending of non piped water 
was popular in both west and far-east in past centuries. It still operates at full force in some 
communities of the developing world. Roth (1987) cites cases from ancient Greece and Rome, France 
at the time of the revolution, the era of Ottoman rulers to China and Indonesia in the 1980s. 
 
Source: Roth (1987). 
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4.6 Some remarks 
 
An overview of the water and sanitation sector reveals a number of problems that 
require special attention in the design of central-local relations. There are technical 
and operational problems in the provision of drinking water in many developing 
countries, such as irregular maintenance and the resulting high unaccounted for water. 
Secondly, there are financial problems due to limited consumption metering and 
inadequate tariff-setting. Thirdly, there are human resource gaps, low productivity, 
political interference in and lack of clear regulatory responsibility. Fourthly, there are 
significant gaps in accountability of service providers to consumers. These constraints 
will be assessed in the districts of study in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5.0 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
We discuss our research strategy in this chapter. We focus on how the hypotheses on 
which the research is based is tested. We define our variables and indicators, present 
data collection techniques and describe the selection of districts for our study.  
 
 
5.1 Analytical framework 
 
Theories and concepts discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4 guided the design of the 
research. The thrust is on the Administrative Design Framework (ADF) summarised 
by Cohen and Peterson (1999). Elements of the Type-Function Framework (of the 
Rondinelli school, 1981, 1992, 1999), the Enablement Framework (Helmsing, 2000) 
and the soufflé theory of Parker (1995) are incorporated to strengthen the approach of 
the ADF.  
 
The ADF is used as the main guide because of the strong focus on institutional issues 
in the analysis of central-local relations – particularly the emphasis on roles analysis. 
Secondly, the ADF, through its institutional pluralism concept, points to the 
importance of partnerships in service provision.  
 
 
5.2 Testing the hypotheses 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, our study is about testing two hypotheses. The first is that 
decentralisation in practice in Ghana does not reflect what is specified by the 
country’s laws and referred to by Rondinelli (1981) as devolution, but rather a 
mixture of deconcentration and delegation.  This hypothesis is tested for Ghana in 
general and for the water and sanitation in particular. The second hypothesis is that 
when pluralism emerges at the decentralised level of government, it yields better 
performance than the case of distributed monopoly. This second hypothesis is tested 
for the water and sanitation sector at the district level. 
 
The following steps are followed by the study in testing the hypotheses: (a) definition 
of research issues and variables; (b) definition of indicators; (c) design of data 
collection methods and instruments and categorisation of sources of data; (d) design 
of framework for data analysis; (e) undertaking field work to collect primary and 
secondary data; (f) data analysis. 
 
5.21 Definition of research issues and variables  
 
Four issues are analysed in testing the hypotheses. These are: (a) forms and types of 
decentralisation; (b) clarity and concentration of roles/ extent of pluralism in service 
provision; (c) performance of types of decentralisation and plural arrangements; (d) 
factors underlying performance. Details of these research issues are presented below: 
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a) Assessing the forms and types of decentralisation 
 
In assessing the forms and types of decentralisation, we analyse the extent to 
which the three main forms of decentralisation - political, fiscal and 
administrative decentralisation occur in the provision of water and sanitation 
in urban and semi-urban districts in Ghana57; and whether all three forms 
occur58. Furthermore, we ascertain the features of the resulting type(s) of 
decentralisation – whether deconcentration, delegation or devolution can be 
found in the water and sanitation sector in Ghana.  
 
b) Definition and analysis of distribution of roles and pluralism in 
service provision 
 
Subsequently, we ascertain whether the roles essential for provision of 
services (discussed in Chapter 2) are clearly assigned to various levels of 
government and the private for and not-for profit sector, and the extent to 
which these roles are being carried out. We further examine the extent of 
distribution of roles in the provision of water and sanitation in urban and semi-
urban districts in Ghana, and whether there is evidence of pluralism.  
 
c) Assessing performance 
 
We draw on a range of criteria from the literature59 to assess the performance 
of the two approaches. These are: effectiveness (a measure of the 
appropriateness of outputs and outcomes in meeting demands of communities 
as well as the broader aims of public policy)60, efficiency (the positive 
relationship of resource outputs to inputs), accountability (holding public 
servants responsible for outcomes), and sustainability (indicated by fiscal 
adequacy and institutional flexibility). We could not analyse the impact (long 
term effects) of water and sanitation as there are numerous other factors that 
combine to affect the health of citizens and, which are beyond the scope of our 
assignment. Instead, we explore the possible influence of the provision of 
water and sanitation on health, that is, whether water and sanitation has began 
to influence some of the immediate determinants of morbidity (UNIICEF, 
1990)61.  
 
d)  Exploring underlying factors 
 
Finally, we explore factors that underlie performance of types of 
decentralisation and pluralist arrangements.  
 
                                                          
57 Cohen and Peterson (1999) add market and spatial forms of decentralisation. However, these are 
usually discussed as part of the three main forms of decentralisation (political, fiscal and 
administrative) by many authors, an issue discussed in Chapter Two. 
58 The following served as a guide: World Bank (2002), Ndegwa (2002), Cohen (1999); Parker (1995). 
59 Cohen and Peterson (1999); Ndegwa (2002); IRC (2002). 
60 Parker’s (1995) definition of responsiveness is captured as part of the discussion on effectiveness.  
61 UNICEF (1990) pioneers what has become know as the Conceptual Framework for Malnutrition and 
Mortality of children. It identifies the various determinants of malnutrition and mortality and indicates 
the levels of effects that various solutions could have. It emphasises that achieving impact requires 
simultaneous action from a wide variety of sectors, actors and power structures. 
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Table 5.1 gives a snap-shot of how the research goes about testing the hypotheses. 
Figure 5.1 presents the conceptual framework underlying the research. 
  
Table 5.1: Testing the hypothesis 
 
Research issue Variables
a) Assess forms  of decentralisation Political decentralisation
Administrative 
decentralisation  
Resulting types  of decentralisation: 
deconcentration, delegation, devolution
Fiscal decentralisation
b) Define and analyse the distribution of 
roles and pluralism in service provision 
(distribution of roles also analysed under 
administrative decentralisation)
Role distribution
Partnerships
c) Assess performance of different 
approaches to service provision
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Accountability
Sustainability
Influence on health
d) Underlying factors
2. When pluralism emerges at the 
decentralised level of government, it yields 
better performance than the case of distributed 
monopoly.
1. Decentralisation in practice in Ghana does 
not reflect what is specificied by the country’s 
laws and referred to by the literature as 
devolution, but rather it reflects a mixture of 
deconcentration and delegation.
Hypothesis
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Figure 5.1: The Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Conceptual Framework
Between government at various levels 
Influencing factors
 - effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, sustainability, influence on health
Improved performance in service provision
Resulting institutional arrangement - ranging from monopoly at the spatial centre to pluralism at decentralised level 
Features of central-local relations
Plural arrangements
Administrative Devolution
Forms of 
decentralisation
Types of 
decentralisation Distribution of roles
Fiscal Delegation Between government and private for and 
not-for profit sector 
Gaps in roles
Political Deconcentration Definition,clarity of roles
 
 
We operationalise the conceptual framework through Figure 5.2, which sums up the 
steps we undertake to analyse the levels of effects of decentralisation in improving the 
delivery of services62.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 Evaluation techniques discussed by Bamberger, et al. (2006) provide the basis of our analytical 
framework. 
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Figure 5.2: The Analytical Framework 
Inputs Laws on decentralisation and service delivery
Policies on service delivery
Immediate effects Less or more Decentralisation More Monopoly or Pluralism
Less or more Political, Administrative, Fiscal Decentralisation
A given type of decentralisation Clarity in role distribution
(deconcentration, delegation, devolution)
Outputs Defined institutional approach to service delivery
Outcomes Postive, stagnating, negative trends in delivery of services in districts
Accountability Efficiency
Effectiveness Sustainability Positive influence on development outcomes
Monopoly in either 
government of 
private sector - 
deconcentrated 
agency
Distributed monopoly in either 
government or private sector - 
delegation
Pluralism - partnerships between 
government, private sector, 
NGOs, CBOs:
' - at spatial centre
' - decentralised centre
 
 
5.22 Definition of indicators 
 
We propose several indicators related to the research issues and variables and to test 
the hypotheses. The indicators build on previous work in the literature63. Indicators 
are proposed in three sets. The first set relates to the forms and types of 
decentralisation and distribution of roles/extent of pluralism. This first set of 
indicators largely portrays the perspectives of providers of water and sanitation in the 
two districts. 
 
The second set of indicators relate to criteria for assessing performance of types of 
decentralisation and extent of pluralism. These largely provide the views of users of 
the service. We however draw also on official sources to strengthen the discussion 
where required - for example, “frequency of government audit” as part of the 
discussion on Accountability. The third set of indicators constitutes the basis of a case 
study that explores factors that underlie performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 Particularly, Ndegwa, S. (2002), World Bank (2002), Parker (1995) and Helmsing (1997). 
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Indicators of forms/types of decentralisation and distribution of roles/pluralism 
 
We propose the following indicators for the analysis of different features of central-
local relations in the delivery of water and sanitation in Ghana: 
 
Feature Indicators 
Political 
  
  
• Involvement of consumers in stages of service delivery 
• Involvement of civic associations in stages of service delivery 
Administrative 
decentralisation, 
Role distribution  
      &  
• Responsibility for hiring, firing and wages over staff 
• Clarity of responsibilities 
• Local responsibility for planning, O&M 
• Responsibility for regulatory framework 
Partnerships 
 
• Responsibility for managing partnerships 
• Responsibilities devolved to partner 
• Capacity to manage partnerships 
• Co-financing arrangement 
Fiscal 
  
  
  
• Local expenditure on sector financed and earmarked by central 
transfers 
• Local expenditure on sector financed by central but controlled by 
district 
• Local investment on sector financed from local revenues 
• Share of revenue in sector raised and retained by district 
 
Indicators of performance 
 
We also propose the following to analyse the performance of emerging models of 
central-local relations: 
 
Criteria Indicator 
Effectiveness • Coverage of safe water 
• Coverage of safe sanitation 
• Reliability of flow of water 
• Hand washing with soap before eating 
• Compounds with clean environment 
Efficiency • % water lost: trend 
• % water lost: level 
• Repair time: level 
• Repair time: trend 
• Average waiting time (dry season) 
• Investment per capita: level 
Accountability • Mechanisms for participation 
• Frequency of government audit 
• Local government's response to audit 
• % respondents with knowledge of components of price of water 
• % respondents ever received feedback on monitoring 
Possible influence 
on health 
• Incidence of water and sanitation related diseases (cholera and guinea worm) 
Sustainability • Use of local skills in operation and maintenance 
• Proportion of local contribution to investment 
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Exploring factors that underlie performance 
 
We use different qualitative and quantitative approaches to explore factors that 
underlie performance of the more successful institutional approaches to service 
delivery. 
 
 
5.3 Research Techniques and Methods 
 
We obtained data for the study from both primary and secondary sources. Primary 
data collection involved both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The combination 
of approaches and techniques enabled clear insights into the delivery of basic services 
(Van Dijk, 2004). Table 5.2 summarises the link between research techniques and 
expected analyses. 
 
Table 5.2: Application of research techniques in the study 
Analysis Household 
survey 
(Personal) Key 
informants 
interview 
Focus 
group 
discussions 
Case study Secondary 
data 
Central-local relations analysis      
    - political, administrative, fiscal 
intergovernmental relations 
 X   X 
    - role analysis, including partnerships X   X 
Performance assessment      
     - effectiveness, efficiency, 
accountability, influence on health, 
sustainability 
X X X   X 
Exploring underlying factors  X X X X 
 
5.31 Secondary data collection 
 
Secondary methods of data collection consisted of review of official records, 
including annual reports of agencies, laws, plans and budgets, maps, operational 
manuals, minutes of meetings, office files, project documents and evaluation reports. 
Secondary data provided us with a basis to select districts for the research and to 
design our primary data collection methods. 
 
5.32 Selection of Districts for the research 
 
We selected two districts for the study: one urban (a one town municipality), Tamale, 
and the other, semi-urban (district with both urban and rural settlements), Savelugu-
Nanton (see Figure 5.3 for location of the two districts in Ghana). The two were 
selected from a list of six districts because they fulfilled and scored highest for all of 
the following criteria: representativeness, ease of obtaining data, proximity, similar 
social and physical characteristics (such as ethnicity and terrain). See Annex 5.3 for 
application of selection criteria. Background information on the two districts is 
presented in Chapter 6.   
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Figure 5.3: Map of Ghana showing the two study districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.33 Primary data collection 
 
We used a household survey and rapid appraisal techniques to obtain primary data 
from users of water and sanitation services. Rapid appraisal techniques centred on 
focus group discussions and key informants interviews using of semi-structured 
questionnaires. The interviews were preceded by a reconnaissance visit. 
 
Reconnaissance  
 
We conducted a reconnaissance visit to the two districts. We toured the terrain to 
identify spatial, economic and social features that should inform the selection of our 
research sample. We also had preliminary discussions with local government officials 
and community leaders on the purpose of our research and agreed on the most suitable 
time to conduct key informants interviews and the household survey. 
 
Key informants interviews 
 
We conducted key informant interviews with officials and community leaders on the 
features of central-local relations /institutional approaches for the delivery of safe 
water and sanitation. Key informants were selected from categories of officials as 
follows:  
(a) Managers of service delivery agencies/departments (water and sanitation) at 
the local level;  
(b) Local government managers; 
(c) Regional level managers; 
Tamale 
Savelugu-Nanton
Togo
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(d) Managers of service delivery agencies/departments at national level 
(Community Water and Sanitation Agency and Ghana Water Company 
Limited); 
(e) Officials of sector ministries (Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of 
Works and Housing); 
(f) Managers of aid agencies and NGOs supporting water and sanitation in the 
two districts (development partners); 
(g) Leaders of community organisations. 
 
Different questionnaires were administered to each category of key informants. The 
subject matter of the questionnaire administered to each category of key informants is 
summarised in Table 5.3 and Annex 5.1. In all, 30 key informants were interviewed. 
Copies of questionnaires are presented in Annex 12.1 to 12.5. 
 
Table 5.3: Key informants interviewed 
Key informants  No. Interviewed Subject of interview 
National level: 
 Directors of Policy and Planning 
from government agencies 
 
4 
- Forms and types of decentralisation 
- Role analysis 
Regional level: 
 Head of regional level managers of 
CWSA, GWCL 
 Regional Head of GWCL 
 Regional engineer from GWCL 
 
2 
 
1 
1 
- Forms and types of decentralisation 
- Role analysis 
District level:  
 District Coordinating Directors  
 District Planning Officers,  
 District Budget Officers,  
 District Environmental Health 
Officers,  
 District Head of GWCL 
 District level engineers  
 NGOs and donor projects  
 Private firms 
 
2 
2 
2 
2 
 
1 
2 
4 
2 
- Forms and types of decentralisation 
- Role analysis 
- Performance of each type of 
institutional arrangement 
- Success factors 
Sub district/ Community Level:  
 System Manager,  
 Water Board Members,  
 Women leaders 
 
1 
2 
2 
- Performance of each type of 
institutional arrangement 
- Success factors 
Total 30  
 
 
Household survey  
 
We conducted a household survey to obtain household views on performance of 
emerging institutional approaches to service delivery. 
 
The sample 
 
We used a combination of random and non-random sampling approaches for the 
survey. The random sampling approach used was stratified sampling; the non-random 
approach was purposive sampling.  
 
Primarily, communities in each district were stratified by urban-rural for each sub-
district of the semi-urban district and core-periphery for the urban district. 
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Stratification was necessary to capture both well-served and under-served areas. The 
periphery of the urban district, Tamale, had spatial and economic features of the rural 
locations of the semi-urban district, Savelugu-Nanton. The number of respondents 
selected from each stratum was a proportion of the population of the stratum out of 
the total population of the district. Annex 5.2 presents information on the definition of 
the strata and the number of respondents drawn from each stratum. 
 
Further, we used the Purposive sampling method to select houses/compounds within 
each stratum. The household head or representative was the unit of enquiry. The 
sampling frame was developed from the maps of the two districts and the draft final 
report of the 2000 Population Census of Ghana. A copy of the questionnaire for the 
household survey is presented in Annex 12.6. 
 
We used the UN Sample Size Calculations for Measuring Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) to determine the sample size (UN, 2002). Details of this method are 
presented in Annex 5.2. A total of 766 respondents were interviewed, 402 from 
Tamale and 364 from Savelugu-Nanton. These were made up of 133 women in 
Savelugu-Nanton (36.5%) and 186 women in Tamale (46.3%) (see Table 5.4). 
Women are an important source of information on use of safe water in Ghana; while 
men are important for views on investment decisions. The significant proportion of 
women interviewed (as household heads) only enriched the responses. The more 
cosmopolitan Tamale had more female headed households. 
 
In terms of gender composition, Tamale had a greater proportion of household 
members as female (52.1%); that for Savelugu-Nanton was 49.6. Local officials 
attributed the difference to a tradition of out-migration of young women in Savelugu-
Nanton to the country’s largest cities, Accra and Kumasi, to work as porters, a means 
of acquiring basic household items before marriage. We however did not come across 
written evidence to support this anecdote. 
 
Table 5.4: Population characteristics of households in the sample 
Savelugu-Nanton Tamale   
No. % No. % 
Household head: 
Male 
Female 
Total 
 
231 
133 
364 
 
63.5 
36.5 
100 
 
216 
186 
402 
 
53.7 
46.3 
100 
Mean household size: 
Male 
Female 
Total 
 
7.8 
7.7 
15.5 
  
6.5 
7.1 
13.6 
 
Proportion of household members 
that were women 
 49.6  52.1 
Proportion of household members 
that were men 
 50.4  47.9 
 
 
Focus group discussions  
 
Focus group discussions (FGDs) provided insight into the nature of participation in 
service provision and helped to triangulate data obtained from officials. FGDs were 
held separately with users and service providers.  
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The group of users included residents and representatives of micro enterprises. The 
group of service providers included service agencies/departments, local government 
officials, central government officials, NGOs and donors. FGDs were essential for 
validating the survey findings and for exploring differences in types of 
decentralisation, how pluralism works in practice, and reasons for differences in 
performance of the two districts in the provision of water and sanitation. 
 
Case study method 
 
The case study method was used to examine the features of the town water system in 
one of the research districts, Savelugu-Nanton. The purpose was to use more 
qualitative approaches to explore factors that explain performance in an in-depth 
manner. It involved use of open-ended questionnaires, further FGDs, extensive review 
of official records, further key informants interviews and structured observation. The 
methods used and subsequent findings are presented in Chapter 11.  
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CHAPTER 6  
 
6.0 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE STUDY DISTRCTS  
 
6.1 County development situation 
 
Ghana is situated in the middle of the West African coast, between Cote d’Ivoire to 
the west, Togo to the east and Burkina Faso to the north (see Figure 5.3). Ghana’s 
economy is the third largest (after Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire) of the 15-country 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and a major trading 
partner of its three neighbours. 
 
The total population of the country is estimated at 20 million, with 44% of the 
population residing in urban areas. The country’s population is growing at 2.6% per 
annum (Ghana Statistical Service, 2001). GDP growth has averaged 4.5% in the last 
two decades, though on a upward trend in recent years. In 2004, the country’s GDP 
growth rate was 5.8% (Republic of Ghana, 2005). Among the factors contributing to 
the upsurge in economic growth are the recovery in agricultural production and 
general improvement in economic management. Nevertheless, GDP growth is 
considered too modest for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals 
(UNDP, 2005). 
 
The incidence of poverty declined from 52% to 40% in the 1990s (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2000). Poverty in Ghana is related to a number of factors including 
geographic location, access to basic services, demography, educational attainment, 
and socioeconomic background. Poverty is most acute in the three regions of the 
northern Ghana where the two study districts are located. Reducing poverty in Ghana 
reduction requires considerable effort to reverse the slide in living standards, which 
though improving, is still worse than 1975 levels (Demery et al, 2000)..  
 
 
6.2 Overview of water and sanitation in country 
 
Access to safe water and sanitation is particularly low in rural Ghana (see Table 6.1). 
Urban Ghana has better access to water, but this has stagnated over the past decade 
due to almost no new investment. Sanitation in urban areas is also at a very low level.  
 
Table 6.1: Trends in water and sanitation provision in Ghana 
 2000 2003 
Rural population with safe water 40% 46% 
Rural population with safe household latrines 15% 20% 
Urban population with safe water 70% 70% 
Urban population safe household latrines 40% 45% 
Source: Ministry of Works and Housing (2004); Republic of Ghana (2002) 
 
According to the Ministry of Works and Housing (2004) one of the main problems in 
urban water systems is unaccounted–for –water (UFW); which is currently at about 
50% of total output – creating a huge unmet demand. In households without piped 
supply, the main problems are high cost of supply relative to piped water obtained 
directly from Ghana Water Company Limited and difficulty in obtaining regular 
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water supply. Inadequate meter reading and poor water quality are the main 
complaints by the industrial consumers. 
 
Coverage of safe water in rural Ghana is at a very low 46.4%. The result is the 
persistence of water borne diseases, including guinea worm infections, trachoma, 
bilharzia, diarrhoea, and occasional epidemic of cholera (Republic of Ghana, 2002). 
Coverage of safe sanitation is also a very low 45%; and 15% in urban and rural areas 
respectively. Hygiene education is now beginning to receive attention. Appropriate 
sewerage and sanitation facilities are generally not widespread.  
 
To meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on water and sanitation, Ghana 
needs to spend about $1.6 billion towards supplying 85% urban population and 80% 
rural population with water by 2015 and $1.1 billion towards providing 84% of urban 
population and 76% of rural population with adequate sanitation by 2020 (Ministry of 
Works and Housing, 2004). See Annex 6.1 for details.  
 
Policy challenges 
 
The Government of Ghana embarked on restructuring the water and sanitation sector 
in the 1990s (Yakubu, 2003). The approach was to separate management of piped 
water in cities from those in small towns and rural districts. Management of sanitation 
was also separated from that of urban water and placed under the District Assemblies 
and the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA).  
 
Urban Water64 
 
Provision of safe water in urban areas is under going reforms aimed at private sector 
participation. The objective is to allow the promotion of commercially viable systems, 
and in the process, release budgetary financing for expansion of coverage in low-
income urban, semi-urban and rural communities65. 
 
Under the reform programme, responsibility for operation of urban water supply, 
comprising about 80 water supply systems in 10 regions, from source to end user, will 
be contracted to a private operator under a management contract. Ghana Water 
Company Limited (GWCL) will operate as an autonomous private limited liability 
company. GWCL will oversee the private operator’s transaction and be responsible 
for asset ownership, sector planning and development and monitoring of performance. 
The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) has a regulatory role, 
particularly with regard to tariff setting.  
 
Rural and Semi-Urban Districts and Small Towns66 
 
The Government of Ghana embarked on restructuring of the water and sanitation 
sector in the early 1990s. The approach was to separate management of piped water in 
cities from that in small towns and rural districts. Management of sanitation was also 
separated from that of urban water and placed with District Assemblies and the 
                                                          
64 See Ministry of Works and Housing (2004). 
65 See http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20312299 
~menuPK:34471~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html 
66 Section makes use of Yakubu (2003). 
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CWSA. The National Community Water and Sanitation Programme (NCWSP) was 
launched in 1994 as a major instrument in the implementation of the reforms 
(Yakubu, 2003)67. The Community Water and Sanitation Agency was subsequently 
established by CWSA Act 564 of 1998, out of the then Ghana Water and Sewerage 
Corporation, the nucleus of which remains today as the Ghana Water Company 
Limited (CWSA, 2004; Korkor, 2003).  
 
Act 564 gives the CWSA the mandate to facilitate the provision of potable water and 
related sanitation services to small towns and rural communities, an approach that is 
significantly different from that of the GWCL in cities. The difference is in the 
emphasis the CWSA approach places on the role of District Assemblies and 
communities in service delivery. A key strategy of the NCWSP has been the emphasis 
on community ownership and management, which promotes community participation 
in planning, implementation and management of water and sanitation. Other strategies 
are demand responsiveness, public sector facilitation through capacity building and 
technical assistance to District Assemblies, private sector provision of goods and 
services and integration of hygiene education with provision of water and sanitation. 
The major components of the NCWSP are provision of potable water and sanitation 
facilities and institutional strengthening. Standards for service provision are 
documented in Annex 6.2.  
 
Policy on Environmental Sanitation 
 
The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development published the 
“Environmental Sanitation Policy” in 199968, providing direction to the role of 
District Assemblies in the delivery of sanitation. The policy emphasizes the role of 
District Assemblies in planning and managing sanitation services. However, the 
policy acknowledges the need for further work on how to harmonise the activities of 
Environmental Health Units, Works Departments and District Water and Sanitation 
Teams in the management of sanitation. The policy is also not clear on where 
responsibility for standard setting and enforcement lies – whether with the MLGRD 
or District Assemblies. 
 
Institutions in the water and sanitation sector69 
 
There are several institutions involved in the delivery of water and sanitation in 
Ghana.  These include the Ministry of Works and Housing (MWH), Ghana Water 
Company Limited (GWCL), Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA), 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), Public Utility 
Regulatory Commission (PURC), District Assemblies, donor agencies, NGOs and 
communities. Roles of each agency in 2004 are summarised below: 
 
• MWH: overall policy oversight for urban and rural water delivery 
• GWCL: provision of water for selected towns. GWCL has branches in towns and 
regions where it operates. 
                                                          
67 The NCWP is so far the main policy thrust for provision of water and sanitation in semi-urban and 
rural districts. A review was being undertaken during the research to provide a single policy document 
on the features of the provision of water and sanitation in semi-urban and rural districts. 
68 See MLGRD (1999). 
69 Based on interviews with officials and an extract from CWSA (2004). 
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• CWSA: programming and negotiation of funds for semi-urban and rural districts 
(small towns and rural areas). Offices are at Headquarters level and in each 
region. Regional offices supervise implementation of programmes that are 
designed and negotiated by Headquarters. Role in sanitation is limited to 
demonstration of technologies. 
• MLGRD: policy formulation for sanitation, manages large donor-sponsored urban 
projects, which usually includes sanitation improvement, provides training in 
sanitation, procures heavy-duty sanitation equipment for all District Assemblies. 
• PURC: regulates provision of water, including tariff setting. 
• District Assemblies: active role in provision of sanitation; a partner of CWSA in 
provision of water in semi-urban and rural districts.  
• Communities: active under the “Community Owned and Managed” model of the 
CWSA in provision of water in semi-urban and rural districts. 
• Donors and NGOs: provide technical and financial assistance; some manage 
projects directly. 
 
The challenge of coordinating activities of all these organisations, and in particular, in 
ensuring uniformity in application of policies and in delivery of facilities is quite 
enormous. There are areas where there is a lack of co-ordination – e.g. between 
CWSA and MLGRD in the area of sanitation, between CWSA and NGOs in 
application of strategies, among donors in application of procurement procedures, 
financing and implementation of projects. 
 
To meet the MDGs on water and sanitation, the United Nations system in Ghana 
urges government-led action to mobilize and manage funding and to address 
challenges that face the sector, including scaling up investments, particularly in least 
served districts; sustainable financing, particularly a combination of tariffs that 
recover costs and subsidies to protect the poor; openness in tariff setting and audit 
reports of water and sanitation agencies; coordination of investment planning systems; 
management systems and capacity that promote more diverse arrangements, including 
decentralisation; accountability of managers; and, urgently address water resource 
management (United Nations and Republic of Ghana, 2004). 
 
From the perspective of this study, it is important to note that reforms in the urban 
water sector has moved in the direction of sharing of roles between two centralized 
agencies, the GWCL and a private operator, and not towards sharing roles with local 
government. Secondly, there is the need to analyse the dimensions of pluralist and 
decentralized arrangements in semi-urban and rural districts to justify their expansion 
in the future.  
 
6.3 Overview of Study districts 
 
6.31 Tamale Municipality70 
 
The Tamale municipality is located at the centre of the Northern Region of Ghana. 
Tamale is the capital of the Northern Region, as well as the economic capital of the 
entire deprived north of the country (comprising Northern, Upper East and Upper 
West Regions). It shares common boundaries with Savelugu-Nanton district to the 
                                                          
70 Based on Tamale Municipal Assembly (2002). 
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north, the other study district. Other districts on the border of Tamale are Tolon-
Kumbungu to the north-west, and East and West Gonja districts to the south and west 
respectively.  
 
In terms of physical features, Tamale is at the heart of the guinea Savannah belt, with 
just five months of rainfall in a year, and high temperatures (maximum day 
temperature ranges from 33o C to 39o C, while mean night temperatures range from 
20o to 22o C). The municipality occupies a total land area of 922 km2.  
 
Tamale is located 180 metres above sea level, with a generally rolling topography. 
Water bodies are scarce, consisting of a few seasonal streams, notably, the Pasam, 
Dirm-Nyogni and Kwaha, as well as dug-out pits and dams. There are about 91 of 
such dug-outs dotted around communities within the municipality.  Where these dug-
outs have been provided they serve as watering points for animals as well as for 
domestic purposes.  Most of these dug-outs dry up during the dry season.   
 
The municipality has a population of 342,00071 with an almost equal split between 
males and females. The population is a fast growing one, at 3.5% per annum, well 
above the national average of 2.6%72. The population density is 318.6 persons per 
square kilometre. The age structure shows a large youthful population, an indication 
of high fertility and low life expectancy. The population of Tamale is quite 
homogenous, comprising largely Dagomba (80%) who are mostly Muslim. 
Communal ownership is strong.  
 
Education in Tamale is far from universal levels, with girls at a disadvantage. Gross 
primary school enrolment is at 85%. Enrolment rate at the junior secondary school 
level is 53%, comprising 61% for boys and 44% for girls. Poverty maps point to 
Tamale as the richest district in northern Ghana, yet one of the poorest urban 
settlements in the country, with an incidence of poverty (head-count ratio) of above 
51%, well above the national level of 39.5% (Coulombe, 2004; Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2000). 
 
The economy of the Tamale is dominated by commerce, small-scale industries and 
agricultural services. Significant crops are rice, maize, sorghum, groundnuts and 
beans. The main industrial activities in the district include micro agro-processing 
activities such as rice milling, vegetable oil extraction, cotton ginning and textile or 
smock making. There are other micro enterprises involved in vehicle repairs, pre-
fabrication of spare parts, manufacturing farm implements, cloth and leather works, 
pottery and carpentry. 
 
Membership of the Tamale Municipal Assembly comprises 52 elected and 30 
appointed members including the Municipal Chief Executive (the Mayor) and the two 
members of Parliament who have no voting rights.  The Assembly is the highest 
political and administrative authority in the Municipality. The Municipality has sub-
district structures – 11 Zonal Councils and 91 Unit Committees. 
 
                                                          
71 Derived from Ghana Statistical Service (2001). 
72 Ghana Statistical Service (2001). 
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6.32 Savelugu-Nanton District73 
 
Savelugu-Nanton District was established in 1988 by PNDC Law 207. It shares a 
boundary with Tamale Municipality, the first study district.  Its total land area is 
1790.70 sq. km, accommodating a population of an estimated 101,00074. The District 
is within the Savannah woodland, which supports the growing of staples like rice, 
groundnuts, yam, cassava, maize cowpea, sorghum, millet and guinea-corn.  The 
White Volta and some of its tributaries flow through the district, providing physical 
advantages for local water systems.  
 
There are 135 communities in the district.  The communities are segregated into one 
(urban) town – Savelugu, the district capital and five other major settlements, which 
include Nanton, Diare, Pong-Tamale, Moglaa and Tampion and 129 villages.  Nearly 
20% of the population resides in the major towns. Agriculture employs majority of the 
population.  
 
The Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly is supported by one Urban Council and five 
Area Councils - Savelugu Urban Council and Moglaa, Pong-Tamale, Tampion, 
Nanton and Diare Area Councils.  Each Urban/Area Council is made up of Unit 
Committees that in turn comprise of communities.  There are a total of 81 Unit 
Committees.  Each Area Council has twenty (20) members constituting the 
representatives of Unit Committees and Assembly members. The Savelugu Urban 
Council has thirty (30) members, comprising 15 Unit Committee members (10 elected 
and five appointed members).   
 
The District Assembly is supported by five sub-committees on Finance and 
Administration, Works, Development Planning, Justice and Security, and Complaints 
and Public Relations. The Executive Committee oversees the sub-committees. There 
are also 11 departments operating as service agencies of the District Assembly.  
 
Poverty is high in Savelugu-Nanton. The incidence of poverty is estimated at 61.6%, 
10 percentage points higher than Tamale75. There are also significant challenges with 
education. About 40% of children of primary school-going age are not in school. 
About half of girls of primary school-going age are not in school. 
 
                                                          
73 Based on Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly (2001).  
74 Derived from Ghana Statistical Service (2001). 
75 Derived from Coulombe (2004). 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
7.0 DECENTRALISATION AND THE PROVISION OF WATER AND 
SANITATION IN SAVELUGU-NANTON DISTRICT 
 
In this chapter, we present an analysis of primary data on central-local relations in the 
provision of water and sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton district. We focus on the forms 
and emerging types of decentralisation and roles of various actors in the provision of 
water and sanitation in the district. 
 
7.1 Political decentralisation in Savelugu-Nanton 
 
In the framework of political decentralisation in Ghana, political representation and 
features of local government structures apply to all districts in the country76. Our 
research therefore focused on two other elements that will allow comparison of the 
extent of political decentralisation in the two districts. These are: (a) participation of 
consumers in all stages of the delivery of water and sanitation; (b) participation of 
civic associations in all stages of the delivery of water and sanitation.  
 
7.11 Participation of consumers 
 
During our survey respondents scored the participation of consumers at different 
stages in the delivery of water and sanitation as either high or medium. Scoring was 
based on a scale 0-5, with zero as no participation, and five as high participation. 
Table 7.1 provides details of the results in Savelugu-Nanton district. 
 
Table 7.1: Participation of consumers in service delivery 
Stage of service delivery Average score 
Planning High 
Financing Medium 
Maintenance High 
Monitoring Medium 
Source: research by author 
 
Structured community meetings for planning and training of women in simple 
maintenance procedures were reasons provided for giving high score. In cases were 
households could not contribute financially to initial investment, citizen groups in the 
richer south of the country were mobilised to fill the financial gap. Hence the medium 
score for financing was given. The Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly and its 
partners have clear guidelines for community participation in general and for water 
and sanitation in particular. 
 
7.12 Participation of civic associations 
 
Respondents scored as medium, the participation of civic associations at all stages of 
service delivery in the delivery of water and sanitation services. Table 7.2 provides 
details.  
 
                                                          
76 See Chapter 3 for detailed discussion of political decentralization in Ghana. 
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Table 7.2: Participation of civic associations in service delivery 
Stage of service delivery Average score 
Planning Medium 
Financing Medium 
Maintenance Medium 
Monitoring Medium 
Source: research by author 
 
Various citizen associations are involved at various stages including Youth 
Associations, Food Sellers’ Associations, Market Women Association, Butchers’ 
Association, women’s groups. Involvement at various stages is mainly through 
invitation to district level meetings and occasional fund raising campaigns. 
Community Water and Sanitation Committees (CWSCs, popularly known as 
“watsans”) are particularly important mechanisms for community level fund raising 
and maintenance, and provide a link with Area Mechanics and the District Water and 
Sanitation Team (DWST). CWSCs exist in 98% of communities with boreholes. 
 
Government departments that are heavy users, particularly Health, Education and 
Agriculture are also involved in planning. 
 
7.13 How effective is civil society in accountability? 
 
On a scale of five, respondents scored three for the effectiveness of civil society in 
keeping accountability in the water and sanitation sector (through budget monitoring, 
media discussions, etc.). Focus group discussions brought out reasons for the 
moderate score. Reasons for the moderate score relate to level of participation of civil 
society, mainly through invitation to meetings. With the exception of meetings of the 
Savelugu Water Board, accountability issues are rarely discussed at meetings. 
Secondly, civic associations in the district are more oriented towards community 
mobilisation for implementation than towards advocacy. 
 
Using Hollensteiner’s typology of participation, overall, Savelugu-Nanton district 
appears to be between Planning and Management and Representation in Policy 
Making (see Box 7.1)77. According to local civil society leaders, civic associations 
require skills in advocacy, as well as more information on details of service delivery, 
such as accounts and monitoring reports, to increase their level of participation. 
  
Box 7.1: Hollensteiner’s typology of Participation 
 
Hollensteiner (1986) defines the extent of participation in terms of (from bottom to top): 
• Participation by only rich 
• Legitimisation of projects among beneficiaries 
• Consultation 
• Planning and management 
• Representation in policy making 
• Full control 
 
Source: Hollensteiner (1986) 
 
                                                          
77 Similar typologies are also presented by Mikkelsen (1995); and DfID (1995). 
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7.2 Administrative decentralisation and distribution of roles 
 
The extent of administrative decentralisation and role distribution/concentration in the 
provision of water and sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton district is ascertained through 
analysis of roles, staff capacity for service provision as well as other measures of 
administrative decentralisation in the following sections.  
 
7.21 Definition and distribution of roles: Water 
 
Actors in the provision of water and sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton are the Savelugu-
Nanton District Assembly (SNDA), Community Water and Sanitation Agency 
(CWSA), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), District Water and Sanitation 
Team (DWST), Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), 
Ministry of Works and Housing (MWH), Community Water and Sanitation 
Committees (CWSCs), Savelugu (town) Water Board, donors and private contractors. 
 
Our survey revealed that there is clarity in the definition of all key roles in the 
provision of water except for leadership, oversight and ownership of assets (see Table 
7.3 and Table 7.4). The picture emerging from definition and distribution of roles is 
one of shared responsibility principally between the SNDA and CWSA Hq. The other 
players support these two managers to ensure provision of water. Even community 
management, one essential principle projected by the literature78 appears to be 
stimulated and managed by the two principal actors (CWSA Hq and the SNDA).  
 
                                                          
78 The concept of “community management” of water and sanitation is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Table 7.3: Roles that are clearly distributed in Savelugu-Nanton district: Water 
Roles in service 
provision 
Responsibility  Remarks 
Policy formulation • Ministry of Works and Housing (MWH)  Policy formulation by MWH is 
usually not backed by funding 
Planning  • CWSA Headquarters (CWSA Hq) and 
donors for design of projects of lead 
donors 
• SNDA for district-wide (multi-sectoral 
and multi- year) planning 
CWSA Hq designs projects with 
bigger donors. DAs incorporate 
such projects into own plans. 
Otherwise DAs plan jointly with 
smaller donors, particularly NGOs 
during annual planning meetings 
Budgeting • DA prepares annual budget for 
responsible functions (including 5% of 
water budget) 
• Regional CWSA (budgets for CWSA 
activities in region) 
• CSWA Hq for CWSA projects in country 
Depends on the level of project 
design. Region is mainly for 
monitoring implementation of DA 
plans. However some donor 
projects are managed by the 
Regional CWSA. 
Coordination • DA (DPCU+DWST), (through planning 
and review meetings)  
• CWSA Region coordinates projects 
across districts 
DA has a mechanism for 
coordination: annual and mid year 
review meetings for all 
stakeholders and all sectors 
Financing • DA (5%) 
• Community (5%) 
• Ministry of Finance/CWSA Hq (largely 
from donor funds; if loan, repayment of 
through general revenues) 
Donor funds account for 90% of 
investment costs through the 
MoF/CWSA Hq 
Operation (actual 
service delivery) 
• Consulting firms (feasibility studies and 
supervision of construction) 
• Contractors/NGOs (construction) 
• CWSCs/Water Board (O&M) 
Evidence of pluralism involving 
the private sector in operation and 
maintenance. Subject is discussed 
in chapter 9. 
Maintenance • Community/Water Board/ CWSCs 
• Area mechanics 
• DA/donors (funds some maintenance)  
CWSCs undertake simple 
maintenance tasks or report the 
issue to Area Mechanics or the 
DWST.   
Regulation • Community (use, security, tariff setting 
for particular community) 
• Water Board (proposes tariffs for town 
system only) 
• DA (tariff approval for town system only) 
• CWSA Hq (approves financing 
arrangement, formulates standards)  
DA approves tariffs for town water 
system which it oversees. PURC 
tariff composition and levels serve 
as a guide.  
Standards are set by CWSA. 
Enforcement of standards is weak. 
Brokerage/partner
ship building and 
management 
• SNDA (contracting) 
• CWSA Regional (consulting, contracting 
in some instances)  
• Donors (contracting)  
SNDA is most active in 
performing brokerage roles 
Auditing • Audit Service (central government 
agency is responsible) 
Auditor-General of the country has 
clear role for auditing DAs. 
Source: research by author 
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Table 7.4: Roles that are not clearly defined: Water provision in Savelugu-Nanton 
Roles in service provision Unclear issues 
Leadership  During our research, key informants could not clearly indicate 
who was accountable for absence of water – whether community 
leaders, the SNDA, CWSA Hq or MWH.  
Oversight It was also not clear whether the SNDA or CWSA regional office 
was responsible for the oversight role. 
Asset ownership  Key informants and secondary data could not give a clear picture 
about asset ownership. It was not clear whether assets are owned 
by the community (due to community ownership principle of the 
CWSA, the SNDA (as law vaguely implies), GWCL (for 
pipelines running through the district) or CWSA Hq (due to lead 
role in capital investment). 
Source: research by author 
 
As presented by Table 7.3 and Table 7.4. roles for Leadership, Planning and 
Brokerage are dispersed among the SNDA, CWSA Headquarters and CWSA Region 
(see remarks on the CWSA chain in Box 7.2 below), donors and MWH - a feature that 
indicates the absence of devolution in the practice of decentralisation. Key informants 
could not clearly indicate who was accountable for absence of water. It was also not 
clear whether the SNDA or CWSA regional office was responsible for the oversight 
role. Key informants and secondary data could also not give a clear picture about 
asset ownership. It was not clear whether assets are owned by the community (due to 
community ownership principle of the CWSA, the SNDA, GWCL or CWSA Hq. 
 
Box 7.2: The CWSA chain 
 
CWSA Headquarters (Hq) 
CWSA Hq provides regulation and policy guidelines. Its role also includes project design and 
management (at the national level). The management instruments of CWSA Hq instruments are 
project-based; it has no sector-wide programme; it depends heavily donor projects (accounts for 90% 
of capital costs); government funds go into salaries and some O&M; user fees are not the driving force 
for O&M. 
  
CWSA Regional office 
The CWSA Regional office is a deconcentrated structure of the CWSA Hq. It is responsible for 
providing information on projects in the region. It also provides information for project design and 
accounting at the CWSA Hq level. In the Northern Region, The CWSA Regional Office manages 
donor projects that cover more than one district, including award of contracts and monitoring of 
projects. The CWSA Regional Office also provides technical assistance to districts with weak capacity. 
 
7.22 Definition and distribution of roles: Sanitation 
 
Our survey indicated that SNDA has far more responsibility for Planning, Budgeting, 
Coordination, Regulation and Brokerage roles in the provision of sanitation than 
water (see Table 7.5). This is because oversight responsibility for sanitation lies with 
the Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development (MLGRD), the Ministry that 
regulates activities of District Assemblies. The MLGRD supports District Assemblies 
with capacity development, standard setting and procurement of equipment. The 
MLGRD does however, not manage local sanitation projects. 
 
The SNDA also has far more responsibility for Planning, Budgeting, Coordination, 
Regulation and Brokerage roles in the provision of sanitation than water because of 
the larger role of households in providing sanitation. Households are responsible for 
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provision of own latrines, the DA for public use. The larger role of the SNDA in 
executing these four roles provides the advantage of proximity to local problems and 
an opportunity for greater local accountability. Roles are however not clearly 
distributed for Leadership (whether the District Assembly or Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development). There is no clear answer to the question: who 
can be held responsible for poor sanitation, the DA or MLGRD?  
 
Table 7.5: Role Distribution: Sanitation provision in Savelugu-Nanton 
Roles in service 
provision 
Responsibility  Remarks  
Policy formulation MLGRD  Policy formulation by 
MLGRD is usually not 
backed by funding 
Planning  • DA for district-wide multi-sectoral multi year planning) 
• MLGRD for donor projects that cover several regions 
and districts 
• CSWA for pilot demonstration projects and sanitation 
support to other government agencies  
Some donors design 
projects independently. 
DAs plan with such 
projects once informed. 
Other donors plan with the 
DA and communities.  
Budgeting • Households responsible for own system 
• DA budgets for public uses and co-financing with 
households to expand access (varies from 5% to 50% 
depending on conditions of donor project)  
• CWSA Hq (budgets for latrines for government agencies 
and demonstration of improved technology) 
• MLGRD for co-financing sanitation projects that it 
manages  
MLGRD’s role is mainly 
for capacity building and 
procurement of equipment 
Coordination DA (DPCU+DWST), (through planning and review 
meetings)  
DA has a mechanism for 
coordination: annual and 
mid year review meetings 
for all stakeholders and all 
sectors 
Financing • DA (5%-50%) 
• Community (5%-100%) 
• Donors through CWSA, MLGRD of DA (10%-50%) 
 
Donor funds account for 
90% of cost of service 
provision through the 
MoF/CWSA Hq 
Operation (actual 
service delivery) 
• Households 
• Contractors (for public use and demonstration projects) 
Contractors are involved in 
operation of public 
facilities and demonstration 
of new technology 
Maintenance • Households 
• DA (for public use)   
The SNDA’s role regards 
public facilities 
Regulation • MLGRD (standards setting)  
• CWSA (standard setting) 
Standard enforcement is 
weak 
Brokerage/partnersh
ip building and 
management 
• Co-financing with households and local NGOs 
• DA (contracting for public use) 
The SNDA is responsible 
for contracting private 
firms in operation of public 
facilities 
Auditing Audit Service (central government agency is responsible) The Auditor-General 
provides external audit 
services to all DAs 
Source: research by author. 
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7.23 Staff Capacity of the SNDA 
 
Staff levels 
Generally, the SNDA does not have enough staff for tasks related to the planning and 
management of basic services. The ratio of existing technical staff to required is 1:3. 
The ratio existing administrative staff to that required is better, at 3:5. District 
officials attribute the staffing gaps to a freeze on employment in the government 
sector by the Ministry of Finance.  
 
Structure and capacity of the District Water & Sanitation Team (DWST) 
At the district level, the DWST is proposed by the CWSA across the country to serve 
as a direct link between the DA and CWSA in the provision of water and sanitation. 
The DWST is basically a team of officers drawn from various departments.  
 
In Savelugu-Nanton, the DWST comprises, the Environmental Health Officer (Team 
Leader), Works Superintendent (from Public Works Department) and Community 
Mobiliser from the Department of Community Development. The DWST is 
responsible for mobilising communities and monitoring of O&M. The principal 
constraint of the DWST is that it is not a formal administrative structure of the 
District Assembly with a legal basis. It therefore cannot operate as a department and a 
budget/cost centre, and therefore has no regular budget for service delivery. The 
Central Administration of the District Assembly acts on its behalf in budgeting, 
thereby subjected to the vagaries of the Central Administration’s budget. The SNDA 
finances the running cost of the DWST. The DWST has no staff of its own. It draws 
on staff of various departments who work for both their parent departments as well as 
the DWST. 
 
According to the CWSA, DAs require the skills in the following to effectively 
manage water and sanitation provision: planning, budgeting, accounting, engineering, 
community development and environmental health. Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 show the 
Savelugu-Nanton DWST as deficient in the required skills areas. Most of its skills are 
at the technician level and are insufficient though with several years experience.  
 
Table 7.6: Levels of education and experience of members of the DWST 
Position of staff Level of education Years experience  
DWST Leader (staff of the Environment 
Health Unit of SNDA) 
Certificate in Environmental  
Health 
 
25 
Works Superintendent (staff of the Public 
Works Department) 
Intermediate Level, City & 
Guilds 
15 
 
Community mobiliser (staff of Department of 
Community Development) 
Certificate in Social Work 2 
Source: research by author. 
Table 7.7: Availability of required skills in the DWST 
Available skills in: Position of 
staff Water and sanitation 
sector planning and 
budgeting 
Coordination Monitoring Contract 
development and 
management 
Operation & 
maintenance 
DWST Leader Yes  Yes Yes  No No 
Works 
Superintendent 
No  
 
No Yes No Yes 
Community 
mobiliser 
No No Yes No No 
Source: research by author. 
 85
 
The SNDA draws on skills from other departments, and indeed, from outside the 
government system to complement those of the DWST. The District Works Engineer, 
(who has a Diploma in Civil Engineering and four years work experience) is not a 
member of the DWST, but provides technical support when required by the District 
Assembly. The District Works Engineer is staff of the deconcentrated Public Works 
Department (PWD). The PWD, if eventually decentralised, as required by Act 462, 
will constitute the Works Department of the District Assembly. 
 
Area level pump mechanics and community hand pump caretakers support the DWST 
at the community level. They have been trained in O&M.  The DWST is also 
supported by various NGOs in all areas of service provision. 
 
In sum, the SNDA does not have enough capacity to effectively manage water and 
sanitation provision. Nevertheless, the central role of the SNDA enables it to bring in 
skills from other central government departments, NGOs and community 
organisations. Most respondents indicate that this combination of formal and informal 
structures in management of service provision is working well. However, they also 
point out emerging strains on the current arrangement as the level of investment and 
scale of technology go up. Officials of the SNDA were unanimous in indicating the 
need for evolution of the current arrangement to a more a formal structure, in the form 
of devolution of the deconcentrated Works Department. They argue that a devolved 
Works Department would have its own budget and would be able to build the required 
skill base for service provision.   
  
By Act 462, the logical structure for water and sanitation is the District Works 
Department (DWD). The DWD is yet to be devolved from its current deconcentrated 
nature (of the central level Public Works Department) as required by law. Thus, as 
one official put it, the establishment of “the DWST should best be regarded as a 
transitional arrangement - to gradually let DAs get into the water and sanitation 
business”.  
 
7.24 Other features of administrative decentralisation 
 
Table 7.8 sums up how other features of administrative decentralisation occur in 
Savelugu-Nanton. 
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Table 7.8: Other features of administrative decentralisation in Savelugu-Nanton 
Feature  How feature is managed 
Duplication and gaps in 
service provision 
Participatory planning and review meetings are used by the SNDA to 
reduce duplication and gaps 
Regional CWSA coordination is limited to knowledge of resources that 
flow through the CWSA structure 
Matching roles, skills and 
financial resource flows 
There is a mismatch as some communities are neither able to carry out 
operation and maintenance (O&M) activities, nor provide counterpart 
funding. The District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) is also limited 
and irregular, reducing the capacity of the SNDA to carry out its tasks.  
Sequencing towards greater 
decentralisation? 
There is a sequence towards decentralisation in government and public-
private partnerships. Nevertheless, the SNDA is cash strapped and having 
problems sponsoring further decentralisation 
Participatory planning Exists for district multi sectoral planning under the guidance of NDPC. 
Also exists for water and sanitation under the guidance of CWSA. 
Participatory budgeting Does not exist. There is no mechanism to promote participatory budgeting 
Responsibility for hiring 
and firing of staff 
Lies with central government departments 
Determination of salaries Lies with central government departments 
Reporting  The DWST reports to the DCE 
Approval of priorities SNDA for district priorities and counterpart funding 
Water grant/loan approved by Parliament/Ministry of Finance 
Regulation There is a regulatory framework for rural water by CWSA, which is 
largely followed. The MLGRD regulates provision of sanitation. 
Target setting SNDA sets target at the district level, through multi-sectoral multi-year 
participatory planning 
Setting of standards CWSA Hq and MLGRD set standards. It is not clear which agency is 
responsible for monitoring enforcement of standards. 
Source: research by author. 
 
 
SNDA’s emphasis on participatory planning has strengthened its brokerage role. 
Participatory planning sessions enable flow of information on available investments 
and how such investments should be targeted.  Generally, there is a sequence towards 
decentralisation in government and public-private partnerships in Savelugu-Nanton. 
Nevertheless, SNDA officials point to the need for more resources to enable further 
decentralisation. 
 
 
7.3 Fiscal decentralisation 
 
7.31 Sources of investment in water and sanitation 
 
The main sources of investment for water and sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton are: (a) 
locally generated revenues; (b) the District Assembly Common Fund79 (DACF); (c) 
donor funds through CWSA to the SNDA and donor funds directly to the SNDA; (d) 
community contributions in cash and kind. The law provides for loans through the 
Ministry of Finance, but the SNDA does not use this source. The SNDA officials have 
the perception that loans will not be approved by the Ministry of Finance, though no 
official communication has been received from the latter.  
 
                                                          
79 5% of national tax revenues set aside for District Assemblies. See Chapter 3 for details. 
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Donor contributions dominate investment in water and sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton 
(see Figure 7.1). Investment from government sources for 1998-2002 account for just 
3% (2% from SNDA and 1% from CWSA). Moreover, government contribution is 
uneven (see Figure 7.2), a feature explained by SNDA staff as due to irregular 
disbursement of the DACF. Community contribution (5%) is higher than 
government’s contribution.   
 
Figure 7.1: Share of Investment in Savelugu-Nanton 1998-2002 
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Source: SNDA official records. 
 
Contribution from central government through CWSA to investment is not common 
and is usually for technical assistance. For example, the 0.8% share of investment in 
Figure 7.1 represents funds to demonstrate the benefits of improved technology for 
sanitation.  
 
Figure 7.2: Share of investment by year in Savelugu-Nanton 
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Source: SNDA official records. 
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a) Locally generated revenue  
 
The contribution of locally generated revenues to the water and sanitation budget is 
negligible, under 1%.  
 
b) DACF 
 
About 45% of the DACF is at the discretion of the SNDA. The DACF is the main 
source of the SNDA expenditure on water and sanitation. Prior to 2002, an additional 
5% of the DACF was deducted at source by the MLGRD to purchase sanitation 
equipment, a practice that has been curtailed. SNDA’s share of the DACF finances 
about 2% of total investment in water and sanitation in the district. The SNDA’s 
contribution is below the 5% required by the CWSA. This is because several NGOs 
operating at the local level do not demand counterpart funding from the SNDA and 
communities, especially in communities with high incidence of water-borne diseases.  
 
Nevertheless, the SNDA made a significant 16.7% to the total investment budget in 
1998 when its counterpart funding was sought to commence a piped water system for 
the district capital, Savelugu, a USD 650,000 project largely financed by UNICEF in 
1998-2000 (see Chapter 11 for detailed discussion of the partnership arrangement for 
the Savelugu Town System). This was cited by local officials as willingness of the 
SNDA to prioritise water over other sectors when large capital investment was 
required. Other SNDA investments in water after 2000 have gone into wells. 
 
c) Donor funds  
 
About 92% of investment in water and sanitation come from donors, directly to the 
SNDA or through the CWSA to the SNDA. This source finances feasibility studies 
and construction/ drilling.  Donor contribution to the district’s investment budget in 
1998-2002 is 96% for water and 62% for sanitation, with an average of 92%. 
Community contribution plays a greater role in financing sanitation. 
 
d) Community contributions 
 
Community contribution to investment in water and sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton for 
1998-2002 is about 5%. Communities contribute more to the district’s sanitation 
investment budget (16%), than its water budget (2%). Community contribution is 
below the required 5% (by CWSA) as several NGOs do not demand co-financing in 
guineaworm endemic communities.  
 
7.32 Total local contribution to investment 
 
Total local contribution (community’s and SNDA’s) for sanitation is about one-fifth 
of the total and five times that for water, indicating deeper decentralisation for 
sanitation (see Figure 7.3). In addition, the SNDA usually has discretion in the 
location of donor and central government projects.  
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Figure 7.3: Local contribution to investments in Savelugu-Nanton 
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Source: SNDA official records. 
 
 
7.4 Conclusions 
 
In sum, Savelugu-Nanton displays the following features regarding central-local 
relations in the provision of water and sanitation: 
 
• High to medium political decentralisation, based on participation of consumers 
and civic associations 
• In terms of administrative decentralisation, there is generally a clear distribution 
of many of the key roles, but considerable capacity challenges exist. Nevertheless, 
the SNDA exercises flexibility in pooling skills from other government agencies 
and the non state sector for provision of both water and sanitation  
• A combination of very limited fiscal decentralisation, and a heavy dependence on 
donor sources for service provision, particularly for water. 
 
In terms of the type of decentralisation and pluralism, Savelugu-Nanton appears to 
exhibit a combination of delegation and pluralism where partnerships are promoted in 
the following ways:  
 
• Delegation by CWSA to the District Assembly and communities in the 
provision of water. The delegated role of the SNDA is enhanced by donors 
who work directly with the SNDA and the operations of the DWST.  
• Delegation in the provision of sanitation. Greater sharing of roles in provision 
of sanitation between central government agencies and the SNDA, but with 
central control over staffing.  
• Institutional pluralism in the provision of both water and sanitation. Pluralism 
in the provision of water is much greater than that for sanitation as roles are 
distributed among SNDA, central government agencies, NGOs, communities 
and the private sector. Pluralism is just beginning to emerge in the provision of 
sanitation where roles are more concentrated in the government structure and 
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involvement of NGOs and CBOs, though present, is much less than in the case 
of water.  
 
In addition, the SNDA benefits from the services of the deconcentrated branch of the 
CWSA at regional level. 
 
The SNDA’s brokerage role in the provision of both water and sanitation is 
noteworthy. The SNDA brokers partnerships through preparation of technical and 
financial proposals, coordination of plan preparation and project implementation and 
through monitoring of access and use of facilities. In areas where the SNDA has no 
skills or formal administrative structures to respond to challenges, it draws on other 
government agencies, donor agencies and NGOs sources to supplement its weak 
capacity.  
 
One observation is the dominant role of the SNDA at almost every stage of provision 
of both water and sanitation. Despite lack of clarity in the distribution of certain roles, 
the SNDA is not excluded and has indeed sought to include itself in organising 
service provision.  
 
Nevertheless, current transitional institutional arrangements, like the DWST, need to 
continue and to evolve to more permanent and well-staffed departments with their 
own budgets. Secondly, informal arrangements for pooling skills from government 
and non state sources need to develop further as challenges in service provision 
increase.  
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CHAPTER 8  
 
8.0 DECENTRALISATION AND THE PROVISION OF WATER AND 
SANITATION IN TAMALE  
 
This chapter presents an analysis of primary data on central-local relations in the 
provision of water and sanitation in Tamale municipality. Like the previous chapter 
on Savelugu-Nanton, this chapter analyses the forms and emerging types of 
decentralisation and roles of various partners in the provision of water and sanitation 
in Tamale. 
 
8.1 Political decentralisation 
 
8.11 Participation of consumers and civic associations 
 
As in the case of Savelugu-Nanton, the extent of political decentralisation in Tamale 
is analysed on the basis of participation of consumers and civic associations in the 
various stages of service delivery. Other determinants of political decentralisation, 
particularly, the election (or otherwise of leaders) are not analysed as they apply to all 
districts in the country by law (see Chapter 3 for discussion of laws and policies). 
 
Our household survey revealed that citizen participation in service delivery is not 
advanced in Tamale like in Savelugu-Nanton. Respondents ranked as low the 
participation of consumers in planning, operation, maintenance and financing. 
Participation of civic associations was regarded as low for all stages. Further 
interviews with service providers confirmed this observation. The Ghana Water 
Company Limited (GWCL), providers of water for the town, and the Tamale 
Municipal Assembly (TMA), providers of sanitation, ranked participation of 
consumers and civic associations as low in all stages of service provision.  
 
8.12 How effective is civil society in accountability? 
 
Furthermore, respondents indicated low scores for the effectiveness of civil society at 
keeping local accountability. On a scale of five, respondents scored one for water and 
two for sanitation for the effectiveness of civil society at keeping accountability. 
Reasons for the low score relate to level of participation of civil society, mainly 
through infrequent invitation to meetings on sanitation and almost no involvement for 
water. Using Hollensteiner’s typology of participation, overall, Tamale appears to be 
between Legitimisation of projects among beneficiaries and Consultation (see Box 
7.1 in Chapter 7 for Hollensteiner’s typology). According to local civil society 
leaders, formal administrative mechanisms need to be established to promote 
structured participation of civil society in decision-making.  
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8.2 Administrative decentralisation and distribution of roles 
 
8.21 Definition and distribution of roles 
 
Actors in the provision of water and sanitation in Tamale are the Tamale Municipal 
Assembly (TMA), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), Ministry of Local 
Government & Rural Development, Ministry of Works and Housing, Area Councils, 
private contractors and donors. Generally, many of the essential roles for service 
provision are clearly defined in Tamale. Details are as follows: 
 
Leadership 
 
There is clarity in the definition of Leadership. The GWCL is responsible for 
provision of water, and the TMA for sanitation. The GWCL exercises leadership 
through target setting in planning of service provision.  
 
Policy formulation 
 
Responsibility for policy formulation for water is with the MWH; that for sanitation is 
with the MLGRD. 
 
Planning 
 
The TMA is responsible for district-wide multi year planning. The GWCL plans for 
delivery of water and the TMA for sanitation. There is no common sector plan for 
water and sanitation. The TMA has no fiscal instruments to influence the operations 
of the GWCL. The GWCL has also none regarding the TMA. 
 
Budgeting 
 
Responsibility for budgeting water and sanitation are split between GWCL and TMA 
respectively. The two processes are not linked. The GWCL does not receive nor share 
information on budgets with TMA. There is no mechanism for coordination. 
 
Financing  
 
Roles are clear. GWCL raises funds through user fees, central government grants and 
loans that are usually guaranteed by central government. TMA finances sanitation 
through user fees (for public facilities), DACF and local revenues. 
 
Operation and Maintenance 
 
Roles are clear. GWCL has own staff for O&M for water. TMA contracts out O&M 
for public toilets. It also has staff for maintenance. Households manage their own 
facilities. 
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Regulation 
 
Responsibility for regulation of water supply is clear. It lies with the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Commission. That for sanitation is not clear, whether the MLGRD or 
TMA. 
 
Setting targets 
 
The TMA sets targets for water and sanitation in its municipal plans. Setting of targets 
for water is meaningless as the TMA’s plans do not cover the activities of GWCL and 
vice versa. Unsurprisingly, targets set for water by two rounds of municipal plans 
have not been achieved. GWCL Tamale follows targets set by GWCL Headquarters 
and not those set by the TMA. Target setting for sanitation is nevertheless the 
responsibility of the TMA.  
 
Monitoring 
 
Responsibility for monitoring regards use, equipment failure, repair time and plan 
implementation. GWCL is responsible for monitoring water supply. That for 
sanitation is not clear. As will be discussed in the next Chapter, there are significant 
gaps in monitoring. 
 
Auditing 
 
Responsibility for auditing is clear, with the Audit Service, a public service agency. 
Accounts of the TMA are audited once a year, short of the recommended two times, 
due to resource constraints. Some donors sponsor independent audits of their projects. 
 
Asset ownership 
 
Asset ownership is clear for sanitation – for households or the TMA, and for water by 
the GWCL.  
 
Brokerage/partnership building  
 
The TMA is responsible for brokerage/partnership building for sanitation. GWCL 
Headquarters is responsible for partnership building for water, even at the district 
level. The role of the private sector in provision of water in Tamale is dependent on 
the policy of GWCL Headquarters. As discussed in Chapter 5, GWCL Headquarters 
has opted for a management contract model. Implementation is due to start in 2006. 
Nevertheless, the peripheral settlements of Tamale, where water is most scarce have 
been working with local NGOs and CBOs to access underground water through wells.  
 
Regarding sanitation, management of 23 of the 95 public toilets in Tamale have been 
contracted out to private operators. The remainder are managed by Area Councils of 
the TMA. The TMA has a plan to contract out all public toilets in phases.   
 
Thus, there is clarity in the distribution of roles for service provision, except for 
monitoring of sanitation and brokerage of community level partnerships for water in 
peripheral settlements.  
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8.22 Administrative structure and staff capacity for service provision 
 
Unlike Savelugu-Nanton, Tamale has never put together a sector investment plan for 
water and sanitation. Senior management of the TMA explained this as due to its 
limited role in water. No reason was given for sanitation. However, the main reason 
appears to be the absence of the prompting and regulatory role of CWSA as in semi-
urban and rural districts. 
 
The TMA prepares three to five-year Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs), 
based on guidelines from NDPC. The Municipal Planning Coordinating Unit (MPCU) 
coordinates plan preparation. GWCL is not part of the TMA structure. It is therefore 
not covered by the TMA budget. Water targets in the TMA plans, where they are 
present, are merely indicative of the wishes of the MPCU. GWCL does not set these 
targets and is not obliged to follow them.  
 
The DACF budget of the TMA is implemented mainly through infrastructural 
projects. Projects are awarded on contract through the Municipal Advisory Tender 
Board whose membership is made up of the chairpersons of the Development 
Planning Sub Committee, the Social Services Sub-Committee, Finance & 
Administration Sub-Committee, the Municipal Coordinating Director, and Municipal 
Planning Officer80. The TMA pays for executed projects on the basis of progress 
reports prepared by the Municipal Planning Officer.  
 
The TMA MPCU has not established the practice of semi-annual reviews of the 
annual or semi-annual reviews of the municipal plan as in Savelugu-Nanton. There is 
no mechanism to promote participation in budgeting. The reason is also due to less 
partnership with donors like UNICEF, who supported the SNDA to implement such 
initiatives. 
 
The Works Department 
 
The TMA has a Works Department, which oversees construction activities in the 
municipality. The Works Department has one (Geodetic) Engineer, a Hygiene 
Educator and several artisans. The Department supervises construction and 
management of sanitation facilities, but has marginal role in water provision, which is 
the preserve of the GWCL. Moreover, like many decentralised departments, 
responsibility for recruiting and firing members of the Works Department lies with 
their parent department, the Public Works Department.  
 
The TMA Works Department has limited skills in management of water and 
sanitation. Just the engineer has skills in contract development.  
 
Table 8.1: Levels of education and experience of staff responsible for public works   
Position of staff Qualifications Years experience  
Municipal Engineer BSc Geodetic Engineering 5 
Environmental Health Officer  Certificate in Environmental Health 15 
Works Superintendents Technician level  
Source: TMA official records. 
                                                          
80 The structure of committees of the District Assembly is discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6. 
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Under the influence of its Municipal Coordinating Director, a former manager with 
the SNDA, the TMA proposes to establish a Municipal Water and Sanitation Team 
(MWST) along the guidelines of the CWSA. The purpose is to attract funds and skills 
from the CWSA chain (see Box 7.2) for peripheral settlements of the municipality 
that the service of the GWCL does not cover.  
 
8.23 Other features of decentralisation 
 
Table 8.2 sums up other features of administrative decentralisation that occur in 
Tamale. There are efforts to sequence the distribution of roles in sanitation provision 
towards decentralisation in government and public-private partnerships for sanitation. 
However, there has been no move towards greater decentralisation for the supply of 
water. Generally, the distribution of roles is clearly defined for water (by the GWCL) 
and for sanitation (by the TMA).  
 
Table 8.2: Other features of administrative decentralisation in Tamale 
Feature Status  
Sequencing of roles towards greater 
decentralisation? 
• There is a greater move towards decentralisation within 
government and public-private partnerships for 
sanitation 
• There has been no move towards greater decentralisation 
for the supply of water  
Matching skills and financial resource 
flows: 
• Concentration of roles in the GWCL reduces potential 
financial contribution by the TMA for water 
• The TMA has staff capacity far less than that required by 
civil service establishment to manage the sanitation 
sector. 
• GWCL Tamale is within its skill limit as established by 
GWCL headquarters 
How duplication is managed: • Duplication is reduced by the clear roles of the GWCL 
for water and TMA for sanitation and the limited role of 
the private sector in the actual provision of services. 
Participatory planning: • Limited for water and sanitation due to dispersal of roles. 
GWCL does not promote participatory planning. The 
TMA has also no participatory review of its plans. 
Participatory budgeting: • Does not exist. There is no mechanism to promote 
participatory budgeting 
Responsibility for hiring and firing of 
staff: 
• GWCL Headquarters is responsible for water 
• Central government responsible for technical staff 
• TMA is responsible for casual staff.  
Determination of salaries: • Lies with central government departments 
Reporting:  • GWCL Tamale reports to Headquarters  
• The Works Department reports to both its Regional 
Offices and the TMA 
Approval of priorities: • GWCL for water 
• TMA for sanitation 
Regulation: • PURC for water 
• That for sanitation is not clear 
Setting of standards: • GWCL for water; MLGRD for sanitation 
Source: research by author. 
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In sum, administrative decentralisation regarding provision of water and sanitation 
has quite distinct features in Tamale. Role definition in Tamale appears to be much 
clearer than in Savelugu-Nanton, primarily because water in Tamale is provided by a 
deconcentrated public utility, the GWCL. This feature also indicates less pluralism in 
provision of water. The GWCL has no links with the TMA in the provision of water. 
The TMA nonetheless, has greater responsibility for the provision of safe sanitation. 
The TMA also carries out actual provision of public sanitation facilities, more than 
the private sector. As local officials indicate, the TMA dominates the provision of 
sanitation. Partnership building is limited to contracting out management of selected 
public facilities to the private sector.  
 
8.3 Fiscal decentralisation 
 
The GWCL’s sources of investment are central government grants, user fees and 
donor funds and loans as obtained by central government. TMA’s sources of 
investment are locally generated revenues, the DACF, other central government 
grants and donor funds. Revenue from user fees (from public toilets) goes into O&M 
and not investment. 
 
As in the case of Savelugu-Nanton, the law provides for loans through the Ministry of 
Finance, but the TMA does not use this source. The TMA administration also has the 
perception that loans will not be approved by the Ministry of Finance, though no 
official communication has been received from the latter.  
 
Analysis of investment in water and sanitation in Tamale is based on data obtained 
from both the TMA and the GWCL Regional Office/Tamale Office. On average the 
TMA contributed a little over a quarter of investments in sanitation from 2001 to 2003 
(see Figure 8.1) and less than 1% of the investment in water. Central government 
dominates investment in water. GWCL’s (Headquarters) is at a low 7%.  Donor 
contribution is more significant in sanitation, where direct partnership with the TMA 
is possible, unlike the case of water where GWCL Headquarters approval is required.  
 
Figure 8.1: Share of investment in Tamale, 2001-2003 
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Source: TMA and GWCL official records. 
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The bulk of the TMA’s spending on the sector is derived from the DACF. Overall, 
about 80% of TMA’s expenditure on water and sanitation is financed and controlled 
by central transfers, mainly donor funds and part of the DACF, leaving just 20% for 
local discretion. Transfers are irregular. Local expenditure on the sector financed from 
local revenues is negligible (1%).  
 
 
8.4 Summary of features of decentralisation in Tamale 
 
In sum, Tamale displays the following features of central-local relations in the 
provision of water and sanitation: 
 
• Low level of political decentralisation based on participation of consumers and 
civic associations. 
• In terms of administrative decentralisation, clear roles for service provision, 
nevertheless, there is concentration of roles for water in the GWCL structure, with 
deconcentration from GWCL Headquarters to GWCL Tamale. There are also 
considerable capacity challenges.  
• Limited contribution of TMA and donors to water provision. 
• Greater sharing of roles in provision of sanitation, but with a bias in concentration 
of roles in the TMA and control of staffing by central government – suggesting 
delegation in the provision of sanitation within the government sector mainly, with 
communities, NGOs and the private sector playing a minimal, albeit increasing 
role. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
9.0 DIFFERENCES IN DECENTRALISATION BETWEEN THE TWO 
DISTRICTS 
 
In this chapter, we build, on the previous discussion, by comparing the dimensions of 
central-local relations in the provision of water and sanitation in the two districts.  We 
provide additional analysis of the types of decentralisation and extent of pluralism in 
the provision of water and sanitation in the two districts. 
 
9.1 Summary of features 
 
There are differences in the approaches to central-local relations for the delivery of 
water and sanitation in the two study districts (see Table 9.1 for a summary). Overall, 
Savelugu-Nanton exhibits a more decentralised and plural approach to the provision 
of water and sanitation. This is particularly so for water, where GWCL maintains a 
deconcentrated approach and has no partnership with the TMA. The TMA has also 
not initiated any partnership arrangement with the GWCL to improve the delivery of 
water.  
 
Regarding sanitation, both Savelugu-Nanton and Tamale have similar approaches to 
the delivery of sanitation – more towards decentralisation, but with responsibilities for 
staffing and in a partial way, funding, managed from above. Local government also 
dominates service provision, particularly in Tamale (see Figure 9.1). Pluralism is 
exhibited more in the provision of sanitation than in Tamale, albeit in a much less 
fashion than the case of water. 
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Table 9.1: Summary features of central-local relations in the two study districts 
Features of central-
local relations 
 Indicators Savelugu-Nanton Tamale 
Political 
decentralization  
Involvement of consumers/civic associations 
in stages of service delivery 
Medium ranking - at the level of involvement in 
planning, financing and management (using 
Holleinsteiner's typology) 
Low ranking - at the level of "legitimisation" 
(using Holleinsteiner's typology) for both water 
and sanitation 
Administrative 
decentralization & 
role analysis 
Responsibility for staff hiring, firing, wages National responsibility National responsibility 
  Clarity of responsibilities Mixed but pluralism and sequencing plan towards 
greater pluralism for both water and sanitation 
Clarity but centralised and concentrated roles 
within a deconcentrated structure for water; for 
sanitation role towards decentralization 
 Local responsibility for planning, O&M Planning, O&M for both water and sanitation O&M only for water; planning and O&M for 
sanitation 
 Responsibility for regulatory framework Enforces nation-wide plus local leadership for 
water and sanitation 
National for water and sanitation 
  Local government setting targets Partial for water; yes for sanitation No, for water; yes for sanitation 
  Local government setting standards None None 
Fiscal 
decentralization  
Investment in sector financed and earmarked 
by central transfers 
Partial for both water and sanitation Yes for water; partial for sanitation 
  Investment in sector financed by central but 
controlled by district 
Partial for both water and sanitation No for water; partial for sanitation 
  local expenditure on sector financed from 
local revenues 
>1% for both water and sanitation >1% for both water and sanitation 
  share of revenue in sector raised and managed 
by district 
All for both water and sanitation Partial for water; all for sanitation 
Partnerships Responsibility for managing partnerships District responsibility for both water and sanitation 
under national guidelines 
National responsibility for water; district 
responsibility for sanitation under national 
guidelines 
  Responsibilities devolved to partner Combination: to town councils, NGOs, 
communities 
Limited for water NGOs coming in where GWCL 
fails; for sanitation partial 
  Coordination mechanism Regular planned meetings Limited information exchange 
  Co-financing arrangement User fees plus local government User fees plus central government for water; user 
fees plus local government for sanitation 
  Competition Water: pluralism; sanitation: domination by SNDA Water: distributed monopoly; sanitation: 
domination by TMA  
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Figure 9.1 applies scores (minimum score of 0 and maximum score of 4) to the 
indicators of central-local relations in service provision for each district described in 
Table 9.1 above. Details of how we apply the scores to the manifestation of forms of 
decentralisation as well pluralism in the provision of water and sanitation are 
presented in Annex 9.1 and Annex 9.2 (Annex 9.2a for water and 9.2b for sanitation). 
Overall, Savelugu-Nanton has a more decentralized and plural system of provision of 
water and sanitation as depicted by Figure 9.1. 
 
Figure 9.1: Extent of decentralisation and pluralism in the two districts 
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Furthermore, we observe the following when we apply the argument of Cohen and 
Peterson (1999) on decentralisation 81 to the findings of the study:  
 
Savelugu-Nanton 
  
1. Water provision: delegation and pluralism at the decentralised level of 
government (a quadrant IV feature in Figure 9.2). Roles are shared by two or 
more governmental institutions and/or private sector firms or community 
organizations. Roles are also spatially decentralized. 
2. For sanitation provision: delegation and pluralism at the decentralised level of 
government, also a quadrant IV feature in Figure 9.2. Pluralism has brought 
several opportunities to improve service delivery, including skills and 
resources from other actors who are not controlled by government.  
 
 
 
                                                          
81 This subject is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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Tamale 
1. Water provision: distributed monopoly and deconcentration of GWCL. Roles 
are not shared but concentrated in the GWCL structure. Responsibility for 
roles is spatially distributed (quadrant II in the Figure 9.2).  
2. Sanitation provision: mix of delegation within the government system (also a 
distributed monopoly or quadrant II feature in Figure 9.2). Nevertheless, we 
observe a move towards pluralism in the provision of sanitation in Tamale. 
This is due to a policy by the TMA to contract out management of a third of 
public sanitation facilities.  
 
Figure 9.2: Applying the ADF’s combination of spatial and roles analysis 
I 
Centralised monopoly  
 
III 
Institutional pluralism at centralised 
level 
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Water in Tamale: distributed 
monopoly: deconcentration within 
the government agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV 
Institutional pluralism  at 
decentralised level  
 
Water in Savelugu-Nanton: 
pluralism through partnerships 
with community groups, NGOs and 
private firms + delegation from 
central to local government   
 
Sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton: 
pluralism through co-financing by 
NGOs and contracting out 
operation of public facilities +  
delegation from central to local 
government  
 
Sanitation in Tamale: transition: delegation from central  
to local government + distributed monopoly which is moving towards 
pluralism (through contracting out operation of public facilities) 
  
 
 
Thus, the type of decentralisation existing in the two districts is not devolution, the 
objective of Ghana’s laws. This confirms our first hypothesis that decentralisation in 
practice in Ghana does not reflect what is specified by the country’s laws and 
referred to by Rondinelli (1981) as devolution, but rather a mixture of 
deconcentration and delegation.  We will in the next chapter test the second 
hypothesis, that when pluralism emerges at the decentralised level of government, it 
yields better performance than the case of distributed monopoly.  
 
In terms of sequencing of reforms, there appears to be some dynamism in central-
local relations in their evolution from one state to another. Our research indicates that 
historically, the responsibility for provision of water has evolved from centralisation 
to deconcentration with the establishment of the Tamale branch of the GWCL. 
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Responsibility for provision of sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton has evolved from 
deconcentration and distributed monopoly to delegation and pluralism, particularly 
with greater involvement of the private sector in the wider national economy since the 
late 1980s. That for Tamale appears to be moving in the same direction. 
Responsibility for provision of water in Savelugu-Nanton has evolved most, from 
centralisation to delegation with pluralism. 
 
 
9.2 Explaining the differences 
 
Discussions with key informants among service providers (managers of the two 
districts and water agencies) and municipal records point to four factors that explain 
the differences in central-local relations in the two districts:  
 
a) The CWSA Approach  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the CWSA approach is more akin to the delegation model 
of decentralisation (project design centrally, use of district staff in management, 
community participation, etc.) with some elements of partnerships (community co-
financing and co-management, NGO co-financing and co-management, etc.). The 
adoption of the CWSA approach to delivery of water by SNDA explains its adoption 
of features of community engagement, and community and district co-financing and 
management.  
 
b) The role of the District Assembly 
 
District key informants and municipal records indicate that the SNDA commenced 
promoting plural arrangements for the provision of basic services before the CWSA 
model took shape in the district. Key informants attributed this to the deep poverty in 
the district which called for more local action; high prevalence of diseases which 
called for partnerships; donor interest in the district because of the extent of poverty; 
and the newness of the district, which stimulated a high expectation of local 
government among citizens. (The Savelugu-Nanton district was established in 1988, 
having been carved out of the then West Dagomba district, the core of which was also 
established as the Tamale Municipality).  
 
According to district officials, one of the most important contributions of donors is by 
enhancing the leadership, brokerage and oversight roles of the SNDA – through 
capacity building in participatory district-wide planning. District-wide participatory 
planning meetings are held twice a year in Savelugu-Nanton, but not in Tamale. 
District-wide participatory plan review/monitoring meetings are also held twice a year 
in Savelugu-Nanton, but not in Tamale. As one staff of a donor agency put it: “the 
brokerage role of the District Assembly has to be nurtured through specific tools that 
promote leadership and accountability. A weak District Assembly can be supported to 
lead other actors through the introduction of participatory management processes”. 
Box 9.1 presents a summary of the participatory planning approaches in Savelugu-
Nanton. 
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Box 9.1: Participatory planning in Savelugu-Nanton 
 
In addition to medium term plans required by the National Development Planning Commission, the 
SNDA leads the district in preparing Annual Action Plans (AAPs). AAPs are operational planning and 
monitoring instruments. The process involves: 
 
• Beginning of year: planning for year in a participatory meeting; setting targets for current year’s 
AAP; identifying funding gaps; combining efforts for resource mobilization. 
• Mid year: The SNDA invites stakeholders to a mid year review of implementation of the AAP. 
• End of year: joint review of year’s achievement and lessons. 
 
Convenors of participatory meetings are the District Planning and Coordinating Unit (DPCU) of the 
SNDA. Participants include all SNDA Departments, Assembly members, NGOs, aid agencies in the 
district, private sector umbrella groups. Meetings are chaired by the Mayor or District Coordinating 
Director. 
 
Preparatory work for meetings is carried out by the DPCU, which puts together progress reports. 
Progress reports are widely distributed and discussed at meetings. Finances are discussed in a 
transparent manner at meetings. Departments consult donors directly for inputs into plans. The Mayor 
also lobbies central government and aid agencies directly to support the AAP. 
 
The practice was introduced with support of aid agencies operating in Savelugu-Nanton. Tamale does 
not have such a practice. 
 
Source: SNDA records, 2003 
 
 
c) Role of donor agencies  
 
Donor agencies support the leadership and brokerage roles of the SNDA through 
training, development of tools and on a lesser basis, use of consultants. Support is 
both demand-driven as well donor-driven. Donors usually insist on changes in 
management practices they view as negative to their investment in districts. 
Nevertheless, donor staff interviewed indicated that Savelugu-Nanton was more 
“proactive” in seeking support, and for specific tasks, than Tamale. The SNDA, for 
example, has a practice of requesting donors to provide their response to the district 
problems during planning meetings. District staff visit donors to learn of their 
programmes and to seek support. The TMA has no such practice.  The main 
difference appears to be the introduction of participatory planning approaches in 
Savelugu-Nanton. 
 
d) Partnerships 
 
As discussed in Table 9.1, Savelugu-Nanton engages more in partnerships, especially 
with local NGOs than Tamale. Key informants among NGOs indicate that the 
difference is not from co-financing arrangements (both districts have co-financing 
arrangements); but rather from their series of training over the years for community 
leaders and district staff in participatory planning and management practices (resource 
mobilisation techniques, sound bookkeeping, regular information flow, and 
accountability structures).  
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9.3 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has revealed that Savelugu-Nanton has a more decentralised and plural 
approach to the delivery of water and sanitation than Tamale. Secondly, and in 
confirmation of the first hypothesis, the study has demonstrated that the devolution 
objective of Ghana’s decentralisation reform is yet to materialize in both water and 
sanitation provision. The emerging type of decentralization is akin to delegation in the 
context of distributed monopoly and limited partnerships in the provision of sanitation 
in Tamale; and delegation in the context of pluralism in the provision of water and 
sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton.  Provision of water in Tamale is akin to 
deconcentration in the context of distributed monopoly. Thirdly, pluralism is being 
exhibited through role distribution among a range of partners for provision of water 
and sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton, and is beginning to emerge in the provision of 
sanitation in Tamale. In particular, pluralism in Savelugu-Nanton has pooled skills 
and resources from non state actors to fill the gaps that have been brought about by 
central government control over staffing and components of development finance. 
 
Institutional reforms introduced by the CWSA partly explain the differences in both 
districts. However, key informants from both districts are quick to point out the 
positive effects of the leadership and brokerage roles by the Savelugu-Nanton District 
Assembly in pooling of skills and funds from outside the government system for 
service delivery. We will in the next chapter discuss what matters most, that is, 
whether the various institutional approaches to service delivery by the two districts 
are producing improved development outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
10.0 DECENTRALISATION OF THE PROVISION OF BASIC SERVICES: 
PERFORMANCE OF THE TWO DISTRICTS 
 
This chapter presents analyses of the performance of the two districts in providing 
water and sanitation using five criteria. The objective is to determine which approach 
to decentralisation in service delivery is performing better. The basis of the analyses is 
primary data supplemented by secondary data from the two districts obtained during 
the field work component of the study. The emphasis is on the current state of service 
provision as well as changes that occurred within the study period (1998-2003). The 
study period coincides with the era of adoption of plural and more decentralised 
approaches to service delivery in Savelugu-Nanton. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Tamale revealed an approach of distributed monopoly in the provision of 
water and sanitation during the period. We utilise the criteria discussed in Chapters 2 
and 5 for assessing performance, and operationalise these in the two districts in the 
following way82:     
 
Criteria Measured by: 
Effectiveness a) changes in coverage of services  
b) reliability of service provision 
Efficiency c) changes in loss of water  
d) time taken to repair broken-down facilities  
e) average waiting time at water point 
f) investment per capita in service provision 
Accountability g) participation of civic associations in planning, financing and 
management of services 
h) frequency of audits  
i) number of times audit reports are discussed at District Assembly 
meetings 
Sustainability j) use of local skills in operation and maintenance  
k) proportion of local financing in new investments 
Influence on health l) changes in the incidence of water and environmentally-related diseases 
 
  
10.1 Effectiveness 
 
10.11 Coverage of safe water  
 
Coverage of safe drinking water83 increased almost four times in Savelugu-Nanton 
between 1998 and 2003 (see Figure10.1). On the other hand, safe water coverage in 
Tamale stagnated at 65% within the period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
82 We draw on the work of Bamberger et al. (2006) on “Real World Evaluation” for this purpose. 
83 Coverage of water and sanitation facilities is defined in Ghana as population served by design 
requirements of service option. See Yakubu (2003) for detailed discussion and Annex 6.2 for examples. 
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Figure 10.1: Coverage of safe water in the two districts 
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As discussed in Chapter 7, the increase in coverage in Savelugu-Nanton was due to 
new investments, particularly in the new Savelugu piped town system and in new 
boreholes. There was however limited investment and system expansion in Tamale. A 
policy of rationing was adopted by the GWCL to reach more citizens. Rationing 
enabled the GWCL to reach about 80% of the citizens but with less frequency and 
more walking distance. Reaching more citizens in Tamale with water was due to a 
compromise with the quality of service - in three ways:  
 
• Rationing of water in areas with regular flow in favour of areas with irregular 
service; 
• Shifts from indoor service to more communal services. Use of safe communal 
sources increased by about a third in the period (see Figure 10.2). Use of public 
standpipes, for example, increased by a 100%; 
• Longer distances and queues for nearly half of the year.  
 
Figure 10.2: Shifts in use of safe communal sources in Tamale (%) 
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10.12 Coverage of safe sanitation 
 
Coverage of safe sanitation went up in both Savelugu-Nanton and Tamale between 
1998 and 2003. The two districts are however far from universal levels of safe 
sanitation. Coverage of safe sanitation increased by 42% in Savelugu-Nanton - from 
11.2% in 1998 to 19.2% in 2003. In Tamale coverage of safe sanitation increased 
within the same period by 59%, from 23.5% to 56.8% (see Figure 10.3). 
 
Figure 10.3: % Population with safe sanitation in the two districts 
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10.13 Regularity of flow of water 
 
The regularity of flow of safe water in northern Ghana is determined by the 
management of the systems and the length of the dry season. In terms of piped water, 
Savelugu-Nanton, which purchases treated water from GWCL and distributes this 
through its district-managed system, performs better than Tamale, which has its 
system managed by GWCL (see Figure 10.4). 
 
Figure 10.4: Flow of piped water in the two districts 
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The two districts face serious water shortages in the dry season. In Savelugu-Nanton, 
the dry season shortage is being reduced through drilling of deeper wells, while in 
Tamale, it is through further rationing. This shows greater administrative flexibility in 
pursuing local solutions in Savelugu-Nanton. 
 
In the 1998-2003 period, the coverage of safe water sources at the peak of the dry 
season in Savelugu-Nanton doubled, from 12.1% to 25.4%. Nevertheless, half of safe 
water points provided from 1998 to 2002 dry up at the peak of the lean season. This 
comprises shallow hand-dug wells (mostly provided by NGOs). Shortages in Tamale 
are managed through further rationing by GWCL – from three days a week of supply 
in the normal season to one-day a week, fewer hours and long queues at water points.  
 
10.14 Hygiene practices 
 
The extent of hygienic practices was assessed through individual practices (hand 
washing) and household practices (evidence of cleanliness of homes/compound). The 
two districts are making some attempts to promote hygiene education – mainly 
through occasional community meetings, use of posters, and an annual sanitation 
week. NGOs and donor projects are keener than the two local governments to push 
hygiene education. Nevertheless, as the results show, the notion of integrating hygiene 
education with water and sanitation is at its infant stage in the two districts.  
 
Hand washing practices 
As discussed in Chapter 4, hand washing with soap (or other effective cleaning 
material) is particularly important for realising health outcomes from investment in 
water and sanitation. In Ghana, where hands are directly used for feeding, hand 
washing is even more important. 
 
Tamale is slightly ahead of Savelugu-Nanton in hand washing, as Table 10.1 shows. 
The study however, did not come across any substantial initiative or investment in 
hand washing in both Tamale and Savelugu-Nanton district. It is possible therefore 
that the difference is due to varying levels of education (see Chapter 7), an issue for 
further research. 
 
Table 10.1: Persons practising hand washing (%) 
 Persons practicing Tamale  Savelugu-Nanton 
Washing with soap before eating 10.9 6.0 
Washing with soap before breastfeeding 16.9 5.5 
 
Household and community practices 
There are substantial defaults in hygiene practices at the household and community 
levels in both districts. Generally, Tamale is slightly worse off (see Figure 10.5), 
especially in the management of liquid waste.   
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Figure 10.5: Households affected by unhygienic practice (%) 
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10.15 Summary performance in effectiveness 
 
Overall, we find Savelugu-Nanton to have been more effective than Tamale in the 
provision of water and in cleanliness of compounds in the 1998-2003 period. This is 
particularly so in coverage of safe water and regularity of flow (see Table 10.2). 
Tamale, however, performed better in coverage of safe sanitation, though both 
districts have poor service coverage. Both lag behind in adoption of hygienic 
practices, a critical component in realising health outcomes.  
 
Table 10.2: Summary performance in effectiveness 
Indicator Tamale Savelugu-Nanton 
Coverage of safe water % change 1998-2003 = 0 % change 1998-2003 = 263 
Coverage of safe sanitation % change 1998-2003 = 59 % change 1998-2003 = 42 
Reliability of flow of water Days a week: 5 (1998) to 2.3 
(2003) 
Days a week: >1 (1998) to 3 
(2003) 
Hand washing with soap 
before eating 
2003 data only: 11% 2003 data only: 6% 
Compounds with clean 
environment 
2003 data only: 31% 2003 data only: 35% 
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10.2 Efficiency 
 
Efficiency is analysed in terms of water loss, length of time taken to repair a broken 
down water point, waiting time at water point and the trend of investment in the 
sector. 
 
10.21 Water loss 
 
Water loss is extremely high in Tamale though on the decline. Unaccounted-for-water 
declined from 64% in 1998 to 48% in 2003 - well above the norm of 10% to 20%84. 
About half of the unaccounted-for-water in Tamale is due to mechanical leakages; the 
remainder is due to inefficiencies in metering. Unaccounted-for-water in the Savelugu 
town water system is at 5% to 10%.  
 
10.22 Repair time 
 
There is no improvement in length of time for repairs in Tamale (two days for the 
1998-2003 period). That for Savelugu has been reduced from seven to two-and-half 
days. According to sector officials, the dramatic reduction in time for repairs in 
Savelugu is due to a plural institutional approach, which promotes management of 
new investment by local skills.  
 
Maintenance in Savelugu is a shared responsibility – between local government, 
private operators and community groups. Community groups, particularly women 
have been trained to undertake minor repairs. Area mechanics (private operators) have 
also been trained by CWSA in replacement of parts. The District Engineer is 
responsible for more difficult repairs. The DWST monitors maintenance.  
 
However, a major constraint is the unavailability of parts on the local market. Due to 
the low demand for parts in northern Ghana, which has relatively new water systems, 
parts are usually obtained in larger cities in southern Ghana; hence, the average two-
and-half days for repairs. 
 
Unlike the case of Savelugu-Nanton, responsibility for maintenance in Tamale is 
concentrated in the GWCL. This implies that every case of maintenance has to be 
referred to the GWCL. Where parts have to be obtained from GWCL Headquarters in 
Accra, the delay is even worse. 
 
10.23 Waiting time 
 
Average waiting time at a water point doubled in Tamale for both normal and dry 
seasons in the 1998-2003 period (see Table 10.3). Yet, the situation is much better 
than the case of Savelugu, which has fewer water points. Tamale has realised more 
gains in water points that dry up in the dry season through its stringent policy of 
rationing water and use of vendor services.  
 
Waiting time in Savelugu in the dry season averages one hour, due to the drying up of 
wells. Savelugu-Nanton still has almost all of its hand-dug wells drying up in the lean 
                                                          
84 See Wyatt (2002) on efficient water delivery norms. 
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season, affecting almost 20% of the population. The remedial measure has been to 
shift from hand-dug wells to boreholes (10% in 1998 to 27% in 2003). 
 
Table 10.3: Efficiency of water systems 
 Tamale Savelugu-Nanton 
 1998 2003 1998 2003 
Unaccounted for water 
(UFW) 
64% (2001) 48% NA 5% 
Length of time to repair to 
broken down part 
2 days 2 days 7 days 2.5 days 
Average waiting time at 
water point (normal season) 
2 minutes 5 minutes 10 minutes 10 minutes 
Average waiting time at 
water point (dry season) 
5 minutes 10 minutes  60 minutes 60 minutes 
 
10.24 Cost of water 
 
Payment for water is almost the same for the two districts, but doubles in Tamale 
during the lean season, a result of more expensive vendor services and carting water 
over longer distances by households when rationing is severe (see Table 10.4).  
 
Table 10.4: Cost of water 
 Tamale  Savelugu-Nanton  
Average amount paid  for 10 gallons 
in normal season  2003  
322 cedis 317 cedis 
Average amount paid  for 10 gallons 
in lean season 2003  
690 cedis 337 cedis 
 
10.25 Investment per capita 
 
In per capita terms, investment in water and sanitation increased in both Tamale and 
Savelugu-Nanton from 2001 to 2003. Savelugu-Nanton however attracted investment 
almost thrice that of Tamale in water and sanitation (see Figure 10.6).    
 
Figure 10.6: Per capita investment in water and sanitation 2001-2003 (cedis) 
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Sources of investment 
 
Growth in investment in Savelugu-Nanton is largely due to donor contributions (see 
Figure 10.7). Direct community contribution is also important for water and sanitation 
in Savelugu-Nanton. In the case of Tamale, central government investment funding to 
the GWCL and the TMA’s capital spending on sanitation are the major sources. 
Central government’s investment in water in Tamale comes from an indirect form of 
donor contribution, the Highly Indebted Poor Country’s Initiative, which is a global 
initiative that allows selected poor countries, including Ghana, to use funds that will 
otherwise have gone to debt repayment on poverty reduction initiatives85.  
 
Figure 10.7: Per capita investment in water and sanitation by source, 2001-2003 (cedis) 
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Local contribution (District Assembly plus community) 
 
As Figure 10.8 shows, local contribution to investment is more for sanitation than for 
water for the two districts, due to higher role of households in provision of sanitation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
85 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm 
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Figure 10.8: Local (DA+Community) contribution to per capita investment in water and 
sanitation, 2001-2003 (cedis) 
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Nevertheless, local contribution to investment is 1.6 times higher in Savelugu-Nanton 
than Tamale for sanitation, and a substantial 94 times higher for water.  
 
District Assembly contribution 
 
In per capita terms, the SNDA spends more on water and sanitation than the TMA 
(see Figure 10.9). For water, in particular, the SNDA spend about 47 times that by the 
TMA. This is because the TMA has no formal involvement in the activities of the 
deconcentrated GWCL. The TMA’s involvement in water is mainly through the 
provision of tanker services to senior civil servants when the flow is irregular. The 
TMA however spends a little more than the SNDA for sanitation.   
 
Figure 10.9: Per capita investment by local government, 2001-2003 (cedis) 
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According to district officials, the TMA’s role in water is particularly constrained 
because it is not part of the GWCL decision-making system.  
 
10.26 Summary: Efficiency 
 
Savelugu-Nanton appears to be making more gains regarding efficiency (see Table 
10.5). The Savelugu town water system is far more efficient in minimizing water loss. 
Savelugu-Nanton has also made substantial gains in reducing repair time. In addition, 
Savelugu-Nanton has mobilised more external and domestic resources for service 
provision. The cost of water is also cheaper in Savelugu-Nanton. Tamale is however 
working to reduce its very high levels of water loss (though a long way off levels in 
Savelugu town). Tamale, nevertheless, has a shorter waiting time at a water point in 
the dry season.  
 
Table 10.5: Summary Table on Efficiency 
Indicator Tamale Savelugu-Nanton 
% water lost: trend Decreased by 25% (2001-2003) NA (extremely limited 
functioning piped system at 
beginning of study period) 
% water lost: level 48% (2003) 5% (2003) 
Repair time: level 2 days (2003) 2.5 days (2003) 
Repair time: trend No change (1998-2003) Reduced by 64% (1998-2003) 
Average waiting time in 
dry (lean) season 
5 minutes (1998) to 10 minutes 
(2003) 
No change: 60 minutes (1998-
2003) 
Investment per capita: level About half of national average 
(2001-2003) 
2,500 cedis above national 
average (2001-2003) 
 
 
10.3 Accountability 
 
Accountability is assessed through participation of citizens in planning, financing and 
management, flow of information between service providers and citizens, and 
regularity of audit and extent of dissemination of audit findings. 
 
10.31 Participation of citizens 
 
Decision making 
Participation of citizens is much higher in Savelugu-Nanton. Nearly 47% of 
respondents have participated in at least one decision regarding provision of water and 
sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton, compared to 11% in Tamale (see Table 10.6).  
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Table 10.6: Participation of citizens in decision-making 
 Tamale (%) Savelugu-Nanton (%) 
Participate in decision making 
          Yes 11.4 47.1 
          No 88.6 52.9 
Participate in deciding type of water point 
         Yes 11.5 40.8 
         No 88.5 59.2 
Knowledge of use of monies paid  for water 
        Yes 37.3 47.6 
        No 62.7 52.4 
Participate in discussing monitoring report 
       Yes 7.5 28.5 
        No 92.5 71.5 
Involved in decision regarding provision of water 
       Yes 33.6 58.2 
       No 66.4 41.8 
 
Decision on type of water point 
About 41% were consulted in deciding the type of water point to be provided in 
Savelugu-Nanton. Just 12% of citizens of Tamale were engaged in any discussion 
regarding the type of service to be provided.  
 
Keeping the environment clean 
About half of respondents in Savelugu-Nanton play direct roles in deciding how to 
keep their environment clean, compared to a quarter in Tamale. Town Councils and 
the Municipal Assembly decide on such matters in Tamale.  
 
Information flow 
Citizens of Savelugu-Nanton are better informed about what goes into the price of 
water, progress with service provision and financial performance of their systems (see 
Figure 10.10). 
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Figure 10.10: Information flow in the two districts 
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Participation in pricing 
District and community management in Savelugu-Nanton enables participation of 
more citizens (43%) in pricing of water than the more centralized management model 
of Tamale (9.8%). The price of water in towns and villages is negotiated on the basis 
of costs of operation and maintenance and affordability levels as perceived by 
members of the Community Water and Sanitation Committees and the Savelugu 
Water Board. As will be discussed in Chapter 11, residents of Savelugu town are 
willing to pay more than the Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC) approved 
rates for water because of their participation. 
 
Box 10.1: Mechanisms for participation and accountability 
 
Inherent in the more decentralised Savelugu-Nanton model are clear mechanisms for information flow. 
Participation through elected community leaders is almost universal. These include leaders of 
Community Water and Sanitation Committees (CWSCs), Savelugu Water Board (SWB) and Civic 
Associations. 
 
CWSCs are particularly important mechanisms for citizen participation in planning, fund raising, 
maintenance and information flow. CWSCs are established just before investments are made in safe 
water. About 35% of citizens are served by CWSCs, that is, in communities with covered wells and 
boreholes.  
 
The SWB is another important mechanism for ensuring participation and information flow in service 
provision in Savelugu-Nanton. The SWB serves an additional 30% of the population. The work of the 
SWB is discussed in detail in Chapter 11. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, various citizen associations are involved by the District Assembly at various 
stages of decision-making, including Youth Associations, Food Sellers’ Associations, Market Women 
Association, Butchers’ Association, women’s groups.  
 
Source: Household survey, Focus Group Discussions and municipal records. 
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10.32 How effective are community organisations in accountability? 
 
Focus group discussions brought out how CWSCs and the Savelugu Water Board 
(SWB) ensure accountability. CWSCs and the SWB keep their own books, maintain 
bank accounts and organise meetings to discuss accounts. Meetings review problems 
with O&M, keeping water points clean, etc. Further, CWSCs and SWB organize 
community meetings to discuss pricing of services and problems regarding O&M. 
Nine out of ten respondents in Savelugu-Nanton obtain information in pricing from 
CWSCs, community representatives on the SWB and community meetings (see 
Figure 10.11).  
 
Figure 10.11: Source of information on pricing of water, Savelugu-Nanton (% respondents) 
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10.33 Audit procedures in local government 
 
Government procedures require that every government unit should be audited twice a 
year and at the minimum once a year. There were four rounds of external financial 
audit in both the TMA and SNDA in the 1998-2003 period. In both districts, the 
Mayor and Presiding Member of the Assembly reviewed findings of the audit reports. 
None of the reports were however discussed at Assembly meetings. 
 
10.34 Procedure for awarding contracts 
 
To further assess accountability, we reviewed the procedure for awarding contracts. 
Key informants from the two districts were requested to assess the procedure for 
awarding contract on a scale of three. The two districts were ranked at level “two” for 
both transparency and competitiveness. The moderate score was due indications of 
political influences in the award of contracts in both cases.  
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There is a greater variety of participants in the SNDA’s procedure for awarding 
contracts, due to its more plural arrangements (see Box 10.2). For water, these include 
the CWSA and donors who operate at the district level. Contracts for sanitation 
projects usually include the Regional Coordinating Council.  
 
Box 10.2: Procedure for awarding contracts for water in Savelugu-Nanton 
 
The procedure for water is as follows: 
 
• Pre bidding workshop by CWSA 
 
• Preparation of TOR for consultancy services by CWSA 
 
• Recruitment of consultant by DA 
 
 
• Preparation of bidding documents by CWSA and DA 
 
• Advertisement/ request for proposals by DA/CWSA 
 
• Opening of bids by DA 
 
• Evaluation of bids by DA/CWSA 
 
• Contract award by DA 
 
Source: Savelugu-Nanton district administration. 
 
The TMA procedure for awarding contracts shares responsibilities between the 
Assembly and the Regional Coordinating Council in the case of sanitation projects. 
The TMA is not involved in contracting procedures of the GWCL and vice versa.  
 
10.35 Summary: Accountability 
 
Generally, accountability in the provision of water and sanitation is better in 
Savelugu-Nanton than Tamale (see Table 10.7). The Savelugu-Nanton approach to 
delivery of water and sanitation promotes more participation and results in better flow 
of information. This is essentially due to the pluralist arrangement. The Tamale 
approach promotes concentration of information and roles in the government 
structure. Nevertheless, the government system in both districts is not strong in audit 
and sharing audit reports. 
 
Table 10.7: Summary Table on Accountability  
Indicator Tamale Savelugu-Nanton 
Mechanisms for participation Announcements through media Community organisations 
Frequency of government audit No change: once a year (1998-
2003) 
No change: once a year 
(1998-2003) 
Local government's response to 
audit 
No change: only DCE and PM 
have knowledge (1998-2003) 
No change: only DCE and 
PM have knowledge 
(1998-2003) 
% respondents with knowledge of 
components of price of water 
37% (2003) 48% (2003) 
% respondents ever received 
feedback on monitoring 
2% (2003) 32% (2003) 
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10.4 Sustainability 
 
The study measured Sustainability in terms of use of local skills in operation and 
maintenance and proportion of local financing for new investments. 
  
10.41 Responsibility for repairs 
 
Responsibility for repairs is firmly placed in community leadership structures in 
Savelugu-Nanton, unlike the case in Tamale, where it is placed within structures - 
GWCL for water, and the TMA for sanitation. The O&M arrangement in Savelugu-
Nanton transfer skills to community agents as follows: 
 
• CWSC members – minor repairs like fixing loose bolts and nuts 
• Local artisans/Area Mechanics – replacement of parts (paid by CWSCs)  
• District Engineer – monitoring/replacement of parts in case of difficulty 
 
In Savelugu-Nanton, a total of 95% of technical staff (for operation and maintenance) 
are from the district. In the case of TMA, GWCL has its own system of staff 
management, which recruits from all over the country, and rotates staff at different 
points in time.  
 
10.42 Proportion of local financing for new investments 
 
Tamale contributes slightly more local contribution as a proportion to total investment 
in water and sanitation (see Figure 10.12 and Figure 10.13). However, Savelugu-
Nanton contributes more in absolute terms. As discussed in section 10.25 above, local 
contribution to investment is 1.6 times higher in Savelugu-Nanton than Tamale for 
sanitation, and a substantial 94 times higher for water.  
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Figure 10.12: Proportion of local contribution in Savelugu-Nanton (cedis) 
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Figure 10.13: Proportion of local investment in Tamale (cedis) 
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10.43 Summary for Sustainability 
 
Regarding sustainability of service provision, Savelugu-Nanton has the advantage of 
using local skills for operation and maintenance, unlike Tamale, which relies in a 
substantial manner on skills from outside the district. However, Savelugu-Nanton 
relies heavily on foreign aid to invest in its systems. Tamale also relies substantially 
on central government grants for investments.  
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Officials in Savelugu-Nanton have another concern about sustainability, that is, 
ownership of water assets, thereby responsibility for replacement. Unlike the GWCL 
system, the law is not clear about who owns the assets in district-community managed 
system – is it the District Assembly, the Water Board, the community or the CWSA. 
  
Table 10.8: Summary Table on Sustainability 
Indicator Tamale Savelugu-Nanton 
Proportion local contribution to investment 
(2003) 
8% 7% 
Per capita local (DA+community) 
investment in water and sanitation (cedis 
2001-2003) 
1,684 4,301 
Use of local skills (2003) Mostly outside Mostly local 
 
 
10.5 Possible influence on health 
 
The study measures the possible influence that the provision of water and sanitation 
may have on health in the two districts. This is done by assessing the incidence of 
guinea worm and cholera. Ghana’s Ministry of Health (2003) cites several ailments 
that are directly affected by poor access to water and sanitation in the country. These 
include diarrhoea, dysentery, malaria, cholera and guinea worm. The study chose to 
focus on cholera and guinea worm because they are more easily determined by 
households.  We chose to explore the possible influence on health by the provision of 
water and sanitation and not the impact, which required collection of data on many 
other variables beyond the scope of our study. 
 
To determine the possible influence on health we reviewed the incidence of the two 
ailments in the 1998-2003 period, in line with the period used for analysis of new 
investments in water and sanitation. The indicator used was the incidence rate ratios 
(IRR), that is, incidence rates five years ago divided by the incidence rates in the 
current year.  
 
There was appreciable decline in incidence of the two ailments for both districts, 
using the IRR (see Table 10.9). The IRR for cholera of 1998 to 2003 current for 
Tamale is 1.33, while that for Savelugu-Nanton is 1.63. The IRR for guinea worm for 
1998 to 2003 for Tamale was 2.82, slightly higher than that of Savelugu-Nanton, 
which was 2.52.  
 
Table 10.9: Influence on health: Incidence Rate Ratios 
  Tamale Savelugu-Nanton 
 IRR (95% CI) IRR (95% CI) 
Cholera   
2003 1.00 1.00 
1998 1.33  1.63  
Guinea worm   
2003 1.00 1.00 
1998 2.82  2.52  
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Overall, Savelugu-Nanton influenced to a greater degree the prevention of the deadly 
cholera. Tamale performed better in the case of guinea worm. We acknowledge the 
possible influence of other factors in interpreting these results, particularly 
anthropological factors that are beyond the scope of our study.  
 
 
10.6 Conclusions 
 
The second hypothesis of the study states that “when pluralism emerges at the 
decentralised level of government, it yields better performance than the case of 
distributed monopoly”. As discussed in chapter 5, performance is assessed by the 
study through five criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, sustainability and 
possible influence on health.  
 
Overall, the study confirms the second hypothesis regarding effectiveness, efficiency 
and accountability. We find the more decentralised and plural Savelugu-Nanton 
district to have performed better than Tamale in the 1998-2003 period in the provision 
of water and sanitation in terms of effectiveness in providing more and better quality 
services to users; in the efficiency of its systems; and, in accountability of service 
providers to users.  
 
The picture regarding the possible influence on health is not conclusive, given the 
possible role of anthropological factors. We also observe considerable challenges with 
sustainability faced by the two districts. Savelugu-Nanton is nonetheless 
strengthening its chances for sustainability through greater use of local skills and local 
contribution to investments.  
 
We use a more qualitative approach in the next chapter to explore factors which 
influence performance of the water and sanitation sector in the more plural and 
decentralised Savelugu-Nanton district.  
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CHAPTER 11 
 
11.0 SAVELUGU TOWN WATER SYSTEM: AN EMERGING MODEL OF 
INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
 
In this chapter, we choose a town water system from the more successful Savelugu-
Nanton district (see discussion on performance in previous chapter), to ascertain how 
decentralisation and pluralism influence performance. The selected case is the 
Savelugu (town) Water System (SWS), which is a component of the entire water 
system for Savelugu-Nanton district, but serves just the capital town. We begin with 
an examination of the extent of decentralisation and pluralism in institutional 
arrangements underlying the SWS. We then assess the performance of the system to 
determine that this particular case is indeed performing well. Finally, through the use 
of qualitative approaches, we explore factors that explain performance.  
 
Data for the assessment is drawn from both primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources include interviews with managers of the SWS, members of the Board, 
managers of the Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly (SNDA), GWCL, CWSA and 
donor agencies, as well as discussions with residents of the town. Secondary sources 
include financial records of the SWS, minutes of meetings of the SWS Board and 
previous research material.  
 
11.1 Background 
 
Savelugu is the capital of the Savelugu-Nanton district. It has a population of about 
30,00086. It is an administrative and trading post, utilising advantages of its location 
on the artery that links the south of Ghana to sahelian countries such as Burkina Faso, 
Mali and Niger (Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly, 2000).  
 
The drinking water situation was acute in Savelugu before the SWS was developed.  
GWCL had old pipelines dating back to the 1960s. These pipelines had broken down 
for over a decade. The main source of safe water was six kilometres away, which was 
very irregular. Citizens therefore relied on expensive vendors or unsafe sources, 
particularly four dams. Dams were used to trap water during the rainy season. Three 
of the dams dried up for four months (the peak of the dry season – December to 
April). Women’s productivity was affected most, since women had to abandon 
economic activities in search of water. In the same way children had to spend part of 
their school hours in search of water87. 
 
The four dams were all infested with guinea worm88. The incidence of guinea worm 
and other water- borne diseases was high in the town. Every other home had a guinea 
worm case89 90. Many citizens affected by deadly diseases like cholera lost their lives 
(Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly, 2000).  
 
                                                          
86 Derived from Republic of Ghana (2001). 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Data obtained from records of the District Health Service 1995-2000. 
90 A guinea worm patient takes three to twelve months to recover.  Productivity of the people was thus 
low, deepening poverty. 
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The GWCL had not invested in providing safe water to Savelugu in decades because 
of its inability to attract investment as well as its experience of low level revenue 
recovery associated with peri-urban and semi-urban districts. The one-point 
borehole/hand-dug well of the CWSA system was also assessed as not economical to 
meet the demands of residents and small businesses in the town.  
 
Meanwhile, several donors showed interest in reducing the incidence of water borne 
diseases, particularly guinea worm in Savelugu91. Consequently, the SNDA took up 
the leadership to work with its partners to develop the town’s water system. The 
objectives were to establish a water system that was economical in terms of scale, 
served the population on a sustainable basis and led to the eradication of water-borne 
diseases, especially guinea worm92. The result is the SWS, which is made up of 
transmission lines from the GWCL system, a stocking system (reservoir and pumps), 
a distribution network to homes and public fountains. About 90% of the population of 
the town are served by public fountains, with the remaining 10% having indoor 
connections. The policy on community, rather than indoor connections was adopted 
by the Savelugu Water Board when the SWS was established to reduce unaccounted 
for water, manage the demand for water and enhance the recovery of tariffs. 
 
11.2 Choice of the Bulk Purchase system 
 
The SNDA, with support from its partners, undertook feasibility studies through local 
firms before deciding on the scale and model of service delivery. The first of such 
studies (conducted in October-November 1998) was to determine technical options 
for provision of safe water. Three options emerged as follows93:  
 
a) Extraction of underground water for mechanization in a piped network 
b) Bulk purchase from the GWCL regional system that also supplies Tamale 
c) Extraction of underground water through boreholes/hand dug wells  
 
An international NGO, World Vision International supported the decision-making 
process with hydro geological investigation of underground water potential in 
February 1999. There were about 48 drilling attempts within a six kilometre radius, 
16 were successful, of which four had yields adequate for mechanisation. 
Unfortunately, all the four were not within four kilometres from the town, and thus 
with high financial costs implications94.  
 
Consequently, the second preferred option, the Bulk Purchase from GWCL was 
selected for implementation as a “relief” measure, knowing the limitations of the 
GWCL system, and pending the availability of improved technology and funding in 
the future to pursue extraction of underground water in a piped network95. 
 
The third option was eliminated due to failure to extract ground water within walking 
distance and the high cost of meeting the demands of citizens with this approach (by 
                                                          
91 Derived from Gariba and Associates (1998). 
92 See Community Partnerships for Health and Development - CPHD (2003); SNDA records, 2003 
93 By Afrowood Ltd (1998), a private consulting firm based in Accra, Ghana. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid.  
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CWSA standards, a total of 100 boreholes would be required to serve the population 
of 30,000). 
 
The Bulk Purchase system ranked second to mechanised underground water in terms 
of a range of technical factors. The community also preferred the mechanized 
underground water system due to known irregular and unreliable flow of water from 
the GWCL system and fears about the fate of such an arrangement in the event of a 
private takeover of GWCL96. 
 
However, bulk purchase of water from GWCL had advantages - particularly in 
avoiding the high cost of underground water extraction and distribution in the 
normally difficult terrain of the Northern Region. In addition Savelugu did not have 
the skills to manage the treatment and transmission of water97. As local officials put 
it: “Savelugu had to learn from a smaller scale of operation” (see discussion on 
“scale” in section 11.61).   
 
11.3 Clarity and sharing of roles and partnership building 
 
The Savelugu Water System adopts a pluralist approach to provide safe water. A 
partnership arrangement was established to provide safe water to the town. Principal 
partners were the SNDA and the town’s residents on one hand, represented by the 
SWB, and the Ghana Water Company Limited on the other hand. Supporting partners 
were CWSA, UNICEF, World Vision International (WVI) and the Guinea Worm 
Eradication Programme (GWEP) of the Ministry of Health.  
 
The study found out that the SNDA has so far played the leadership and brokerage 
roles98. However, it relies substantially on technical support from supporting partners 
to perform tasks associated with these two critical roles, particularly in drafting of 
technical proposals, fund raising and establishment of coordination mechanisms. 
 
11.31 Roles of principal partners 
 
Under the arrangement, GWCL supplies treated water in bulk to the Savelugu Water 
Board, which in turn stocks and sells to the public and recovers tariffs to pay GWCL 
for the cost of water, like any unsubsidized consumer in cities.  
 
The terms of contract between GWCL and Savelugu establishes clear roles as 
follows99: 
 
Treatment and bulk distribution 
a) GWCL sells treated water on a Bulk Purchase basis to the SWB. The price of 
water is according to rates of the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission100 for 
commercial and domestic uses. GWCL also provides technical advice on matters 
related to the bulk purchase of water.  
                                                          
96 Discussions about privatisation of Water in Ghana were ongoing at the same time that the SWS was 
initiated. 
97 Gariba and Associates (1998) 
98 See Chapter 2 for Cohen and Peterson’s definition of various roles in service provision. 
99 SNDA records, 1999. 
100 See Chapter 3 for the role of PURC in tariff approval in Ghana. 
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Stocking, redistribution and payment of tariffs 
b) GWCL is obliged to provide water daily. The SWB stocks and redistributes the 
water and pays the full cost at the end of each month based on the amount of 
water supplied. Savelugu does not benefit from the GWCL subsidy of life-line 
tariff to the poor because of its bulk purchases. 
 
Maintenance of mains 
c) GWCL carries out major repair works on the transmission mains within the 
Savelugu system; SWB pays for the work done. 
 
Expansion 
d) The SWB provides data and plans for expansion101, whilst GWCL provides 
technical support for job execution. 
 
Quality  
e) The SWB is obliged to pay regularly for water consumed; the GWCL is obliged to 
sustain water supply in terms of adequate pressure and flow, and of acceptable 
quality according to WHO standards.   
 
Partnership meetings to review any modification in the agreement occur every six 
months.  Where any party is unable to fulfil its part of the obligation, that party is 
expected to explain the circumstances leading to the failure and recommend measures 
to address them. 
 
11.32 Roles of supporting partners 
 
The principal partners were supported by others in starting the SWS, in particular, 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Vision International (WVI), the 
Guinea Worm Eradication Programme (GWEP) of the Ministry of Health and the 
Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA). 
 
UNICEF financed up to 70% of the total cost of establishing the SWS, about 
US$650,000.00. The Guinea Worm Eradication Programme of the Ministry of Health 
used its central government weight to mobilize UNICEF and World Vision 
International.  
 
World Vision International financed hydro-geological studies and the construction of 
six boreholes within the town to supplement water from GWCL. One borehole, 
located about five kilometres from the town has been mechanised to augment supply 
from GWCL, and three others of about six kilometres away have been capped 
pending mechanisation in the near future, when new investment is available.  
 
All supporting partners financed technical assessments, supported meetings and 
negotiations between the SWB and the GWCL and contributed towards the 
development of capacity of the district to manage the system.  
 
                                                          
101 Including more public stand posts (public fountains) and household connections, but for now, the 
quantity of water supplied by GWCL is a serious limitation to household connections. 
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The CWSA assists in the training of management staff where necessary. CWSA is 
currently mobilizing central government funds (from HPIC relief sources) for further 
extraction of underground water, which was originally the most preferred option.  
 
11.33 Interests of partners 
 
The partnership arrangement was possible because both principal and supporting 
partners had varied, yet converging interests in the provision of safe water. For some, 
the interest was in providing safe water as a means to their objective, while to others 
the provision of safe water was the reason for their existence. A summary of the 
various interests is as follows: 
 
Partner Interest 
Community members • Eliminate incidence of water-borne diseases; increase equitable 
access to safe water  
• Eliminate the activities of vendors who for decades had 
controlled the price of water 
GWCL • For business reasons - the potential of the arrangement to reduce 
the rate of unaccounted for water and increase revenue through 
efficient distribution, billing and tariff collection.  
• The GWCL Manager saw opportunities to learn from a system 
to which it made no capital investment, yet realized gains which 
could be replicated in Tamale and beyond. 
SNDA • Responsible for provision of basic services 
• Reducing the incidence of water-borne diseases 
Guinea Worm Eradication 
Programme (Ministry of 
Health) 
• Eliminate guinea worm from the country 
UNICEF • Fulfil global mandate of advocating for rights of children to safe 
water and good health 
World Vision International • Fulfil organizational mandate of accelerating development of 
deprived areas 
CWSA • Ensure provision of safe water in semi-urban and rural districts 
 
The SWS can therefore be said to be exhibiting pluralism. Its fulfils the requirements 
of Cohen and Peterson (1999) of clarity of roles in sharing of tasks by two or more 
governmental institutions (SNDA, GWCL, CWSA) and private sector firms (private 
contractors, NGO, commissioned revenue agents) and community organizations 
(SWB, water and sanitation committees).  
 
11.34 Role distribution and decentralisation  
 
According to Cohen and Peterson (1997) institutional pluralism can occur at the 
spatial centre or decentralized levels. Pluralism at the decentralized level is 
particularly essential for purposes of accountability by service providers to 
consumers. In this regard, the study ascertained the location of partners of the SWS, 
that is, the location from which roles were performed. 
 
The Savelugu town and the Savelugu-Nanton district perform tasks in each of the key 
roles, and indeed performed many of the key roles involved in the provision of water, 
an indication of decentralization. Figure 11.1 provides a spatial view of concentration 
of roles around the Savelugu town and the Savelugu-Nanton district.  
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Figure 11.1: Decentralisation and management of the Savelugu Water System 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Leadership
Planning
Funding
Execution
OperationMaintenance (transmission)
Maintenance (town system)
Brokerage
Monitoring
Urban Council District Region Centre
 
 
Moreover, the Savelugu town plays a part in usually externally-led roles such as 
funding and planning/technical design. The private for and not-for profit sector also 
has clearly defined roles (see Table 11.1). 
 
Table 11.1: Roles in establishing the Savelugu Water System 
Role Responsibility 
Leadership SNDA 
SNDA 
GWCL Regional Office 
Private firms 
World Vision International 
Planning  (technical feasibility, 
socio-economic feasibility, 
technical and financial proposals): 
  
UNICEF  
UNICEF  
World Vision International 
SNDA 
Funding 
  
  
Residents 
GWCL Regional Office 
World Vision International 
Private firms 
Execution 
  
  
SNDA (District Engineer) 
SWB's Management Committee 
CWSA Regional Office (for skill development only) 
Operation 
Commissioned agents for revenue collection 
Maintenance (transmission lines) GWCL Regional Office 
SWB's Management Committee Maintenance (town system) 
  Artisans 
Brokerage SNDA 
Monitoring SNDA 
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Thus, the SWS can be said to be exhibiting clarity of roles in sharing of tasks by two 
or more governmental institutions (SNDA, GWCL, CWSA) and private sector firms 
(private contractors, NGO, commissioned revenue agents) and community 
organizations (SWB, water and sanitation committees) and at a very decentralized 
level (Town/Urban Council and community level). The SNDA played the leadership 
role in mobilizing partners and resources to establish the SWS. The District 
Coordinating Director and District Engineer worked with consultants and staff of 
partners to undertake studies and execute the SWS. In terms of operation and 
maintenance, the District Engineer and DWST assist in supervision of use of water 
from the system as well as any other in the district. The SNDA and SWB purchase 
water services associated with transmission from the GWCL. The GWCL sells water 
and skills for maintaining transmission to the SWB. GWCL is the major, but not the 
only provider of water. The SWB supplements GWCL sources with underground 
water. It is noteworthy that according to the bulk purchase arrangement for the SWS, 
GWCL, the national public utility plays the role of a contractor. 
 
 
11.4 Is Pluralism performing? 
 
The study further ascertained whether the pluralist arrangement is promoting 
accountability, effectiveness and efficiency. Has the partnership approach and Bulk 
Purchase model delivered safe water in accountable, effective and efficient ways? 
 
11.41 How accountable is the Savelugu Water System? 
 
To assess accountability in the management of the SWS, the study looked at three 
variables: degree of autonomy of the management102, use of participatory processes 
and transparency in financial management. 
 
a) Degree of autonomy and participatory processes 
 
There are structures to promote accountability in the SWS, including the Water 
Board, Management Committee, Water and Sanitation Committees and the SNDA. 
The roles played by these structures promote significant local autonomy. 
 
The Savelugu Water Board 
 
Who chairs the Board? 
The Savelugu town system is managed by a ten-member Board. The Board is chaired 
by an elected Assembly member. The Chairman is elected by other members of the 
Board. The Board Secretary is the system’s manager (Project Manager) and therefore 
not elected. The Treasurer is however elected by other members. 
 
Who represents consumers? 
Consumers’ interests are taken care of by elected Assembly members of the town, 
who are represented on the Board. A representative of women’s groups also has a seat 
on the Board. Members meet once a quarter. Community views are presented by the 
elected Assembly members and women’s representative, and vice versa. Annex 11.1 
                                                          
102 See Bahl and Linn (1992). 
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presents a list of members of the Water Board, their background and how each of 
them got on to the Board.  
 
What is the role of Water and Sanitation committees? 
For purposes of managing water, the town is zoned into six areas. Each zone has a 
Water and Sanitation Committee, comprising equal numbers of men and women. 
Water and Sanitation Committees are represented on the Board. By virtue of their 
location, Water and Sanitation Committees serve as a link for information flow 
between households and the Board. 
 
What is the role of the Mayor? 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the District Chief Executive (Mayor) is not elected, but 
appointed by the President of the country. In Savelugu, the Mayor is a member of the 
Board without a vote. However, all members and officials interviewed indicated the 
considerable power he exercises over the Board, especially in the tariff setting and 
mobilization of resources. The Mayor has two main tools to influence Board 
decisions, one informal and the other formal. The informal tool is lobbying other 
members of the Board to elect his preference as Chair. The formal tool is the approval 
power of the SNDA over tariff decisions.  
 
Who does the Board report to? 
The Board submits quarterly reports, including accounts to the SNDA, but not to the 
CWSA or GWCL, giving an indication of local autonomy and devolution. As one 
official put it, the practice of submitting quarterly reports, including accounts to the 
District Assembly “is unimaginable in the GWCL or some other providers of basic 
services, particularly the Department of Health”103. There are however mixed views 
of officials and residents about the apparent subordination of the SWB to the SNDA. 
These include fears about undue allegiance to the Mayor, who many times looks up to 
political bosses in the region and centre for direction. However, others also point to 
the advantages, particularly, the Mayor’s key role in mobilising financial resources 
from World Vision International and UNICEF to start the water system. Nevertheless, 
concerns are high among officials that political concerns may override economic ones 
in the tariff setting, and that a not-so cooperative Mayor may one day start interfering 
directly in how resources are allocated by the SWB. 
 
Who sets tariffs? 
The Board makes recommendations for tariff changes for approval by the SNDA. The 
SNDA has in the past overruled tariff decisions of the Board. The Board is however 
responsible for other major decisions, including approval of proposals made by its 
Management Committee.  
 
Annual General Meetings 
Annual General Meetings are held once a year. Meetings are open to residents. 
Meetings focus on the general status of the system, performance of the system and 
tariff proposals.  
 
 
 
                                                          
103 The Department of Health in Savelugu-Nanton reports to the Region and not the SNDA. The SNDA 
has nevertheless developed tools for information sharing, including participatory planning meetings. 
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b) Transparency in Financial Management 
 
Evidence of financial audit 
The study found no evidence of a formal audit of the system. The only controls are: 
(i) the SNDA’s Budget and Finance Officers are occasionally requested by the Mayor 
to comment on financial reports of the SWB. (ii) The SNDA is a co-signatory (with 
the SWB) of the bank account of the system. Payments to GWCL, staff salaries, 
maintenance and repairs are drawn from this account. 
 
11.42 Effectiveness 
 
Coverage 
The SWS has proved to be effective in increasing the coverage of safe water. About 
75% of Savelugu town was fully served with safe water in 2003, a dramatic jump 
from 10% in 1999. However, in cases of shortages from the GWCL system, residents 
rely on longer walking distance to boreholes in neighbouring settlements or resort to 
vendors or unsafe sources.  
 
Regularity of flow 
The GWCL is unable to meet the full daily water requirement of the community. The 
SWB has therefore put in place a system of rationing, 12 hours of flow per day for 
each zone.  
 
Equity concerns 
Households that are unable to pay immediately are allowed to keep a register for 
future payment. Those unable to pay at all are allowed to fetch water using very small 
containers on a regulated basis.  
 
11.43 Efficiency concerns 
 
Management of the System 
A Management Committee is responsible for the day-to-day management of the water 
system. The Committee oversees technical and financial operations of the system. 
Members of the Management Committee are hired, paid and fired by the Water 
Board. They comprise a System Manager, Pump Attendants and a Revenue Officer. 
The Management Committee keeps books on transactions of the system and liaises 
with the GWCL on operational issues.  
 
Each Water and Sanitation Committee (WSC) has an Overseer, a Treasurer and a 
Liaison. Commissioned Agents are appointed by Water and Sanitation Committees to 
collect user fees at public fountains. These agents submit accounts to the management 
through the (WSC) Treasurer each day. The Liaison makes reports of malfunctions of 
the system to the Management Committee.  
 
The System Manager keeps monthly performance charts on the pump attendants, 
which are discussed at either Board or Water and Sanitation Committee meetings.  
Revenue accrued from water sales are paid into a bank account, with joint signatories 
from the SWB and the SNDA. Payments to GWCL, staff salaries, maintenance and 
repairs are drawn from this account. The District Engineer assists with maintenance 
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assessments and provides advice on repair works. The works engineer of the District 
Assembly is also responsible for the technical supervision of the system. 
 
Staffing 
The system currently engages the services of four salaried workers, one plumber on 
contract and 21 commissioned agents. The salaried workers include a System 
Manager, Revenue Officer, Pump Attendant and a Security Officer. Commissioned 
Agents supervise the sale of water at public fountains and are paid 10% of total sales.  
 
Water losses 
Unaccounted for Water (UFW) arising from physical losses, illegal connections, as 
well as un-recovered tariffs are lower in Savelugu than neighbouring towns. Actual 
UFW (refers to losses to the system) at Savelugu is 15%. Underlying reasons include 
occasional pipe bursts, especially in the night when pressure is high, spillage at 
fetching points and concessions granted to the poor. Actual UFW is 48% for Tamale 
and 70% for neighbouring town of Kumbungu (CPHD, 2004).   
 
Tariff setting 
Tariffs are proposed by the SWB, and approved by the SNDA. The basis of tariff 
approval is always PURC levels plus a margin for local operation and maintenance 
and expansion costs. Savelugu water tariffs are therefore higher than that of the PURC 
system (see Figure 11.2).  
 
Figure 11.2: Cost of a gallon of water 
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Tariff Recovery 
The Tariff Recovery Rate for Savelugu (refers to the proportion of water supplied to 
the town for which the full cost has been paid). This stands at 100% for the period 
January 2000 to April 2003, meaning full cost recovery by the GWCL in its dealings 
with Savelugu. As depicted by Figure 11.3, this is in sharp contrast to the rather very 
low tariff recovery for the GWCL system in Tamale. The high recovery rate (90%) 
for Tamale in 2000 was due to government paying most of its bills. The central role of 
SNDA in the Savelugu system ensures more prompt payment of bills by government 
departments. High tariff recovery in Savelugu is also due to limited in-door 
connections, community sensitisation to report pipe leakages promptly, promoting 
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water fetching habits that minimise losses, regular servicing of meters, stringent 
measures to check financial leakages and a contractual arrangement with private 
plumbers to attend promptly to reported cases of pipe leakages. 
 
Figure 11.3: Tariff recovery rate 
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Capital investment in the System 
 
A capital investment of 4,500,000,000 cedis (about US$ 650,000) has been made in 
the SWS. The major contributor was UNICEF (about 70%). Other contributors were 
GWCL (overhead tank), World Vision (8%), SNDA (1.5%) and community members 
(1%).  
 
Operation and Maintenance  
 
Operations costs involve fuel for the booster station, utility bills and remuneration of 
staff. Maintenance has so far been minor, including replacement of damaged 
secondary pipe lines and taps. User charges have fully financed the cost of operations 
and maintenance since the establishment of the system.  
 
Expansion and future replacement 
 
The story is however different for expansion of the network. The system is only able 
to finance labour costs, which constitute about a third of expansion costs. UNICEF 
has financed a little over half of the cost of expansion, mainly in the form of direct 
supply of parts. The District Assembly has contributed just 13% of expansion costs. 
In all total local contribution (system revenue + SNDA contribution) is 42% (see 
Figure 11.4 below).  
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Figure 11.4 Source of finance for expansion 2000-mid 2003 
 
Total savings by the Savelugu town system at the end 2002 was about 22, 340,000 
cedis (about US$ 2972), though having increased from 4,900,400 cedis (about US$ 
980) in 2000.  
 
According to local officials, future expansion and sustainability of the system will 
depend on the possibility of siting a high yielding borehole in the district whose water 
will not be treated so that the system can stop depending on the water from Tamale. 
Currently most of the revenue from the system goes to pay GWCL for supplies. 
 
Nevertheless, the system’s pluralist arrangement has the potential of compensating for 
its inability to fully finance expansion and future replacement. The SNDA and CWSA 
presented a proposal to central government for grants under the HIPC Relief Initiative 
to finance the development of mechanized extraction of underground water. The 
proposal is meant to reduce Savelugu’s dependence on the Bulk Purchase 
arrangement with the GWCL, thereby saving more resources to expand the network. 
Approval of the proposal will add to the value of the pluralist arrangement, which 
enables the District Assembly to mobilise funds from a wide range of sources.  
 
11.44 Possible influence on health 
 
The “use” of “guinea worm reduction” to attract external resources appears to have 
paid off. The number of cases in the town declined from 667 in 1999 to 23 in 2002 
(see Figure 11.5 below). 
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Figure 11.5: No of guinea worm cases in Savelugu town 
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11.5 Explaining performance 
 
Local officials, Board members, supporting donors and consumer representatives 
were asked during the research to explain the performance of the system through 
ranking of several possible factors. These factors were mentioned by officials and 
community leaders who took part on focus group discussions and key informants’ 
interviews. They include Manageable scale and technology, Participation, 
Competition, Accountability, More decentralization, Capacity of local government 
and Capacity of private sector. Results of the ranking exercise were as follows: 
 
Highly ranked factors 
Highly ranked factors were those judged to have a direct positive contribution to 
performance:  
• Manageable scale and technology 
• More decentralization and partnerships 
• Accountability of service providers to consumers 
 
There was consensus among all officials and community leaders that these three 
factors had contributed to performance in a direct way. 
 
Moderately ranked factors 
Moderately ranked factors were those judged to have a not- so-direct contribution to 
performance, but were nevertheless positive factors. Two factors fell in this category:  
• Capacity of local government 
• Capacity of private sector  
 
Lowly ranked factors 
Lowly ranked factors were those judged to have the least contribution to performance. 
These were: 
• Participation 
• Competition 
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Further discussions with local officials explained that Participation was ranked low, 
not because it was not an important factor, but due to its implied role in promoting 
accountability and management of the system. The point that emerged strongly was 
that Participation would be most rewarding if used as a means to Accountability and 
better management.  
 
Competition was ranked lower than Participation. Respondents acknowledged that 
given the scale of service and the role of the SNDA, which they regarded as positive, 
competition was at best limited to smaller operational areas, particularly among 
Commissioned Agents for collection of fees. 
 
Highly ranked factors are discussed in greater detail. 
 
11.51 The scale and technology factor 
 
Indoor vs. community services 
 
As discussed, public fountains serve about 90% of residents, with the remaining 10% 
having indoor services. According to the System Manager, this decision was reached 
after several rounds of discussions with residents and based on two factors: initial cost 
of extending services to all zones of the town, and reducing unaccounted for water. 
Public fountains were seen as the short-term answer to reduce constraints associated 
with household connections, particularly collecting user fees and reducing leakages.  
 
Choice of technology 
 
Reasons for the choice of technology have been discussed in detail in section 11.3.  
The Bulk Purchase arrangement was selected mainly because of two reasons: 
avoiding costs and skills associated with treatment and transmission of surface water, 
which GWCL bears; avoiding the cost of transmitting underground water from 
sources several kilometres away from the town. All respondents indicated that 
Savelugu did not have the skills to manage treatment of water. Secondly, it was more 
manageable, given existing skills and institutions, to buy safe water for distribution 
than to generate it.  
 
Technology and skill base 
 
Respondents pointed out that the most important management factor has been skills. 
The SWS relied extensively on its external partners for skills to establish the system, 
thus the need to start with a relatively low level technological option. Respondents 
emphasised the need for Savelugu to learn from a smaller scale of operation. 
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11.52 The decentralization and partnership factor 
 
Decentralization has been promoted by the leadership role of local government, the 
SNDA; and the design features of the SWS. 
  
Leadership by local government 
 
Local leadership and brokerage by the SNDA is at the heart of the success of the 
SWS. Savelugu is characterized by poverty (see Chapter 6) and lack of technical 
skills. Central government grants are not adequate to scale up provision of basic 
services. In this context, local government, the SNDA, has responded in various ways 
to ensure safe water by playing the role of: 
 
a) Leader in mobilizing skills and resources; 
b) Broker in facilitating preparation of technical proposals, sharing of costs among 
donors and resolving different interests; and a medium for channelling resources 
of external agencies, both state and non state, with an interest in a water-related 
problem such as the eradication of guinea worm, reduction of other water-borne 
diseases or the promotion of the right to safe water; 
c) Overseer of the Savelugu Water System. The Savelugu Water board reports to the 
SNDA, which monitors its accounts, regularity of flow of water and on several 
occasions provides technical and financial support.  
 
Design of the SWS: akin to institutional pluralism 
 
The SWS has the following institutional design features: 
 
a) Delegation by the SNDA to the SWB to manage the SWS with elements of 
devolution and. Delegation is through the reporting relationship between the SWS 
and SNDA, approval of tariffs by the SNDA and the strong influence of the 
Mayor in mobilizing resources and in approval of tariffs. Devolution is supported 
by the domination of elected officials on the Board and the wide powers of the 
SWB in managing the system, including decisions on scale of service provision.  
b) Pluralism through partnerships between community organizations, the SWS, the 
SNDA for managing the system; the SNDA, NGOs and donors for the provision 
of financial and technical resources; the GWEP of the MoH and the SNDA for the 
eradication of guinea worm; contract arrangements with private commissioned 
agents to collect user fees and artisans to maintain the system; and representation 
of community groups, the town’s Council and the SNDA on the SWB. The SWS 
relied substantially on financial and technical support from NGOs and donors to 
establish the system.  
c) Pluralism through partnership with the GWCL in the Bulk Purchase agreement, 
where the GWCL is a supplier of treated water to the SWS. The SWS pays fully 
for the purchase of water and for maintenance carried out by the GWCL on 
transmission lines. The relationship between the SWS and GWCL is an unusual 
one in Ghana – that is having a district level company contract the main public 
utility for the supply of treated water through a service agreement.  
 
 
 - 138 -  
11.53 The Accountability factor 
 
Management of the SWS is designed to ensure participation of elected officials at 
most stages of service provision. Secondly, Annual General Meetings of the SWB 
ensure information exchange between consumers and the SWB. Thirdly, delegation of 
management of public fountains to area Water and Sanitation Committees promotes 
early reporting of leakages and oversight over Commission Agents for collection of 
user fees. In addition, presentation of the SWB’s accounts to the SNDA promotes 
accountability.  
 
The design and implementation of these mechanisms for accountability were 
influenced by three factors:  
 
a) The CWSA model for provision of water in semi-urban districts, which requires 
the establishment of Water and Sanitation Committees, regular meetings of these 
Committees and maintenance of given management practices (see Chapter 6 for 
more detailed discussion) 
b) Donor requirements to reduce financial leakages and promote sustainability of 
their investments 
c) SNDA’s interest in overseeing the SWS. The SNDA regards the SWS as a semi-
autonomous agency, which is subject to two controls: submission of financial and 
technical reports every quarter and approval of tariffs. 
 
11.54 Will the current trend of performance continue? 
 
Views of respondents were mixed about whether the SWS will be able to sustain 
gains and to expand coverage and efficiency.  
 
Not so positive views 
Many officials point out factors that threaten the SWS. Key among these are: 
 
a) The heavy reliance on donors for funds and skills for expansion. The SWS was 
established on heavy donor contribution (about 80% of investment costs). 
Subsequent expansion has also depended heavily of donor support (58%). 
b) Absence of any form of preparation for future replacement. The current tariff 
structure has two components: user fees to pay GWCL and operation and 
maintenance costs. Savings have been made from O&M in the past five years as 
the system is new. These savings have gone into expansion. Officials have not 
factored in the current arrangement future O&M costs that are likely to rise, as 
well as replacement costs. 
c) Accountability mechanisms, though promoting transparency, has lacked external 
and independent audit. 
  
Positive views 
Some officials are however optimistic about further expansion and sustainability of 
the SWS. They raise the following points: 
 
a) Continued donor investment is contingent on good management of the system, 
especially in terms of accountability and efficiency, areas the SWS has made 
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significant gains. Donor support is also regarded as having been attracted by the 
clarity of roles, which is facilitated by local leadership. 
b) Leadership role of the SNDA. Officials argue that once the SNDA got involved in 
any scheme as a central actor, various interests rallied to perform assigned tasks.  
c) Maintaining a pluralist approach will bring innovative ways of mobilizing funds 
and skills. The Regional CWSA has for example, submitted a proposal to Central 
Government for funds to develop a network based on extraction of underground 
water. The objective is to reduce dependence on GWCL and expand the system. 
d) Growing acknowledgement of the CWSA approach to service provision, which 
continues to is attract donor funds and has started to attract increases in Central 
Government support.  
 
11.6 Conclusions 
 
In an attempt to explain factors that influence performance, this chapter started by 
establishing that the institutional approach adopted by the SWS is that of institutional 
pluralism. Subsequently, the chapter determined, and with a positive result, how well 
pluralism was performing, in terms of accountability, effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
Using more qualitative methods, the study then identified factors that explain 
performance of the SWS, which represents an example of a plural arrangement for 
service delivery. Outstanding among the factors are manageable scale and technology, 
decentralisation and partnerships and accountability. Local capacity concerns also 
influenced the adoption of the particular scale and technology as well as plural 
arrangements. Competition, though present, was limited to contracting out operations 
and maintenance of specific components of service delivery, due to capacity 
considerations.  
 
Underlying these influencing factors for performance are the roles that the SNDA has 
played in the process, particularly, in leadership, brokerage and oversight. The answer 
to the question “will performance continue?” appears to be dependent on how well the 
SNDA continues to play these three roles in the future. 
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CHAPTER 12 
 
12.0 SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
12.1 The Analytical Framework  
 
We started this thesis with an argument by Linder (2002) that decentralisation leads to 
new institutions of government; and that decentralisation, together with other 
institutions, the market and the social system contribute to the transformation of 
society. Our analytical framework for the study in Chapter 5 defines in a logical 
manner the way we expect decentralisation to influence the delivery of basic 
services104. 
 
The main elements of our analytical framework on how decentralisation influences 
the delivery of basic services are that: (a) underlying legislation and subsequent 
policies serve as inputs; (b) the emerging type of decentralization and distribution of 
roles are the immediate effects; (c) the emerging institutional approaches to service 
delivery (monopoly, distributed monopoly, pluralism) at the decentralised level of 
governance are the outputs; and, (d) improved performance in the delivery of services 
serve as outcomes. We tested our hypotheses through this analytical framework and 
summarise the findings in this Chapter. Subsequently, we formulate conclusions for 
theoretical framework on the basis of our findings. We end the Chapter with policy 
implications of the study for Ghana.  
 
12.2 Testing the hypotheses 
 
12.21 First hypothesis 
 
The first hypothesis for the study was that decentralisation in practice in Ghana does 
not reflect what is specified by the country’s laws and referred to by Rondinelli (1981) 
as devolution, but rather a mixture of deconcentration and delegation.  This 
hypothesis has been tested for Ghana in general in Chapter 3 and for the water and 
sanitation in particular in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 of the study. 
 
We discussed some theoretical frameworks on decentralisation in Chapter 2 to 
provide a basis for testing the two hypotheses of the study. These frameworks were 
clustered under the structure oriented Type Function Framework (TFF) by the 
Cheema-Nellis-Rondinelli-Silverman school; the roles oriented analysis of 
decentralisation through the Administrative Design Framework (ADF) by the Cohen-
Peterson school; and the Enablement Framework (EF) by the Helmsing school. We 
noted the argument of the TFF that various combinations of the main forms of 
decentralisation, political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation result in types of 
decentralisation - deconcentration, delegation and devolution; from the ADF that 
various combinations of roles in service provision result in monopoly, distributed 
monopoly or pluralism at centralised or decentralised levels of governance; and from 
EF that local governments can perform better if they play an enabling rather than 
direct service provision role.  
                                                          
104 We use evaluation techniques discussed by Bamberger, et al.(2006) as the basis of our analytical 
framework. 
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Further, we reviewed the evolution of decentralisation in Ghana in chapter 3 starting 
from pre-independence days. On the basis of secondary data we examined in detail 
the most recent wave of reform that started in 1988 and which states devolution as its 
objective (MLGRD, 1996). We noted the challenges to decentralisation that the 
literature on Ghana105 brings out. Regarding political decentralisation, there are 
challenges in the determination of a manageable level of participation at the level of 
local government. Additionally, there is the challenge of moving beyond the 
government sector to structured participation of the private sector and civil society in 
local development. We also ascertained that the implementation of administrative 
decentralisation has been slow. Incentives that make staff at the local government 
level have strong allegiance to their parent ministries at the centre are still in place. 
Also, public-private partnerships for the provision of basic services are at an early 
stage of development. We again observed weaknesses in fiscal decentralisation. 
Discretion of local government over the use of the District Assembly Common Fund, 
the main fiscal instrument for decentralisation, is limited. About half of the Fund is 
earmarked by the Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development (MLGRD). 
Moreover, recurrent budgets for the delivery of basic services are largely held by 
parent ministries, who disburse to their respective departments at the local level in a 
deconcentrated fashion.  
 
In addition, we reviewed the economic characteristics of water and sanitation in 
Chapter 4 and how these relate to decentralisation and pluralism. We noted the 
possibility of a wide range of institutional approaches to service delivery, particularly 
various forms of private sector involvement and community participation at the 
different levels of government. 
 
We then tested the first hypothesis using the case of water and sanitation provision. 
We collected and analysed primary data for this purpose from two districts, Tamale 
and Savelugu-Nanton. Tamale and Savelugu-Nanton have similar economic and 
social characteristics and are neighbours to each other. Tamale is a one-town district 
whereas Savelugu-Nanton is a semi-urban district with a mix of small towns and rural 
settlements.  
 
We developed a set of indicators for the various elements of the analytical framework 
shown in Figure 5.2: for immediate effects and outputs, indicators of the main forms 
of decentralisation (political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation) as well as 
indicators of the concentration/distribution of roles in service delivery; and, for 
outcomes, indicators of performance of the water and sanitation sector in the two 
districts through assessing their effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, sustainability 
and possible influence on health.  
 
We used these indicators with the help of a household survey, key informants’ 
interviews and an examination of official records in the two study districts. We 
learned that there are differences in the type of decentralisation and as well as in the 
distribution of roles for the delivery of water and sanitation in the two districts.  
 
                                                          
105 These include Ayee (1995), Nkrumah (2000), Nkrumah (1998), MLGRD (1996), MLGRD (2002), 
Laryea-Adjei (2001), World Bank (1993), UN and Republic of Ghana (2005), Alhassan and Arthur 
(2004). 
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Overall, the immediate effects of legislation and policies in Savelugu-Nanton are seen 
in a more decentralised and plural approach to the delivery of water and sanitation 
than in the case of Tamale. This is particularly so for water, where GWCL has a 
deconcentrated approach to service delivery and has no partnership arrangement with 
local government, the Tamale Municipal Assembly (TMA); and where the TMA has 
also not initiated any partnership arrangement with the GWCL to improve the 
delivery of water. Regarding sanitation, both Savelugu-Nanton and Tamale have 
similar approaches to the delivery of sanitation – more towards decentralisation, but 
with responsibilities for staffing and in a partial way, funding, managed from above. 
We also ascertain that pluralism is beginning to emerge in the provision of sanitation 
in Savelugu-Nanton more than in Tamale, which has roles for service provision 
largely concentrated in the government structure. 
 
In terms of outputs, our analysis shows that the provision of water and sanitation in 
Savelugu-Nanton is through delegation and pluralism at the decentralized level of 
government. Roles are shared by more than one governmental institution, NGOs, 
private sector firms and community organizations. Roles are also spatially 
decentralised. Plural arrangements in Savelugu-Nanton have brought opportunities for 
service delivery - in the form of skills and resources from other actors who are not 
controlled by government.  
 
In Tamale, water provision is through a combination of distributed monopoly and 
deconcentration. Roles are concentrated in the structure of the GWCL, but spatially 
distributed from its headquarters in Accra to Tamale. Provision of sanitation in 
Tamale is through delegation and distributed monopoly within the government, with 
signs of a transition to pluralism (mainly through contracting out management of one 
third of the public sanitation facilities).  
 
We depict in Figure 12.1 the theoretical states of the interaction between 
decentralisation and distribution of roles (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of 
this framework). After applying our analytical framework, we demonstrate in Figure 
12.2 how decentralisation and pluralism have emerged in the two study districts in the 
provision of water and sanitation, including the evolution path that they have 
followed. 
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Figure 12.1: Theoretical states of decentralisation and distribution of roles 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.2: Evolution of decentralisation in the two districts 
 
 
 
Provision of water in Tamale: 
 
Provision of sanitation in Tamale: 
 
Provision of water in Savelugu-Nanton: 
 
 Provision of sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton: 
 
 
We further note that extremely limited fiscal decentralisation as well as control of 
local government staff by the centre are disincentives for devolution in the two 
districts.  
 
We therefore confirmed the first hypothesis that decentralisation in practice in Ghana 
does not reflect what is specified by the country’s laws as devolution. The design and 
implementation of reforms have led to a hybrid of types of decentralisation for the 
provision of each service and a more intricate hybrid for a combination of services. 
Furthermore, the existence of pluralism differs in each of the two districts, even for 
the same service.  
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Subsequently, we assessed reasons provided by key informants for the differences in 
the type of decentralisation and distribution of roles in the two districts. The first 
reason is that provision of water is via two approaches in Ghana, one more centralised 
than the other. Tamale falls under the more centralised GWCL system and Savelugu-
Nanton, the more decentralised CWSA system. The inference is that policies for 
delivery of basic services have all not been revised to support the objective of 
decentralisation. The two main public agencies for delivery of water have different 
approaches, with CWSA seeking a central role for local government in service 
delivery, and the GWCL operating in a deconcentrated manner. 
 
The second reason given by managers for the differences in decentralisation is the 
role that local government plays in the delivery of services, even in cases of a strong 
central pull. The Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly (SNDA), with the support of its 
partners, has enhanced its leadership and brokerage roles in the provision of water and 
sanitation services. This is demonstrated by its ability to organise and lead 
participatory planning and monitoring meetings, pool skills from NGOs and the 
private sector for specific tasks and mobilise financial resources from a wide range of 
actors for service provision. We found out that staff of the SNDA have a posture of 
expediting the work of other agencies (state and non-state) involved in direct service 
provision. Leadership and brokerage roles are much less evident in the TMA.  
 
The third reason is the role of external partners. International development partners 
have in particular been attracted to work in Savelugu-Nanton because of its plural 
arrangements. Support is both demand-driven as well donor-driven. International 
development organisations usually insist on changes to management practices they 
view as negative to their investment in districts.  
 
12.22 Second hypothesis 
 
The second hypothesis for the study states that when pluralism emerges at the 
decentralised level of government, it yields better performance than the case of 
distributed monopoly. We tested this hypothesis at the outcomes level of our 
analytical framework by determining the performance of Savelugu-Nanton and 
Tamale in the provision of water and sanitation over a five year period, 1998 to 2003. 
We used indicators of effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, sustainability and 
possible influence on health for this purpose. 
 
We found in Chapter 10, that Savelugu-Nanton is more effective than Tamale (for the 
1998-2003 period of the study), particularly in increasing the coverage and reliability 
of water to the benefit of users. We also found Savelugu-Nanton to be generally more 
efficient in the provision of water and sanitation, particularly in minimizing water loss 
and in mobilising both local and external resources for investment. Savelugu-Nanton 
also performs better than Tamale in terms of local accountability. Savelugu-Nanton 
promotes more participation and better flow of information in the provision of 
services. This is essentially due to plural arrangements that have been adopted by the 
district for the provision of services. On the other hand, the Tamale approach 
promotes concentration of information and roles in the government structure, a feature 
that restricts accountability to consumers.  
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Sustainability appeared to be a challenge for both Tamale and Savelugu-Nanton 
approaches. The Savelugu-Nanton approach has the strength of using local skills for 
operation and maintenance, unlike Tamale, which relies heavily on skills from outside 
the district. Both cases also rely extensively on foreign support to expand their 
systems.  
 
The picture regarding possible influence on health is not conclusive. Savelugu-Nanton 
has performed better in the prevention of the deadly cholera. Tamale on the other 
hand has performed better in the reduction of guinea worm.  
 
Overall, we found that the more decentralised and plural Savelugu-Nanton has 
performed better (from 1998 to 2003) in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and 
accountability. Our findings are however not conclusive regarding sustainability and 
influence on health.  
 
Thus we partially confirmed the second hypothesis in that when pluralism emerges at 
the decentralised level of government, it yields better performance than the case of 
distributed monopoly in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and accountability. We 
could not confirm with certainty that pluralism at the decentralised level of 
government yields better performance than distributed monopoly in terms of 
sustainability and possible influence on health. Our findings also did not show the 
reverse – that distributed monopoly performs better than pluralism at decentralised 
level of government in terms of sustainability and possible influence on health. More 
work is needed in this area.   
 
Furthermore, our conclusion regarding the second hypothesis is confirmed when we 
cross tabulate (see Table 12.1 to 12.4) the type of decentralization and performance 
using selected indicators, including: 
 
 Regularity of flow of piped water (hours a day) to residents (an indicator of 
effectiveness) 
 Responsibility for operation and maintenance of water facilities (an indicator 
of administrative decentralisation) 
 Length of time taken to repair broken down water points (indicator of 
efficiency) 
 Proportion of households with clean compound (an indicator of effectiveness) 
 Proportions of households invited to participate in making decisions on water 
supply and sanitation (an indicator of political decentralisation) 
 Proportion of households taking part in discussing monitoring reports on the 
state of water points and sanitation facilities (an indicator of accountability) 
 
We find that the households with piped systems in the more decentralised Savelugu 
town have longer periods of supply in a day than their counterparts in Tamale (see 
Table: 12.1). The District-managed Savelugu Water Board, which exhibits features of 
delegation and pluralism, provides longer periods of water supply than the 
deconcentrated Tamale GWCL. 
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Table 12.1: Regular flow of water/responsibility for O&M 
 
Proportion of households indicating hours a day of 
piped water to residents (%) 
 
 
 
Proportion of households indicating who 
operates and maintains water facilities 
(%) 
Less than 12 hours 12 hours or more 
   
Savelugu Water Board 10.5 89.5
Tamale GWCL 85.8 14.2
N = 364 and 402 for Savelugu-Nanton and Tamale respectively 
 
Furthermore, households with better response time for broken down water points are 
more likely to be using community and district managed systems rather than relying 
on the GWCL for maintenance (see Table 12.2).  
 
Table 12.2: Responsibility for maintenance/time taken for maintenance 
 
Proportion (%) of households indicating responsibility 
for broken down water points as: 
 
 
 
Proportion of households indicating 
length of time to repair broken down 
water point (%) 
SWB/DWST+ 
community 
GWCL 
Savelugu-Nanton 
Less than 2.5 days 66.2 
More than 2.5 days 33.6 
Tamale 
Less than 2.5 days  56.2 
More than 2.5 days  43.9 
N = 364 and 402 for Savelugu-Nanton and Tamale respectively 
 
In addition, households who participated in decision-making are more likely to have 
clean compounds, an indication of safe sanitary conditions at home (see Table 12.3). 
  
Table 12.3: Participation/cleanliness of compounds 
 
  Proportion of households indicating involvement in 
decision-making (%) 
Proportion of households with clean 
compound (%): 
Savelugu-Nanton  49.2 
Tamale 22.9 
N = 364 and 402 for Savelugu-Nanton and Tamale respectively 
 
Households not involved in participation are also not likely to have taken part in 
reviewing monitoring reports on service provision. The more decentralised Savelugu-
Nanton has more households who are involved in both decision-making on service 
provision as well as in reviewing monitoring reports (see Table 12.4). 
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Table 12.4: Participation/accountability 
 
   
Proportions of households invited to 
participate in making decisions on water 
supply and sanitation (%) 
  
Proportion of households taking 
part in discussing monitoring 
reports on the state of water points 
and sanitation facilities (%) 
Participated Did not participate 
Savelugu-Nanton 
Reviewed monitoring report 24.8 3.6 
Did not review monitoring report 22.0 49.6 
Tamale 
Reviewed monitoring report 5.3 2.0 
Did not review monitoring report 6.1 86.5 
N = 364 and 402 for Savelugu-Nanton and Tamale respectively 
 
We further explored, through more qualitative techniques, including key informants 
interviews and focus group discussions with experts as well as users why Savelugu-
Nanton is doing better in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and accountability; and 
why it is not lagging behind Tamale in terms of sustainability and possible influence 
on health. We conclude that the Savelugu Water System draws its strengths from the 
following: 
 
a) A local government that plays leadership, brokerage and oversight roles in the 
provision of services and that has instruments to pool skills and funds from 
other actors;  
b) Adoption of manageable scale and technology for providing services within 
the context of available local capacity (capacity available in the area, both in 
and out of government);  
c) Service provision that is decentralised to the lowest level of governance on the 
basis of efficiency considerations, which include the ability of the Water 
Board to collect user charges and to promptly repair broken down facilities. 
d) Formulation of a clear objective of deepening local accountability of the 
service provider through the design of a water system that is accountable to 
local government and not to a distant national public utility. Through this 
arrangement, the Savelugu Water Board is able to convince consumers to pay 
more than user charges approved by the national Public Utility Regulatory 
Commission (but less than cost of vendor services). Thus, the Savelugu Water 
Board fully finances its operation and maintenance and increasingly, its 
expansion costs. Accountability to local government is also promoted by the 
adopted scale of service provision. 
e) Setting up of well defined plural arrangements for mobilising technical 
assistance and funds from NGOs, private consultants, central government and 
international aid agencies. Local managers indicate that Savelugu-Nanton had 
no choice but to “open up” to a variety of actors, including non state actors to 
provide safe water due to its lack of skills and funds. 
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12.3 Conclusions  
 
Our conclusions of the study are presented in three parts. The first regards our 
observations on the two cases from Ghana that we have studied. The second set of 
conclusions relates to the theoretical framework used for the study. The third set is on 
the policy implications of the study. 
  
12.31 Districts in Ghana and the provision of water  
 
In our study of central-local relations and the provision of water and sanitation in 
Ghana we conclude that there is a great deal of diversity in institutional approaches 
for service delivery. Despite the same decentralisation framework for the entire 
country, there is a great deal of diversity in the form the framework takes in the 
provision of services at the district level. National policies for delivery of basic 
services have all not been revised to support the objective of decentralisation. In the 
case of water, for which two central government agencies, the GWCL and CWSA 
have oversight responsibility, the decentralisation framework has had some influence 
on the approach used by one agency, the CWSA which was established in the heat of 
the reforms; and no influence on the other, the GWCL which was established long 
before the current wave of decentralisation reforms started. While the CWSA 
approach seeks a central role for local government in service provision and thereby 
provides mainly policy and funding roles to local governments, the GWCL operates 
in a deconcentrated manner having almost no institutional links with local 
government. By operating under GWCL, Tamale for example, does not enjoy the 
benefits that decentralisation and pluralism bring, unlike Savelugu-Nanton, which has 
significantly increased coverage and reliability of services in recent years.  
 
There is also diversity even where just one central agency has oversight 
responsibility. In the case of provision of sanitation, the two districts use decentralised 
approaches for service delivery due to the existence of one central government 
agency, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, which is 
responsible for policy guidance for all districts. Nevertheless, Savelugu-Nanton has 
adopted more plural institutional approaches for service delivery.  
 
A distinctive feature of the performance of two cases is the role that local 
governments play in operationalising decentralisation policies. We have identified 
three roles that underlie the performance of the more successful Savelugu-Nanton 
district. These are leadership, brokerage and oversight roles. Our conclusion is that 
despite a pull from the centre, local governments are able to deepen decentralisation 
through the roles they choose to play. A passive local government, as in the case of 
Tamale regarding water provision, neither positions itself nor develops instruments to 
work with centralised agencies (like the GWCL) for better services for its people. 
 
Distributed monopoly, particularly in the government sector, is dominant, though in 
different forms, for example, in the form of deconcentration in the provision of water 
in Tamale and delegation in the provision of sanitation in the same district. We have 
observed from the case of Savelugu-Nanton that distributed monopoly evolves to 
pluralism where there are a conscious national policy and an enterprising local 
government.  
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Furthermore, there appears to be little consideration for the outcomes of 
decentralisation in terms of better services in Ghana. It appears that the goals of 
Ghana’s decentralisation reforms are not directly linked to improvements in the 
provision of basic services. Reforms have focussed more on the general government 
structure of administration and less on service delivery agencies and their 
performance. 
 
In addition, there is no consistency in ensuring that all forms of decentralisation, 
political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation are mutually supportive of each 
other106. All three forms are occurring at very different paces. Central government 
agencies have no guidance on how they can proceed with all forms of decentralisation 
either at the same time or in a clearly sequenced manner. The focus has been on 
establishing District Assemblies and not on reforming central government agencies.  
 
We have also learned that pluralism is facilitated by considerations of manageable 
scale and technology in service provision. Furthermore, the case of water provision in 
the two districts show that decentralisation and pluralism make possible increases in 
coverage and reliability of services, efficiency and accountability to the benefit of 
users more than through distributed monopolies. Finally, access to aid appears to be a 
strong “carrot” in getting local governments to adopt more decentralised and plural 
approaches. This should be a subject of further investigation.  
 
12.32 Revisiting the theoretical framework for analysing decentralisation 
 
Whereas the Cheema-Rondinelli-Nellis-Silverman school emphasises the structural 
elements of decentralisation through the Type Function Framework (TFF), the Cohen-
Peterson school, through the Administrative Design Framework (ADF) focuses on the 
concentration or distribution of roles. The former defines end states in the form of 
types of decentralisation (deconcentration, delegation, devolution); the latter produces 
an array of options from institutional monopoly to pluralism. We have reviewed 
various elements of the two schools in our analyses107. Our findings have a bearing on 
these frameworks. 
 
12.321  Analysis by types of decentralisation 
 
Dynamic interactions, not static types of decentralisation 
 
As our cases have demonstrated, the compartmentalisation of types of decentralisation 
into deconcentration, delegation and devolution is too simplistic and should best be 
regarded as a theoretical guide in the examination of what happens on the ground. 
What happens in reality is more complex, more diverse and more dynamic. Various 
aspects of the provision of each basic service can have features of different types of 
decentralisation. Our study has revealed the need for a framework that reveals the 
intricacies of these diverse features for each service and for a combination of services 
for a given geographical area. 
 
                                                          
106 Reference to Parker’s (1995) soufflé theory discussed in Chapter 2. 
107 We have also reviewed the dimensions of community engagement in decision-making as 
emphasised by the Enablement Framework (EF). Our analyses have nevertheless focused largely on the 
elements of the ADF and TFF. 
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Secondly, the notion of a hybrid of types of decentralisation should also be 
understood as an evolving phenomenon at any given point in time. A hybrid of types 
can exist for the provision of each service at the local level. Mapping a variety of 
hybrids will reveal a more intricate mix of types. Moreover, these can change from 
year to year depending on how political, administrative and fiscal matters are resolved 
in service provision. It is therefore important to have a framework that maps these 
dynamics as and when they occur, to determine whether a particular 
system/district/country is on course to achieve policy objectives. In effect, 
conclusions about types of decentralisation should reflect details about services and 
the dynamics of interaction between various actors over time. Analysis of 
decentralisation by types should therefore go further to reveal (possible) diversity and 
differences in various aspects of the institutional approach to the provision of each 
service, how these combine to reinforce each other, and how these are evolving, 
whether towards more decentralisation or centralisation.   
 
More emphasis on the process of decentralisation in analysis 
 
Thirdly, we observed the need for greater emphasis on the process of decentralisation 
and not just the end-state of types of decentralisation. Our cases have demonstrated 
that the process of implementing decentralisation reform is equally as important as its 
stated objective and design. We have observed that, while the objective of devolution 
is clearly stated in Ghana’s policy documents, policy makers in the country are not 
addressing the challenges of the processes involved. There is for example no plan to 
sequence implementation of forms of decentralisation for each basic service towards 
the objective. The end-state has been fixed by the Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development, but the process has not been given the required attention. 
Elements of political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation are proceeding at 
varied stages in an uncoordinated manner and are at variance with Parker’s (1995) 
soufflé. It is therefore important to have a framework that maps the process as well as 
the end-state at any point in time.  
  
Evolution of relationships and not one-time transfer of authority 
 
We also observed in chapter 2 that the Cheema-Rondinelli-Nellis-Silverman school 
describe decentralisation in terms the transfer of authority and responsibility for 
public functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent 
government organisations or the private sector (Rondinelli, 1999). Our cases have 
portrayed that decentralisation is about an evolution of power relations in a dynamic 
manner rather than a one-time transfer of power to subordinate agencies. The national 
public utility GWCL for example is a distributed monopoly in Tamale. It is reluctant 
to share powers with local government, the Tamale Municipal Assembly, in the 
provision of water. However, in the Savelugu Water System (SWS), the GWCL has 
virtually been contracted by a more enterprising local government (SNDA) to sell 
water to the SWS. In effect, power relations between the centre and districts are 
characterised by a great deal of diversity and dynamics. We therefore note the need to 
have a framework that captures the diversity and dynamics of power relations.  
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Centralisation-decentralisation not either-or phenomenon 
 
Additionally, we have come across critical roles that are best played by central 
government agencies, including policy guidance, financing and regulating service 
provision by local governments and their partners. Another challenge therefore is to 
have a framework that captures the essential roles that need to be retained by central 
government agencies in decentralisation according to a set of criteria including 
economic characteristics of services, scale and technology considerations and 
elements of a sequencing plan.  
 
Always keep development outcomes in mind 
 
Our study has also emphasised that decentralisation reforms should be driven by the 
overall outcomes of development. We assessed the performance of two districts in 
Chapter 10 in this regard. We find that the dichotomy of national and local is essential 
in analysing the outcomes of decentralisation. As our cases have revealed, the district 
with the more decentralised and plural arrangements for service delivery performed 
better than the other with more centralised arrangements in the provision of water and 
sanitation. Thus, despite the need for some essential roles to be performed by the 
centre, central-local relations should be skewed towards more decentralisation rather 
than centralisation; and promote a brokerage role for local government in the 
provision of basic services.  
 
12.322  Roles analysis 
 
Dealing with transaction costs 
 
In advocating for the analysis of decentralisation from the roles perspective, the 
Cohen-Peterson school acknowledges the possibly high coordination costs involved in 
pursuing institutional pluralism. The challenge with high transaction costs in plural 
arrangements, particularly from regulation, is also mentioned by Euromarkets (2005).  
Our study finds that in the more successful Savelugu-Nanton case, transactions costs 
are reduced through pooling of skills among partners for specific tasks instead of 
hiring more staff. This way of reducing transactions costs may nevertheless need to be 
modified as the scale of service increases.  
 
Emphasis on local governance rather than local government 
 
We also note that there can be unrealistic assumptions about the personnel and 
financial capacity of private partners. The Savelugu-Nanton case has found a way 
around this by including staff of partners in its capacity development programmes. Its 
emphasis has been on building local rather than local government capacity. 
Nevertheless, there is the possibility of overstating the capacity of private partners in 
plural arrangements. Our study has revealed the need for a framework that monitors 
capacity gaps in both public and private agencies. 
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Essential roles for local government: leadership, brokerage, oversight 
 
Our study has demonstrated the usefulness in mapping of roles in the analysis of 
decentralisation, particularly in identifying complementary roles at the centre to keep 
decentralisation on track and roles that the private (profit and not-for-profit) sector 
can play in service provision. We have also established how a particular role, like 
financing, can be shared by agencies at different levels of governance and how such 
roles can be coordinated. Above all, we have found the interrelated roles of 
leadership, brokerage and oversight as the most important roles in terms of how local 
government improves its performance in service provision. We therefore note the 
importance of having a framework that in a given context determines which roles 
various levels of government and their partners should perform.  
 
Pluralism, but with decentralisation 
 
The ADF focuses on three criteria for assessing outcomes, effectiveness, efficiency 
and accountability. In addition to these, we have determined the importance of 
assessing sustainability, particularly in financing and management arrangements; we 
also emphasised the assessment of possible influences on health. Our findings are 
consistent with the emphasis placed by the ADF on pluralism. Our point of departure 
is lies in our emphasis that pluralism should be in the context of decentralisation for 
better provision of basic services.   
 
Determining underlying factors 
 
Finally, our study notes the challenge of attribution in analysing the success or 
failures decentralisation in terms of development outcomes. In our study, we have 
relied on descriptive analytical approaches to do this. More work is required in the 
development of quantitative tools.  
 
In sum, our analysis has shown ways in which the theoretical framework underlying 
the study can be enhanced. The challenge is to have a framework that strengthens the 
focus on development outcomes in decentralisation reforms, that is, views 
decentralisation as the means and not the end. In this regard, what is required is a 
framework that provides analytical tools for determining which balance in the 
distribution of roles and authority will enable the realisation of development 
objectives and outcomes (better health, literacy, higher incomes, etc.). 
 
Such a framework should capture the diversity of various aspects of institutional 
approaches or types of decentralisation for the provision of each service; and of 
combinations of services for a given geographical area, and how these are evolving, 
whether towards more decentralisation or centralisation.  It should map the process of 
decentralisation as well as the end-state at any point in time, including sequencing of 
reforms. The framework should also map the dynamics of interactions among various 
actors, including the diversity and dynamics of power relations and whether these add 
up to the achievement of a country’s decentralisation objectives. It should link more 
strongly the distribution of roles and authority to considerations for service provision 
in a given spatial unit, particularly the economic characteristics of services, scale and 
technology considerations and elements of a sequencing plan – to determine which 
combinations of decentralisation and decentralisation are optimal in the achievement 
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of results. Finally, an improved framework should deepen the analysis of the role of 
local government in provision of service provision, in particular leadership, brokerage 
and oversight roles.  
 
 
12.4 An improved framework 
 
Based on the findings of our study, we propose two Tables on how the diversity and 
dynamics of decentralisation and pluralism can be discussed and presented in a logical 
way. The first, Table 12.5, presents a guide to analysts and practitioners in providing a 
snapshot view of the diversity of decentralisation and pluralism in a given spatial unit, 
including a given district and country. The second Table, Table 12.6 will enable 
tracking of changes in features of decentralisation and pluralism for the provision of 
services. Tracking can be done for specific time periods that are dictated by the 
sequencing plans of countries. 
 
Based on our analytical framework (discussed in chapter 5) and findings, we 
emphasise in the two Tables, the mapping of the features of decentralisation and 
pluralism for the provision of each service and for combination of services for which 
local government has a role according to national laws. We propose four steps for the 
analysis of central-local relations in a logical way. The four steps will enable analysis 
of: (a) features of decentralisation and distribution of roles; (b) role of local 
government; (c) sequencing of reforms; and, (d) performance of systems.  
 
The steps enable analysis of these four issues simultaneously and in a logical way. 
Sequencing of reforms, for example, can occur according to features of Step 2, with a 
range of options from deconcentration with distributed monopoly to devolution with 
pluralism. The ability local government to perform leadership, brokerage and 
oversight roles, though an integral part of roles analysis in Step 1, are also presented 
as resulting features of decentralisation in Step 2. This is to place emphasis on the 
importance of these roles as our study has found. Step 3, provides an opportunity to 
identify and analyse the intervening variables between decentralisation and 
performance, including capacity of local partners, scale of provision of services and 
choice of technology. 
 
We place emphasis on Step 4 to ensure that decentralisation reforms aim at improving 
the performance of systems that provide basic services. At the end of the day, 
decentralisation reforms must contribute directly to improving the living standards of 
citizens. 
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Table 12.5: Presenting a snap-shot view of diversity and results in decentralisation 
Features of central-local relations Indicators (service and 
country specific)
Goal Reality Goal Reality
Step 1 Forms of decentralisation
(political, administrative, fiscal 
decentralisation)
Roles analysis
Role concentration in one organisation
Role distribution spatially but in one 
organisation
Role sharing among actors, state and 
non state
Step 2 Resulting features
Deconcentration
Deconcentration + pluralism
Delegation + distributed monopoly
Delegation + pluralism
Devolution 
Devolution + distributed monopoly
Devolution + pluralism
Leadership role by local government
Brokerage role by local government
Oversight role by local government
Step 3 Intervening variables
Other variables (scale, technology, 
macro stability, etc.)
Step 4 Performance 
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Accountability
Sustainability
Impact
Each service Combination of services
Basic services (local government by law have 
role in their provision)
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Table 12.6: Presenting periodic changes in the diversity involved in decentralisation 
Features of central-local relations Indicators (service and 
country specific)
Year 3 Year 5
Goal Reality Reality Reality
Step 1 Forms of decentralisation
(political, administrative, fiscal 
decentralisation)
Roles analysis
Role concentration in one organisation
Role distribution spatially but in one 
organisation
Role sharing among actors, state and 
non state
Step 2 Resulting features
Deconcentration
Deconcentration + pluralism
Delegation + distributed monopoly
Delegation + pluralism
Devolution 
Devolution + distributed monopoly
Devolution + pluralism
Leadership role by local government
Brokerage role by local government
Oversight role by local government
Step 3 Intervening variables
Other variables (scale, technology, 
macro stability, etc.)
Step 4 Performance 
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Accountability
Sustainability
Impact
Each service 
Basic services (local government by law 
have role in their provision)
 
 
 
12.5 The analytical framework and policy implications  
 
We conclude the study with policy implications for the design and implementation of 
decentralisation. These are based on lessons from our application of the analytical 
framework to the two cases. 
 
The first policy implication is the need to have unambiguous laws that define the type 
of decentralisation that a country is aiming for. Many countries have included the 
objectives of pursuing decentralisation in their Constitution. These need to be backed 
by specific laws that lay out the type of decentralisation that the country should 
pursue. In addition, laws establishing service delivery agencies and possible 
partnership arrangements should be made consistent with the specific laws that set out 
the nature of decentralisation reform. 
 
 The second policy implication is the need for specific policies to guide 
implementation of laws on decentralisation. Policies should set out the process of 
implementing reforms as well as instruments that various levels of government will 
adopt to ensure implementation of the reforms, including fiscal instruments, 
institutionalisation of participation and management of staff. Policies should also 
provide guidance on partnership arrangements for service delivery. Existing policies 
on the provision of services should be revised in this regard.  
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The third policy implication of our study is the need to formulate an implementation 
plan in support of decentralisation laws and policies. As noted from the two cases, 
there is likely to be a deviation from the original objective of decentralisation if there 
is no conscious adherence to road-map or sequencing plan. The road-map should 
include details of how and when to implement the various forms of decentralisation 
and should be monitored at frequent intervals. 
 
The fourth policy implication is the need for an incentive framework to ensure that 
local governments play the roles that are expected of them by law; as well as 
disincentives for central government agencies to avoid competing with local 
governments over the same tasks. The incentive framework should promote roles that 
our study has highlighted as essential in the provision of services, including 
leadership, brokerage and oversight. As discussed, grants from donors have been used 
to create such a framework in Savelugu-Nanton. 
 
We also note the need for frequent monitoring of improvement in services and other 
development outcomes. We must keep an eye on the purpose of decentralisation in 
making life better for citizens. 
 
Finally, this study has learnt about factors that stand out as influencing performance 
and concludes by emphasising the following in the design of central-local relations in 
the provision of basic services in Ghana:  
 
a) Ensure that decentralisation reform covers all forms, so that the resulting type 
of decentralisation meets the challenges of service provision at the local level;  
b) Develop arrangements for service provision that include rather that exclude 
actors outside local government, including NGOs and private operators, 
whether small of large scale; pluralism performs better; 
c) Match the preferred scale and technology for providing services with available 
local capacity (capacity available in the area, both in and out of government); 
d) Aim at deepening local accountability in decentralisation reforms;  
e) Focus on leadership, brokerage and oversight roles for local government in the 
design of reforms; these are critical to expanding basic services.  
 
The observation by one of the managers of GWCL, the deconcentrated public utility, 
is particularly relevant to the conclusion of this study: that reform of agencies that 
deliver basic services must be in the context of decentralisation; that in the provision 
of  water in urban districts, reforms should promote flexibility for greater partnerships 
at the decentralised level of governance, particularly with larger roles for local 
government; and that “more local and shared arrangements are needed to determine 
options for scale of service provision, reduce leakages, mobilise local skills and funds, 
and above all improve service delivery” 108.  
 
Future success will also depend on how well the leaders of local governments adapt to 
changes in the development environment, particularly the expanding role of the non 
state sector in the provision of basic services. For this to occur, central-local relations 
in Ghana will need to continue to evolve; evolve towards greater decentralisation and 
pluralism.  
                                                          
108 The Northern Regional Manager of the GWCL, August 2003, Tamale. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 4.1: Options for Private Sector Participation 
 
Sources of information: 
• http://www.worldbank.org/devforum/toolkit.html   
• http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/water/topics/bench/wup.html 
• http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/wstoolkits 
• http://www. worldbank.org/watsan/pdf/keyprinciples.pdf 
• Idelovitch and Ringskog (1995) 
• Roth (1987) 
 
The “Dublin principles” lay the ground for options in the institutional arrangements 
for service provision. The general literature outlines the range of options - from 
government ownership and management to private ownership and management. 
Options range from public to private ownership. 
 
(I) Public ownership: 
 
a) Management contracts: the public agency retains responsibility for service 
provision, but arranges for private management giving the private company 
freedom for day-to-day management decisions without commercial risks. The 
private contractor acts at all times on behalf of the public authority. The contractor 
has no legal relationship with the consumer. The public sector retains financial 
responsibility for the service and has to provide funds for working and investment 
capital. Compensation is usually based on improved efficiency, volume of water 
produced, improved collection rates, and reduction of unaccounted for water. In 
many cases, management contracts precede longer-term leasing or concession 
arrangements, by strengthening accounting and consumer records and information 
on physical facilities. The management contract may include a productivity bonus 
or a share of the profits. 
 
b) Contracting: where a government agency is responsible for the whole sector, some 
activities can be contracted out to private firms. The public authority retains 
overall responsibility for operation and maintenance of the system, except for 
specific limited scope of services that are contracted out or outsourced. The public 
authority bears all the commercial risk and finances fixed assets and working 
capital. The responsibility of the private sector is limited to management of its 
own personnel and services efficiently. Public authorities that plan to use service 
contracts extensively may need to undergo some changes to fulfil their new role, 
which shifts from execution to supervision. Institutional reforms may be required 
to decentralise control, to provide technical assistance at the local level, to enforce 
standards for quality control, and to manage staffing changes. Multiple contracts 
ensure adequate competition and enable the water authority to compare costs and 
performance on an ongoing basis. A benefit of service contract is the direct link 
between work performed and compensation. 
 
c) Lease contracts: also known as affermage, are arrangements where a private 
operator rents the facilities from the public authority for a certain period and is 
responsible for operation, maintenance, and management of the system. The 
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public authority, which remains the sole owner of the assets, is responsible for 
capital expenditures for new projects, replacement of major works, debt service, 
and tariffs and cost recovery policies. Leaseholders are responsible for all 
operation, maintenance functions, including offices, vehicles and spare parts, 
renewals, and replacements as well as for billing, collection, and financing 
working capital. Risks are limited. In most cases, the public sector assumes the 
capital investments risk, and the leaseholder, the commercial risk.  
 
d) Concessions: In a concession, the contractor or concessionaire has overall 
responsibility for services, including operations, maintenance and management, as 
well as capital investments for the expansion of services. The fixed assets 
however remain the property of government, but are entrusted to the 
concessionaire for the duration of the concession contract and must be returned in 
the same condition at the end of the concession period. The advantage of 
combining responsibility for operations and investments in the same entity is that 
it provides an incentive to the operator to make efficient investment decisions 
because their consequences will affect it directly.  It also provides an incentive for 
technological innovations, as the operator will directly benefit from efficiency 
improvements.  
 
e) Franchising: government can issue a competitive bid for a franchise for service 
provision by the private sector at specified standards and tariffs. Water is provided 
in France in such a manner.  
 
f) Consumer cooperatives: these are self-governing voluntary organisations that are 
especially active where the private for-profit sector is weakest. Governments have 
worked with and through voluntary organisations to provide water and sanitation 
in several low-income communities of Africa. Water cooperatives are to be found 
in most developing countries, and although not all have been successful, many 
have made significant contributions to the development of water supply and other 
public services. They can be particularly helpful at the village level, where 
informed consumers, sharing common interests within small communities, can 
take the place of the professional management hat can be afforded only by large 
systems. 
 
Private ownership: 
 
a) BOOT (Build-Own- Operate-Transfer) contracts: under a BOOT contract, a firm 
or consortium of firms finances, builds, owns, and operates s specific new facility 
or system. After a predetermined period, ownership of the facility is transferred to 
the public authority. They are particularly applicable to new plants that require 
large amounts of financing, e.g. large water treatment plants or wastewater 
treatment plants. A slight variation of the BOOT is the BOT, where ownership is 
transferred to the public sector as soon as the facility is completed, and the 
function of the private firm is only to build and operate it. Another variation is 
BOO, where ownership is not transferred to the public sector but remains with the 
private firm that builds and operates the facility. 
 
b) Reverse BOOT: in countries where economic or political risks are high, the 
private sector may not be interested in participating in a BOOT bidding or may 
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request very high risk premiums in return for their participation. Is such cases, the 
public sector may finance and build the plant, contract it to the private sector over 
a long period of time. To acquire the plant gradually, the private firm pays an 
annual fee to the public authority, which usually covers the full debt service of the 
entire investment cost.  
 
c) Joint ownership: under a joint ownership, a private sector firm and the public 
authority incorporate a firm. The public authority may keep a golden share, which 
entitle it to special powers that may be used only in specific situations. Corporate 
agreements spell out how profits/losses will be shared. Successfully jointly owned 
can establish creditworthiness and raise capital by floating bonds or issuing not. 
This has the advantage of limiting public sector debt. In countries with a weak 
regulatory tradition, joint ownership may satisfy regulatory requirements because 
a board of directors that will have insight into the firm’s operations represents the 
public sector. 
 
d) Outright sale: the sale and private ownership of water supply and sewerage 
systems may be prompted by the desire to completely separate ownership from 
operations and maintenance. Experience with full privatisation of water supply is 
limited, but shares of the company are usually sold on the stock market to private 
investors, exerting pressure for efficiency through the stock market. 
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Annex 5.1: Key informants 
 
Respondents Issue Source of data 
Headquarters of MWH, MLGRD, GWCL, CWSA: 
4 Directors of Policy and 
Planning 
(i) Nature of central-local 
relations of each: (urban 
water, semi-urban water, 
sanitation) using indicators 
of political, administrative, 
fiscal and partnerships 
Official records, 
interviews using 
structured questionnaire 
  (ii) Who does what  Official records, 
interviews using 
structured questionnaire 
Regional level: 
2 Head of regional level 
managers from CWSA, GWCL 
(i) + (ii) Official records, 
interviews using 
structured questionnaire 
District level:  
2 District Coordinating Directors, 
2 District Planning Officers,  
2 District Budget Officers,  
2 District Environmental Health 
Officers,  
1 District Head of GWCL,  
2 District level engineers 
4 NGOs and donor projects,  
2 Private firms 
a) Performance of each type 
of institutional arrangement 
Official records, 
household survey using 
structured 
questionnaire, key 
informants interview 
using semi-structured 
questionnaires 
  b) Assess success factors Case study: Focus 
group discussion, key 
informants interview, 
official records 
Sub district/ Community Level:  
1 System Manager,  
7 Water Board Members,  
2 women leaders 
a) Assess success factors Case study: Focus 
group discussion, key 
informants interview, 
official records 
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Annex 5.2: Notes on Sampling 
 
Determining the sample size 
 
Assumptions: 
Access to water at the district level = 55%-65% 
Margin of error = 10% 
Average household size = 6 
 
Sample size required = 100 households for each district 
 
Nevertheless, a larger sample was drawn due to the interest of the author to carry out 
other types of analysis, beyond the study, at the sub-district level in future. 
 
A total of 766 respondents were interviewed in the same number of households, 402 
from Tamale and 364 from Savelugu-Nanton.  
 
Definition of sample strata  
 
Sample strata  Estimated population 
size 
 % of total  Sample 
Savelugu-
Nanton 
   
Savelugu UC        26,082 25.8% 94
Nanton        20,810 20.6% 75
Pong-Tamale          9,989 9.9% 36
Diare        13,041 12.9% 47
Moglaa        19,423 19.2% 70
Tampion        11,654 11.5% 42
 Total       101,000 100.0% 364
Tamale       
South       208,433 60.9% 245
North        57,000 16.7% 67
Central        76,567 22.4% 90
 Total       342,000 100.0% 402
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Annex 5.3: District selection criteria 
Score 0-3      
 Representativeness Ease of 
obtaining data 
Proximity Similar social 
characteristics 
Total 
Weight 2 1 1 1  
      
Urban district:       
      
Tamale 6 (3x2) 3 2 3 14 
Tema  6 (3x2) 2 3 0 11 
Accra Central 4 (2x) 2 3 1 10 
      
Semi-urban 
district: 
     
      
Bawku East 6 (3x2) 2 1 2 11 
Elmina 6 (3x2) 2 1 1 10 
Savelugu-Nanton 6 (3x2) 3 2 2 13 
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Annex 6.1: Water and Sanitation MDG in Ghana: Progress, and Costs  
 POPULATION 
(2000) 
ACCESS IN 
1990 
MDG GOAL COST OF  
MDG ($’M)
 Number 
(000) 
Number 
(000) 
% Population 
(2015-w) 
(2020-sa) 
Number 
Access 
%  
Water Supply (MDG: 2015) 
Urban 8,278 4484 59 12,897 11,000 85 891 
Rural 10,566 4543 43 15,303 12291 80 654 
Sanitation (MDG: 2020) 
Urban 8,278 3349 40 15094 12629 84 722 
Rural 10,566 1371 13 19,501 14,903 76 249 
Source: MWH (2004) 
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Annex 6.2 Potable Water Facility Options and Standards in Ghana 
 
The various water facility technology options and standards are as follows:  
 
FACILITY STANDARD 
i. Hand Dug Wells with hand pumps: This is provided to communities with population less than 
150 
 
ii. Boreholes fitted with hand pumps: This is provided to communities with population less than 
300 
 
iii. Small piped systems: The various systems under pipe are boreholes with 
mechanized pumps, gravity systems, spring catchments, 
and surface water. Pipe systems are provided to 
communities from 2000 to 50,000 who are prepared to 
manage the piped system themselves. 
 
The Small Towns are further categorized based on population threshold as follows: 
 
  
 
Sanitation Facilities Options and Standards 
 
Provision of sanitation facilities is targeted mainly at individual households and 
institutions. The various technology options and their standards are as follows:  
 
FACILITY STANDARD 
VIP latrines Average of 8 persons per household latrine 
 
Pour/flush toilets Average of 8 persons per pour/flush toilet 
 
WC/Septic tank Average of 8 persons per water closet 
 
KVIP latrines Average of 50 persons per squat hole 
 
 
CATEGORY POPULATION THRESHOLD 
Category I 2,000-5000 
Category II 5,001-15,000 
Category III 15,001-30,000 
Category IV 30,001-50,000 
 - 173 -  
 
Annex 9.1: Scoring features of central-local relations 
 
Indicators are derived from a wide range of literature109 (see summary in Chapter 3 
and 5). A scale of 0 (minimum score) to 4 (maximum score) is applied. The sum is 
presented for each form of decentralization as well as for a combination of all three 
forms (giving an indication of the extent of decentralisation). 
 
Features of central-local relations
Features Indicators score score
Political Involvement of consumers/civic 
associations in stages of service delivery
medium ranking - at the level 
of involvement in planning, 
financing and management 
(using Holleinsteiner's 
typology)
3 low ranking - at the level of 
"legitimisation" (using 
Holleinsteiner's typology) for 
both water and sanitation
1
Administrative Leadership by local government in 
setting targets
Partial for water; yes for 
sanitation
3 No, for water; yes for 
sanitation
1
Leadership by local government in 
setting standards
None 0 None 0
Responsibility for hiring, firing and 
wages over staff
national responsibility 1 national responsibility 1
clarity of responsibilities mixed but pluralism and 
sequencing plan towards 
greater pluralism for both 
water and sanitation
3 clarity but centralised and 
concentrated roles within a 
deconcentrated structure for 
water; for sanitation role 
towards decentralisation
2
Local responsibility for planning, O&M planning, O&M for both 
water and sanitation
4 O&M only for water; planning 
and O&M for sanitation
3
Responsibility for regulatory framework enforces nationwide+local 
leadership for water and 
sanitation
2 national for water and 
sanitation
1
Fiscal Investment in sector financed and 
earmarked by central transfers
Partial for both water and 
sanitation
2 Yes for water; partail for 
sanitation
1
Investment in sector financed by central 
but controlled by district
Partial for both water and 
sanitation
2 No for water; partial for 
sanitation
1
local expenditure on sector financed from 
local revenues
>1% for both water and 
sanitation
0 >1% for both water and 
sanitation
0
share of revenue in sector raised and 
managed by district
All for both water and 
sanitation
4 Partial for water; all for 
sanitation
3
Partnerships Responsibility for managing partnerships district responsibility for both 
water and sanitation under 
national guidelines
3 national responsibility for 
water; district responsibility 
for sanitation under national 
guidelines
2
responsibilities devolved to partner combination: to town 
councils, NGOs, communities
3 Limited for water NGOs coming 
in where GWCL fails; for 
sanitation partial
2
coordination mechanism regular planned meetings 3 limited information exchange 1
co-financing arrangement user fees+local govt 3 user fees+central govt for 
water; user fees + local 
government for sanitation
2
competition multiple firms for water; 
domination of SNDA for 
sanitation
3 monopoly for water; 
domination of TMA for 
sanitation
2
Total score 39 23
SAVELUGU-NANTON TAMALE
 
 
 
                                                          
109 See for example, Ndegwa (2002). 
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Annex 9.2a: Scoring extent of decentralisation in the provision of water 
 
Extent of Decentralisation: Scale 1-4 SAVELUGU-NANTON TAMALE
Types of Dec. INDICATORS           SCALE score score
Political Involvement of consumers/civic associations in 
stages of service delivery
involvement in planning, 
financing and management
4 involvement in financing 2
Leadership in setting targets Partial 2 None 1
Leadership in setting standards None 1 None 1
Administrative Responsibility for hiring, firing and wages over 
staff
national responsibility 2 national responsibility 2
clarity of responsibilities mixed but sequencing plan 3 clarity but centralised 2
Local responsibility for planning, O&M planning, O&M 4 O&M only 3
Responsibility for regulatory framework enforces nationwide+local 
leadership
3 national weak enforcement 2
Responsibility for managing partnerships partially district responsibility 3 national responsibility 2
Fiscal local expenditure on sector financed and 
earmarked by central transfers
local expenditure on sector financed by central but 
controlled by district
local expenditure on sector financed from local 
revenues
>1% 1 >1% 1
share of revenue in sector raised and retained by 
district
Partnerships investment
responsibilities devolved to partner combination: to town councils, 
NGOs, communities
3 NGOs where GWCL fails 2
coordination mechanism regular planned meetings 3 limited information exchange 1
co-financing arrangement user fees+local govt 3 user fees+central govt 2
competition multiple firms 3 monopoly 1
35 22
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Annex 9.2b: Scoring extent of decentralisation in provision of sanitation 
 
Scale 1-4 SAVELUGU-NANTON TAMALE
Types of Dec. INDICATORS          score score
Political Involvement of consumers/civic associations in 
stages of service delivery
involvement in planning, 
financing and management
4 involvement in financing 2
Leadership in setting targets Partial 2 None 1
Leadership in setting standards None 1 None 1
Subtotal 7 4
Administrative Responsibility for hiring, firing and wages over 
staff
district responsibility 4 district responsibility 4
clarity of responsibilities clear, and towards 
decentralisation
4 clear, and towards 
decentralisation
4
Local responsibility for planning, O&M planning, O&M 4 planning, O&M 4
Responsibility for regulatory framework national weak enforcement 2 national weak enforcement 2
Responsibility for managing partnerships district responsibility 4 district responsibility 4
Subtotal 18 18
Fiscal local expenditure on sector out of total investment 1 2
local expenditure on sector financed by central but 
controlled by district
2 2
local investment on sector financed from local 
revenues
>1% 1 >1% 1
share of revenue in sector raised and retained by 
district
Subtotal 4 5
Partnerships responsibilities devolved to partner combination: to town councils, 
NGOs, communities + private 
sector
3 combination: to town councils + 
private sector
2
coordination mechanism regular planned meetings 3 irregular meetings 1
co-financing arrangement user fees+local govt 3 user fees+local govt 3
competition multiple firms 3 monopoly 1
Subtotal 12 7
Total 41 34  
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Annex 11.1: Composition of the Savelugu Water Board 
 
The following presents a list of members of the Water Board, their background and 
how each of them got on to the Board. 
 
Members         Background How each of them got on 
to the board 
Alhassan Abukari  Businessman (Chairman) Elected Assembly member 
Kwabena Anim M (Secretary) Teacher (Systems manager) Elected Assembly member  
Mohammed Mumuni Civil servant (treasurer) Elected Assembly member  
Abukari Iddrisu Karl Businessman (Board member responsible 
for sanitation) 
Elected Assembly member  
Alhaji Mbu Sumani Businessman (member) Elected Assembly member 
Hajia Gurunpaga Businesswoman (Board member 
responsible for sanitation) 
 
Mariama Abu Businesswoman  Represents food sellers 
Abukari Yakubu Businesswoman Nominated by SNDA 
District Chief Executive Mayor (ex officio) Head of the district 
District Coordinating Director Civil servant (ex officio) District manager 
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Annex 11.2: Respondents: SWS Case Study 
 
1. Dr Carl Osei  (District Director of Health Services) 
2. Abukari Abukari (District Guinea Worm Coordinator) 
3. Eric Djokoto (District Engineer) 
4. Mohmmed Mumuni (Systems Treasurer) 
5. Ahassan Abukari (Ag Board Chairman) 
6. Kwabena Anim M (Ag Systems Manager) 
7. Tuahir Sulemana (DWST Team Leader) 
8. Abdulmumin Issahaku (Revenue collector) 
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Annex 12: Questionnaires 
 
Annex 12.1 Questionnaire for local managers 
 
Survey on type of decentralisation of water and sanitation in Ghana 
 
 
Introductory Note 
 
Decentralisation occurs in three main forms: political, administrative and fiscal. In 
combination, these forms manifest in a type of decentralisation or a hybrid of types. Types of 
decentralisation are mainly categorised into: deconcentration (the redistribution of functions 
to non central government levels within sector ministries or other sector-specific national 
agencies); delegation (the transfer of decision-making responsibility to semi-autonomous 
organisations not wholly controlled by the government, but ultimately accountable to it); and 
devolution (the transfer of decision-making responsibilities to quasi-autonomous units of 
local government with corporate status).  
 
From the perspective of responsibilities, the ultimate of decentralisation is to move from 
concentration of roles in a particular level of government to pluralism among government and 
private organisations.  
 
This survey seeks to analyse the types of decentralisation pursued in the delivery of water and 
sanitation in urban and semi-urban districts. The objective is to examine how differences in 
types of decentralisation, particularly in the concentration/distribution of roles and pluralism 
explain performance in the provision of water and sanitation in urban and semi-urban 
districts. 
 
 
Political decentralisation:  
 
1. How would you rank participation of consumers in delivery of water and sanitation 
services? 
 
Participation 
in: 
High Medium Low None 
Planning     
Financing     
Maintenance     
Monitoring     
 
2. How would you rank participation of citizen associations in service delivery? 
 
Participation 
in: 
High Medium Low None 
Planning     
Financing     
Maintenance     
Monitoring     
 
3. Name citizen associations involved:  
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4. Rank on a scale of five the effectiveness of civil society at keeping accountability in the 
water and sanitation sector (through budget monitoring, media discussions, etc.) 
 
Not 
effective 
1 2 3 4 5 Very effective 
     
 
 
Administrative decentralisation: 
 
5. Definition and clarity of responsibilities 
 
6. Are key roles in service provision clearly defined and distributed within government? 
 
Yes  No  
 
7. Are there any roles for the private sector? 
 
Yes  No  
 
8. If yes, are private sector roles clearly specified? 
 
9. Please complete the Table below 
 
Outline stages in provision of water and sanitation and responsible agencies. 
 
Roles in service provision Is role defined by 
law/official operational 
guidelines? 
If yes, which agencies are 
responsible? 
 Yes  No   
Leadership     
Policy formulation    
Planning     
Budgeting    
Coordination    
Financing    
Operation (actual service 
delivery) 
   
Maintenance    
Regulation    
Oversight, monitoring    
Auditing    
Asset ownership    
Brokerage/partnership building 
and management 
   
 
10. If more than one agency is responsible for a role, explain how duplication and gaps are 
managed. 
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11. Are there mismatches between distribution of roles and skills and financial resource 
flows?  
 
Yes  No  
 
12. If yes, in what ways? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. What has been the pattern of distribution of roles in the last five years? 
 
Static  
Towards decentralisation in government  
Towards public-private partnerships  
Towards decentralisation in government and public-private 
partnerships
 
 
 
14. Is there a sequencing plan towards greater decentralisation? 
 
Yes  No  
 
15. If no, why is there no consideration of further decentralisation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capacity of District Assembly for planning and coordination for water and sanitation 
 
Planning process at district-wide level 
 
16. Describe approaches/procedures for district-wide planning and budgeting. (Please attach 
separate sheet if needed) 
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17. Describe the strengths and weaknesses of the approach/procedure for district-wide 
planning and budgeting 
 
Strengths:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weaknesses:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Planning process for water and sanitation 
 
18. Describe approaches/procedures for planning and budgeting for water and sanitation at 
the district level. (Please attach separate sheet if needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. Are there mechanisms to promote participation in planning and budgeting? 
 
20. If yes, outline these mechanisms to promote participation in planning and budgeting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staffing in planning and coordination 
 
21. How many staff are required for planning and coordination? 
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22. How many are at post? 
 
23. What is the explanation for the gap? 
 
24. Indicate (a) the level of professional skills and (b) existence of skills in planning, 
coordination and management of public private partnerships. 
 
Position of 
professional staff  
Qualifications  Years 
experience 
  
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
Skills in: Position of 
professional 
staff 
Planning Coordinatio
n 
Monitorin
g 
Contract development 
and management 
Financial 
management 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Staff directly in water and sanitation: 
 
25. What tier of government is responsible for determining the salary and hiring of staff in 
the water and sanitation unit/agency at each level of government? 
 
 
 National Regional District 
Salary    
Hiring/Firing    
 
26. What is the ratio of existing technical staff vs. required? …………………………. 
 
27. What is the ratio of existing administrative staff vs. required …………………….. 
 - 183 -  
 
28. Indicate characteristics of staff responsible for water and sanitation who are at post and 
where they are located: 
 
Position of staff Qualifications Years 
experience  
Location (national, 
regional, district) 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
29. Indicate the existence of skills in sector planning, budgeting, other coordination, 
monitoring, contract management 
 
Skills in: Position of 
staff Water and sanitation 
sector planning and 
budgeting 
Coordinatio
n 
Monitorin
g 
Contract 
development 
and 
management 
Operation 
and 
maintenanc
e 
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Administrative structures 
 
30. Who does the district manager of water and sanitation report to and receive directives 
from? 
 
District Chief Executive  
Head of a semi-autonomous/autonomous 
agency
 
Regional manager of water and sanitation  
 
 
Approval of priorities  
 
31. Who approves the line item budget at each level of government? 
 
National  
Regional  
District  
 
 
Regulation 
 
32. Is there a regulatory framework to guide service provision? 
 
Yes  No  
 
33. If yes, to what extent is the regulatory framework followed? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 A great deal 
 
 
 
34. Who is responsible for setting targets/standards for service delivery? 
 
 
 
 
 
35. Does the District Assembly have a role in setting targets/standards? 
 
Yes  No  
 
36. If yes, explain the role of the District Assembly? 
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Fiscal decentralisation: 
 
37. List the revenues assigned to each level of government. 
 
National: 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional: 
 
 
 
 
District: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38. Which tiers of government/semi-autonomous agency has the authority to access loans 
markets? 
 
39. Are utility companies financially autonomous from local governments, or must the local 
government assume their liability? 
 
Financially autonomous 
Liability assumed 
 
40. What share of revenue in sector is raised and retained by local government? _______ 
 
41. What proportion of local expenditure on sector is financed and controlled by central 
transfers? ___________    Are transfers regular? _____________ 
 
42. What proportion of local expenditure on sector is financed by central transfers but 
controlled by local government? ___________  Are transfers regular? ____________ 
 
43. What proportion of local expenditure on the sector is financed from local revenues? ___ 
 
44. What share of aggregate local expenditure on the sector does the local level have effective 
control over (i.e. can spend at their own discretion)? _________________ 
 
45. Are local governments given unfunded mandates by higher level government units?  
 
46. What percentage of the sector budget at local level is taken up by salaries?  
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Assessing performance of decentralisation types in the provision of water and sanitation 
 
From records: 
 
Assessing Effectiveness 
  
Effectiveness will be measured by access to the three essential services in the provision of 
water and sanitation, that is, safe water, household latrines and public education on hand 
washing; and by changes in reliability of services in past five years. 
 
Trends in access to safe water: 
 
47. Indicate the proportion of the population without a safe water point (i.e. inside pipe, water 
vendor from a treated source, public standpipe, borehole, covered well) 
 
 % population with access to: 
 Piped 
water 
Borehole Covered 
well 
Uncovere
d well 
River/ 
stream 
Other 
(specify
) 
2002       
2001       
2000       
1999       
1998       
 
48. Indicate the proportion of the population with safe water points that fail (dry up, break 
down, etc.) for most part of the year 
 
 % population with access to safe water in the lean 
season 
2002  
2001  
2000  
1999  
1998  
 
49. Indicate the proportion of the population without safe toilets (flush toilet (WC), 
Ventilated Improved Pit latrine (VIP))  
 
 % population with access to: 
 Flush toilet 
(WC) 
Ventilated 
Improved Pit 
(VIP) 
Bucket/pan 
latrine  
Traditiona
l pit 
No 
latrine 
Other 
(specify
) 
2002       
2001       
2000       
1999       
1998       
 
50. Do you have public education programmes on hygiene and handwashing? 
 
51. If yes, describe the content of and channels used for the programmes. 
 
 - 187 -  
 
 
52. Who finances the programmes? 
 
53. When did such programmes start? 
 
54. What proportion of the population is covered by the programmes? 
 
55. Have you assessed the impact of the programmes? 
 
56. If yes, describe the impact in concrete terms. 
 
Assessing Efficiency 
 
Efficiency will be measured by the time it takes to repair a broken-down facility, attraction of 
new investments and changes in the two factors in the last five years. 
 
57. What percentage of water is lost through leakage (for piped systems)? _________ 
 
58. What percentage of water was lost through leakage five years ago? _________ 
 
59. What percentage of pipelines/wells/borehole is broken down? 
 
60. What was the situation five years ago? 
 
61. What percentage of pipelines/wells/boreholes dry up in the dry season? 
 
62. What percentage dried up five years ago? 
 
63. Who is responsible for the repair of broken-down water point (pipeline, handpump, etc.)?   
 
 
64. On average, how long does it take to repair a broken-down water point (pipeline, 
handpump, etc.)? ______________________ 
 
65. How long did it take to repair a broken-down water point (pipeline, handpump, etc.) five 
years ago?  
 
(a) Same period of time _______________ 
(b) Shorter period of time ______________ 
(c) Longer period of time ______________ 
 
66. Indicate the investment in water in the last five years: 
 
 Source of investment 
 District 
Assembly 
Water 
company/ 
board 
Donor 
contributions 
Direct 
community 
contributions 
Total 
2002      
2001      
2000      
1999      
1998      
Total      
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67. Indicate the investment in sanitation in the last five years: 
 
 Source of investment 
 District 
Assembly 
Sanitation 
agency 
Donor 
contributions 
Direct 
community 
contributions 
Total 
2002      
2001      
2000      
1999      
1998      
Total      
 
 
Assessing Accountability 
 
Assessing accountability will focus on the direct involvement of citizens in service provision, 
as well as on feedback mechanisms that ensure that service providers respond to the demands 
of consumers. 
 
 
68. How many external audits have been carried out in the last five years of the District 
Assembly and Water Company? 
 
(a) Financial audit of the District Assembly ___________ 
(b) Financial and technical audit of the District Assembly ___________ 
(c) Financial audit of the Water Company ___________ 
(d) Financial and technical audit of the Water Company ___________ 
 
69. How many Assembly members were provided with copies of the audit reports? 
 
70. How many of the audit reports have been discussed at District Assembly meetings? 
(Obtain Municipal and central government records on audits and minutes of meetings 
with Assembly members, community leaders to discuss audits) 
 
71. State the procedure for awarding contracts for service delivery 
 
Step in contracting Responsibility  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
72. To what extent is the process of contracting competitive? (Rank on a scale of three) 
 
Not 
competitive 
1 2 3 Competitive 
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73. To what extent is the process of contracting transparent? (Rank on a scale of three) 
 
Not 
transparent 
1 2 3 Transparent 
 
 
Assessing Influence on health   
 
Influence on health will be determined through patterns of diseases that are a direct 
consequence of the lack and use of safe water and sanitation as well as the contribution of 
improved services to girl enrolment in basic school.  
 
74. Indicate the trend of out-patient (OPD) attendance for malaria and typhoid and incidence 
of guinea worm in the last five years. 
 
 OPD attendance 
for malaria 
OPD attendance 
for typhoid fever 
OPD attendance 
for cholera 
Incidence of 
guinea worm 
2002     
2001     
2000     
1999     
1998     
 
75. Indicate the trend of girl enrolment in basic education in the past five years: 
 
 Primary school 
Gross enrolment 
rate for girls 
Total primary  
school Gross 
enrolment rate 
Junior secondary 
Gross enrolment 
rate for girls 
Total junior 
secondary Gross 
enrolment rate 
2002     
2001     
2000     
1999     
1998     
 
 
Assessing Sustainability 
 
Sustainability will be measured by the proportion of local financing for operation and 
maintenance, local financing for new investments and use of local skills in operation and 
maintenance. 
 
76. What proportion of the cost of operation and maintenance is financed by consumers? 
 
77. What was the proportion five years ago? 
 
78. What proportion of new investments is financed by: 
 
(a) Consumers ____________ 
(b) The District Assembly ______________ 
 
79. What was the proportion five years ago? 
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80. What proportion of your technical staff (for operation and maintenance) are from: 
 
(a) The District 
(b) Region 
(c) Accra 
(d) Hired from outside the country 
 
81. What was the situation five years ago? 
 
(a) The District 
(b) Region 
(c) Accra 
(d) Hired from outside the country 
 
82. State whether the following features exists in the provision of the service: 
 
 Feature exists Feature does not exist 
Clarity of responsibilities (especially for local 
government and the non state sector) 
  
More decentralisation   
Competition   
Structured participation   
Manageable scale and technology   
Transparent procedures   
Capacity of local government to undertake tasks   
Capacity of private sector to undertake tasks   
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Annex 12.2 Supplementary questionnaire for Tamale Metropolitan Assembly  
 
1. Who is responsible for setting targets for delivery of: 
 
a) Water ___________ 
 
 
b) Sanitation ___________ 
 
Fiscal decentralisation: 
 
List the revenues assigned to the TMA. 
 
Revenue sources 2002 2003 
From National: 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
  
Regional   
District 
- 
- 
- 
 
  
Others 
- 
- 
- 
  
 
2. What proportion of TMA’s expenditure on water and sanitation is financed and controlled 
by central transfers? ___________    Are transfers regular? _____________ 
 
3. What proportion of TMA’s expenditure on water and sanitation is financed by central 
transfers but controlled by TMA? ___________  Are transfers regular? ____________ 
 
4. What proportion of TMA’s expenditure on water and sanitation is financed from local 
revenues? ___ 
 
5. What share of aggregate TMA’s expenditure on water and sanitation does TAMA have 
effective control over (i.e. can spend at their own discretion)? _________________ 
 
6. Are local governments given unfunded mandates by higher level government  
7. units?  
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Trends in access to safe water: 
 
8. Indicate the proportion of the population covered by safe water provision in the Tamale 
municipality (i.e. inside pipe, water vendor from a treated source, public standpipe, 
borehole, covered well) 
 
 % population with access to: 
 Piped 
water 
Borehole Covered 
well 
Uncovere
d well 
River/ 
stream 
Other 
(specify
) 
2003       
2002       
2001       
2000       
1999       
1998       
 
9. Indicate the proportion of the population with safe water in the lean season (dry up, break 
down, etc.)  
 
 % population with access to safe water in the lean 
season 
2003  
2002  
2001  
2000  
1999  
1998  
 
Assessing Efficiency 
 
10. What percentage of water is lost through leakage (for piped systems)? _________ 
 
11. What percentage of water was lost through leakage five years ago? _________ 
 
12. What percentage of water points are broken down? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
13. What was the situation five years ago? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
 
 
 
 - 193 -  
14. What percentage of water points dry up in the dry season? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
 
15. What percentage dried up five years ago? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
 
16. Who is responsible for the repair of broken-down water point?   
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
 
17. On average, how long does it take to repair a broken-down water point? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
 
18. How long did it take to repair a broken-down water point five years ago?  
 
(a) Same period of time _______________ 
(b) Shorter period of time ______________ 
(c) Longer period of time ______________ 
 
19. Describe how rationing of water is carried by the GWCL in Tamale. 
 
a) In the normal season 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) In the peak season 
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20. Indicate the investment in water in the last five years: 
 
 Source of investment 
 District 
Assembly 
Water 
company/ 
board 
Donor 
contributions 
Direct 
community 
contributions 
Total 
2003      
2002      
2001      
2000      
1999      
1998      
Total      
 
Assessing Influence on health   
 
21. Indicate the trend of out-patient (OPD) attendance for malaria and typhoid and incidence 
of guinea worm in the last five years. 
 
 OPD attendance 
for malaria 
OPD attendance 
for typhoid fever 
OPD attendance 
for cholera 
Incidence of 
guinea worm 
2003     
2002     
2001     
2000     
1999     
1998     
 
22. Indicate the trend of girl enrolment in basic education in the past five years: 
 
 Primary school 
Gross enrolment 
rate for girls 
Total primary  
school Gross 
enrolment rate 
Junior secondary 
Gross enrolment 
rate for girls 
Total junior 
secondary Gross 
enrolment rate 
2003     
2002     
2001     
2000     
1999     
1998     
 
Assessing Sustainability: 
 
23. What proportion of the cost of operation and maintenance is financed by consumers? 
 
24. What was the proportion five years ago? 
 
25. What proportion of new investments is financed by: 
 
(a) Consumers ____________ 
(b) The District Assembly ______________ 
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26. What was the proportion five years ago? 
 
 
27. What proportion of your technical staff (for operation and maintenance) are from: 
 
(a) The District 
(b) Region 
(c) Accra 
(d) Hired from outside the country 
 
28. What was the situation five years ago? 
 
(a) The District 
(b) Region 
(c) Accra 
(d) Hired from outside the country 
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12.3 Supplementary questionnaire for Tamale Municipality GWCL 
 
1. Describe approaches/procedures for planning and budgeting for water in the Tamale 
municipality. (Please attach separate sheet if needed) 
 
 
 
 
2. Do you have any support for sanitation (sewerage, institutional sanitation, etc.)? If yes, 
state type of support, area covered and money involved. 
 
 
 
3. What tier of government is responsible for determining the salary and hiring of staff in 
your agency (at your level of administration)? 
 
 
  
Salary  
Hiring/Firing  
 
4. What is the ratio of existing technical staff vs. required? …………………………. 
 
5. What is the ratio of existing administrative staff vs. required …………………….. 
 
6. Indicate characteristics of management staff: 
 
Position of staff Qualifications Years 
experience  
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
7. Who approves the budget of your agency (at your level of administration)? 
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8. Is there a regulatory framework to guide service provision? 
 
Yes  No  
 
9. If yes, to what extent is the regulatory framework followed? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 A great deal 
     
 
 
10. Who is responsible for setting targets/standards for service delivery? 
 
 
 
Trends in access to safe water: 
 
11. Indicate the proportion of the population covered by safe water provision in the Tamale 
municipality (i.e. inside pipe, water vendor from a treated source, public standpipe, 
borehole, covered well) 
 
 % population with access to: 
 Piped 
water 
Borehole Covered 
well 
Uncovere
d well 
River/ 
stream 
Other 
(specify
) 
2003       
2002       
2001       
2000       
1999       
1998       
 
12. Indicate the proportion of the population with safe water in the lean season (dry up, break 
down, etc.)  
 
 % population with access to safe water in the lean 
season 
2003  
2002  
2001  
2000  
1999  
1998  
 
13. Do you have public education programmes? 
 
14. If yes, describe the content of and channels used for the programmes. 
 
 
 
15. Who finances the programmes? 
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Assessing Efficiency 
 
16. What percentage of water is lost through leakage (for piped systems)? _________ 
 
17. What percentage of water was lost through leakage five years ago? _________ 
 
18. What percentage of water points are broken down? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
19. What was the situation five years ago? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
 
20. What percentage of water points dry up in the dry season? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
21. What percentage dried up five years ago? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
 
22. Who is responsible for the repair of broken-down water point?   
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
 
23. On average, how long does it take to repair a broken-down water point? 
 
(a) Pipelines  _____________ 
 
(b) Wells _________________ 
 
(c) Borehole _________________ 
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24. How long did it take to repair a broken-down water point five years ago?  
 
(a) Same period of time _______________ 
(b) Shorter period of time ______________ 
(c) Longer period of time ______________ 
 
25. Describe how rationing of water is carried by the GWCL in Tamale. 
 
a) In the normal season 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) In the peak season 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. Indicate the investment in water in the last five years: 
 
 Source of investment 
 District 
Assembly 
Water 
company/ 
board 
Donor 
contributions 
Direct 
community 
contributions 
Total 
2003      
2002      
2001      
2000      
1999      
1998      
Total      
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Assessing Accountability 
 
 
27. How many external audits of GWCL Tamale have been carried out in the last five years? 
 
 
28. How widely were the audit findings disseminated? (describe) 
 
 
29. State the procedure for awarding contracts for service delivery 
 
Step in contracting Responsibility  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
30. To what extent is the process of contracting competitive? (Rank on a scale of three) 
 
Not 
competitive 
1 2 3 Competitive 
 
31. To what extent is the process of contracting transparent? (Rank on a scale of three) 
 
Not 
transparent 
1 2 3 Transparent 
 
 
Assessing Sustainability 
 
32. What proportion of the cost of operation and maintenance is financed by consumers? 
 
33. What was the proportion five years ago? 
 
34. What proportion of new investments is financed by: 
 
(a) Consumers ____________ 
(b) GWCL ______________ 
 
35. What was the proportion five years ago? 
 
 
36. What proportion of your technical staff (for operation and maintenance) are from: 
 
(a) The District 
(b) Region 
(c) Accra 
(d) Hired from outside the country 
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37. What was the situation five years ago? 
 
(a) The District 
(b) Region 
(c) Accra 
(d) Hired from outside the country 
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12.4 Questionnaire for national and regional managers 
 
Survey on type of decentralisation of water and sanitation in Ghana 
 
 
Introductory Note 
 
Decentralisation occurs in three main forms: political, administrative and fiscal. In 
combination, these forms manifest in a type of decentralisation or a hybrid of types. Types of 
decentralisation are mainly categorised into: deconcentration (the redistribution of functions 
to non central government levels within sector ministries or other sector-specific national 
agencies); delegation (the transfer of decision-making responsibility to semi-autonomous 
organisations not wholly controlled by the government, but ultimately accountable to it); and 
devolution (the transfer of decision-making responsibilities to quasi-autonomous units of 
local government with corporate status).  
 
From the perspective of responsibilities, the ultimate of decentralisation is to move from 
concentration of roles in a particular level of government to pluralism among government and 
private organisations.  
 
This survey seeks to analyse the types of decentralisation pursued in the delivery of water and 
sanitation in urban and semi-urban districts. The objective is to examine how differences in 
types of decentralisation, particularly in the concentration/distribution of roles and pluralism 
explain performance in the provision of water and sanitation in urban and semi-urban 
districts. 
 
 
Political decentralisation:  
 
1. How would you rank participation of consumers in the delivery of water and sanitation? 
 
Participation 
in: 
High Medium Low None 
Planning     
Financing     
Maintenance     
Monitoring     
 
2. How would you rank participation of citizen associations in service delivery? 
 
Participation 
in: 
High Medium Low None 
Planning     
Financing     
Maintenance     
Monitoring     
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3. Rank on a scale of five the effectiveness of civil society at keeping on accountability in 
the water and sanitation sector (through budget monitoring, media discussions, etc.) 
 
Not 
effective 
1 2 3 4 5 Very effective 
     
 
 
Administrative decentralisation: 
 
Definition and clarity of responsibilities 
 
4. Are key roles in service provision clearly defined and distributed within the sector? 
 
Yes  No  
 
5. Are there any roles for the private sector? 
 
Yes  No  
 
6. If yes, are private sector roles clearly specified? 
 
Please complete the Table below 
 
7. Outline stages in provision of water and sanitation and responsible agencies. 
 
Roles in service provision Is role defined by 
law/official operational 
guidelines? 
If yes, which agencies are 
responsible? 
 Yes  No   
Leadership     
Policy formulation    
Planning     
Budgeting    
Coordination    
Financing    
Execution (actual service 
delivery) 
   
Regulation    
Oversight, monitoring    
Auditing    
Asset ownership    
Brokerage/partnership building 
and management 
   
 
8. If more than one agency is responsible for a role, explain how duplication and gaps are 
managed. 
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9. Are there mismatches between distribution of roles and skills and financial resource 
flows?  
 
Yes  No  
 
10. If yes, in what ways? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. What has been the pattern of distribution of roles in the last five years? 
 
Static  
Towards decentralisation in government   
Towards public-private partnerships  
Towards decentralisation in government and public-private 
partnerships 
 
 
 
12. Is there a sequencing plan towards greater decentralisation? 
 
Yes  No  
 
13. If no, why is there no consideration of further decentralisation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Capacity for planning and coordination for water and sanitation 
 
15. Indicate (a) the level of professional skills and (b) existence of skills in planning, 
coordination and management of public private partnerships. 
 
Position of 
professional staff  
Qualifications  Years 
experience 
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Skills in: Position of 
professional 
staff 
Planning Coordinatio
n 
Monitorin
g 
Contract development 
and management 
Financial 
management 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
16. What tier of government is responsible for determining the salary and hiring of staff in 
the water and sanitation unit/agency at each level of government? 
 
 
 National Regional District 
Salary    
Hiring/Firing    
 
Administrative structures 
 
17. Who does the district manager of water and sanitation report to and receive directives 
from? 
 
District Chief Executive  
Head of a semi-autonomous/autonomous 
agency
 
Regional manager of water and sanitation  
 
 
Approval of priorities  
 
18. Who approves the line item budget at each level of government? 
 
National  
Regional  
District  
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Regulation 
 
19. Is there a regulatory framework to guide service provision? 
 
Yes  No  
 
20. If yes, to what extent is the regulatory framework followed? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 A great deal 
 
 
 
21. Who is responsible for setting targets/standards for service delivery? 
 
 
 
 
 
22. Does the District Assembly have a role in setting targets/standards? 
 
Yes  No  
 
23. If yes, explain the role of the District Assembly? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal decentralisation 
 
24. Is there a clear assignment of expenditure functions to each level of government? 
 
25. List the functions assigned to each level of government 
 
(a) National: 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Regional: 
 
 
 
 
(c) District: 
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26. Are any functions assigned to multiple levels of government? List these.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27. Is there a clear assignment of revenues to each level of government? 
 
 
28. List the revenues assigned to each level of government. 
 
(a) National: 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Regional: 
 
 
 
 
(c) District: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29. Which tiers of government/semi-autonomous agency has the authority to access loans 
markets? 
 
30. Are utility companies financially autonomous from local governments, or must the local 
government assume their liability? 
 
Financially autonomous 
Liability assumed 
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Are local governments given unfunded mandates by higher level government?  
 
31. What percentage of the sector budget at local level is taken up by salaries?  
 
32. State whether the following features exists in the provision of the service: 
 
 Feature 
exists 
Feature does not 
exist 
Clarity of responsibilities (especially for local 
government and the non state sector) 
  
More decentralisation   
Competition   
Structured participation   
Manageable scale and technology   
Transparent procedures   
Capacity of local government to undertake tasks   
Capacity of private sector to undertake tasks   
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12.5 Questionnaire to assess partnerships 
 
Survey on type of decentralisation of water and sanitation in Ghana 
 
Respondents: Agencies directly involved in service delivery 
 
 
Introductory Note 
 
Decentralisation occurs in three main forms: political, administrative and fiscal. In 
combination, these forms manifest in a type of decentralisation or a hybrid of types. Types of 
decentralisation are mainly categorised into: deconcentration (the redistribution of functions 
to non central government levels within sector ministries or other sector-specific national 
agencies); delegation (the transfer of decision-making responsibility to semi-autonomous 
organisations not wholly controlled by the government, but ultimately accountable to it); and 
devolution (the transfer of decision-making responsibilities to quasi-autonomous units of 
local government with corporate status).  
 
From the perspective of responsibilities, the ultimate of decentralisation is to move from 
concentration of roles in a particular level of government to pluralism among government and 
private organisations.  
 
This survey seeks to analyse the types of decentralisation pursued in the delivery of water and 
sanitation in urban and semi-urban districts. The objective is to examine how differences in 
types of decentralisation, particularly in the concentration/distribution of roles and pluralism 
explain performance in the provision of water and sanitation in urban and semi-urban 
districts. 
 
Purpose of questionnaire: To ascertain the existence of results-yielding attributes of a 
pluralist system. The questionnaire seeks to provide an answer to: Which features of the 
pluralist approach have determined the performance of semi-urban districts in the 
provision of water and sanitation, relative to the approach in urban municipalities? 
 
 
Name of agency: 
 
Location and address: 
 
Telephone: 
 
Fax: 
 
Email: 
 
Position of respondent: 
 
Year started operations in district: 
 
Aspect of service delivery agency is involved in:  
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Contribution to service delivery in district 
 
1. What has been the contribution of your agency to provision of water and sanitation in the 
past five years? 
 
Water: 
 Amount of money 
 Investment in 
operation 
Investment in 
maintenance 
Investment in 
expansion of 
service 
Number of persons 
trained to improve service 
delivery 
2002 
 
    
2001  
 
   
2000  
 
   
1999  
 
   
1998  
 
   
 
Sanitation: 
 Amount of money 
 Investment in 
operation 
Investment in 
maintenance 
Investment in 
expansion of 
service 
Number of persons 
trained to improve service 
delivery 
2002  
 
   
2001  
 
   
2000  
 
   
1999  
 
   
1998  
 
   
 
2. How many people have been served by your investments in the district? 
 
Water: 
 Population served by your: 
 Investment in 
operation 
Investment in 
maintenance 
Investment in expansion of 
service 
2002  
 
  
2001  
 
  
2000  
 
  
1999  
 
  
1998  
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Sanitation: 
 Population served by your: 
 Investment in 
operation 
Investment in 
maintenance 
Investment in expansion of 
service 
2002  
 
  
2001  
 
  
2000  
 
  
1999  
 
  
1998  
 
  
 
 
Contribution to skill availability for service delivery 
 
3. Indicate the number of staff of your agency with skills in the following? 
 
Skill area No. of staff 
Planning  
 
Contract management  
 
Technical supervision  
 
Monitoring   
 
Financial management  
 
Community mobilisation/engagement  
 
 
Participation in planning 
 
4. To what extent are private and non-governmental organisations involved in planning for 
service delivery? 
 
Full participation in planning  
Partial participation  
Minimal participation  
No participation  
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Policy on scale 
 
5. What is the policy on the preferred scale of water systems? 
 
Small underground systems 
Large dammed systems 
Others: specify 
 
 
 
6. Why is this scale preferred? 
 
 
Transparency, accountability and competition 
 
7. Do following features of transparency exist? Yes/No 
 
Contract awarded by legally endorsed body  
Process of certifying completion of work observed  
Separation of responsibilities in awarding contract, 
quality monitoring and authorisation of payment 
 
Contract procedures have been made public  
Other transparency measures: specify  
 
 
 
  
8. Is competition in service delivery promoted? Yes/No 
 
9. If yes, how is competition promoted? 
 
Use of pre-qualification criteria  
Open selection processes  
Allocation of geographical areas to different 
contractors
 
Others: specify  
 
 
  
10. Do the following features of accountability exist? Yes/No 
 
Legal backing  
Oversight by political leaders  
Effective performance tracking and reporting  
Appointment of supervisor reserved for only District 
Assembly (without consent of the partner)
 
Direct role of communities in assessing performance  
Arms length relationship between government and 
partners
 
Others: specify  
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Strategy for partnerships 
 
11. What are the strategies of the District Assembly to promote partnerships? 
 
Matching funds
Maintaining contingency capacity (e.g. for emergencies, as a 
bargaining point, to ensure competition, etc.)
Indicate contingency 
capacity: 
Sharing of geographical areas with private sector for service 
provision
Training programmes for both government and non government 
staff involved in service provision
Creation of units/depts to promote and manage partnerships
Others: specify
 
12. If unit/dept exists within the District Assembly for the promotion and management of 
partnerships, which skills are available? 
 
(investigate the exact role of unit/dept) 
(investigate evidence and result of how local government has undertaken key roles, 
particularly, leadership, planning and coordination, financing, oversight and brokerage) 
 
Effects 
 
13. What is the effect of partnerships on the cost of service provision? 
 
Cost of water per litre before and during partnership  
 
Cost of unit of sanitation facility before and during partnership  
 
Introduction of piped system (Indicate coverage) 
Expansion of piped system (Indicate coverage) 
Other: specify  
 
 
 
(Investigate economic capacity of partner(s) to meet the challenge of achieving total coverage 
in the shortest possible time) 
 
Financial standing of agency 
 
14. What is the source of your investments? 
 
Own capital 
Bank finance 
Central government 
Local government 
Donors (specify) 
 
Others: specify 
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Annex 12.6: Questionnaire for household heads 
 
Assessing performance of decentralisation types in the provision of water and sanitation 
 
 
Personal characteristics of household head: 
 
Sex: M ______    F ____________ 
 
No of household members:  M ________    F ___________ 
 
No of children (below 15 years) in household: M _____________   F _____________ 
 
Observe and make notes on the following:  
 
a) Cleanliness of compound (running water, piled waste, etc.) 
 
 
b) Distance from water point to house 
 
c) Distance from toilet to house 
 
Name of community and Area Council: 
 
Assessing Effectiveness: 
Effectiveness will be measured by access to the three essential services in the provision of 
water and sanitation, that is, safe water, household latrines and public education on hand 
washing; and by changes in reliability of services in past five years. 
 
1. What is your main source of drinking water? 
 
(a) Inside pipe   
(b) Water vendor 
(c) Neighbour/private pipe 
(d) Public standpipe 
(e) Borehole 
(f) Covered well 
(g) Uncovered well 
(h) Dam 
(i) Dug-out 
(j) River/stream 
 
2. Who provided the water facility? 
 
(a) Household provided/financed 
(b) Community provided financing 
(c) NGO provided/financed 
(d) District Assembly provided/financed 
(e) Joint provision/financing __  : Specify partners ___________ 
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3. If household uses unsafe sources, why? 
 
(a) Distance ____ 
(b) Waiting time ____ 
(c) Cost ____ 
(d) Taste _____ 
(e) Other (specify)  _______ 
 
 
4. How far is the main source of drinking water?  Km _______ m __________  
 
5. How long does it take to get there?  ____________ hours  ___________ minutes 
 
6. If piped water, how many hours in a day/week do you have water supply? 
 
(a) ______ hours in a day 
 
(b) ______ days in a week 
 
7. If borehole or covered well, how many months in year do you have water?   
 
_______ months in a year 
 
8. In case of irregular supply of potable water, what do you rely on?  
 
9. How far is your source when there is irregular supply of potable water? Km ____ m __ 
 
10. What was the main source of drinking water five years ago? 
 
(a) Inside pipe 
(b) Water vendor 
(c) Neighbour/private pipe 
(d) Public standpipe 
(e) Borehole 
(f) Covered well 
(g) Uncovered well 
(h) Dam  
(i) Dug-out 
(j) River/stream 
 
11. How far was the main source of drinking water five years ago?  ___________ 
 
12. How long did it take to get there? ____________ Hours  ___________ Minutes 
 
13. How regular was the supply of drinking water to your household five years ago? 
 
(a) ______ Hours in a day 
 
(b) ______ Days in a week 
 
(c) ______ Months in a year 
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14. What kind of toilet facility does your household have/use? 
 
(a) Own flush toilet (WC)  
(b) Shared flush toilet (WC)  
(c) Ventilated Improved Pit latrine (VIP)  
(d) Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit latrine (KVIP) 
(e) Traditional pit toilet  
(f) Bucket/pan 
(g) No facility (bush/field) 
 
 
15. Who provided the toilet facility? 
 
(a) Household provided/financed 
(b) NGO provided/financed 
(c) District Assembly provided/financed 
(d) Joint provision/financing __  : Specify partners ___________ 
 
16. What kind of toilet facility did your household have five years ago? 
 
(a) Own flush toilet (WC)  
(b) Shared flush toilet (WC)  
(c) Ventilated Improved Pit latrine (VIP)  
(d) Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit latrine (KVIP) 
(e) Traditional pit toilet  
(f) Bucket/pan 
(g) Communal (specify) ____________________ 
(h) No facility (bush/field) 
(i) Other  (specify) __________________ 
 
17. When in a day and with what do you wash your hands? (tick answer by discussing the 
issue and not through a direct question) 
 
When?                          With What? Water only Water and soap Water and ash 
Before eating    
After eating    
Before feeding your child    
After using the toilet    
 
 
18. Other events for washing hands and with what (specify) __________________ 
 
 
19. If washes hands with water and soap/ash who advised you to wash your hands before 
meals or after using a toilet? 
 
20. Did you observe the same hand-washing practices five years ago? 
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Assessing Efficiency: 
 
Efficiency will be measured by frequency of breakdown, the time it takes to repair a broken-
down facility, attraction of new investments and changes in the two factors in the last five 
years. 
 
21. How often does your water point breakdown? (pipeline, handpump, etc.) 
 
(a) In a month _______________ 
 
(b) In a year _________________ 
 
22. Who is responsible for the repair of broken-down water point (pipeline, handpump, etc.)?   
 
 
23. On average, how long does it take to repair a broken-down water point (pipeline, 
handpump, etc.)? ______________________ 
 
24. How long did it take to repair a broken-down water point (pipeline, handpump, etc.) five 
years ago?  
 
(a) Same period of time _______________ 
 
(b) Shorter period of time ______________ 
 
(c) Longer period of time ______________ 
 
25. On average, how long does a person have to wait at the water point to fetch water? 
 
(a) Dry season _____________ 
 
(b) Rainy season ___________ 
 
26. On average, how long did a person have to wait at the water point to fetch water five 
years ago? 
 
(a) Dry season _____________ 
 
(b) Rainy season ____________ 
 
 
Assessing Accountability: 
 
27. Assessing accountability will focus on the direct involvement of citizens in service 
provision, as well as on feedback mechanisms that ensure that service providers respond 
to the demands of consumers. 
 
28. Are you invited to participate in making decisions on water supply and sanitation in your 
community? (Obtain evidence of recording e.g. minutes from civic associations) 
 
29. If yes, what kind of discussions have you been involved in so far? 
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30. Did you take part in deciding how much you pay for water? 
 
31. Do you know what goes into the price that you pay for water? 
 
32. If yes, how did you obtain the information? 
 
33. If no, why don’t you know what goes into the price of water? 
 
34. Did you take part in deciding what type of water point you should be served with? 
 
35. Do you take part in discussing monitoring reports on the state of water points and 
sanitation facilities? 
 
36. Have you ever been involved in any decision regarding the provision of water and 
sanitation for your household? 
 
37. If yes, which decisions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38. If no, why have you not been involved in any decisions? 
 
 
 
 
 
39. Have you ever been involved in the discussion of audit/financial reports of: 
 
(a) The District Assembly ___________ 
(b) Water Board/Company ___________ 
(c) WATSAN Committee ____________ 
  
 
Assessing Influence on health:   
 
The influence of services on health will be determined through patterns of diseases that are a 
direct consequence of the lack and use of safe water and sanitation as well as the contribution 
of improved services to girl enrolment in basic school.  
 
40. How many times did you have the following diseases last year? 
 
(a) Fever (malaria) ___________ 
(b) Cholera _________ 
(c) Guinea worm _________ 
(d) Diahorrea _______ 
(e) Dysentery _____________ 
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41. How many times did you have the diseases five years ago? 
 
(a) Fever (malaria)  ______________ 
(b) Cholera _________ 
(c) Guinea worm _____________ 
(d) Diahorrea _______ 
(e) Dysentery _____________ 
 
42. (If there is a change in the incidence of diseases) What do you attribute to the change in 
the incidence of diseases? 
 
 
 
 
 
43. Are all girls in your household in school? 
 
44. Where all girls in your household in school five years ago? 
 
45. (If there is a change in girl school enrolment) What would you attribute to the change in 
enrolment of girls in your household in school? 
  
  
Assessing Sustainability: 
 
Sustainability will be measured by the proportion of local financing for operation and 
maintenance, local financing for new investments and use of local skills in operation and 
maintenance. 
 
46. How much did you contribute to install/construct the facility?  __________ cedis 
 
47. Do you contribute to the operation and maintenance of your water points and sanitation 
facilities? 
 
48. How much and how often do you contribute?  ___________ cedis every _________ 
 
49. How is the facility for maintained/managed? 
 
(a) Separate bank account exists ______ 
(b) Bookkeeping exists _______ 
(c) Meetings to discuss account organised ________ 
(d) Pays to Water Company ______ 
 
50. Are there times when the facility breaks down but there is money for repair? 
 
51. Who operates and maintains your water and sanitation facilities? 
 
52. How many are they? 
 
53. Where were the recruited? 
 
(a) From district ________ 
(b) From region _________ 
(c) From Accra ___________ 
(d) From outside the country ___________ 
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54. Do you have a WATSAN Committee? 
 
55. How many members are on the WATSAN Committee?  Men ______ Women ________ 
 
56. Is the community able to pay for repairs? 
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Executive Summary in English 
 
Introduction 
 
The relations between central and local governments as well as with their partners in 
the delivery of services is the subject of this study. This subject is important in 
understanding the way institutions contribute to development, particularly given the 
argument that decentralisation accelerates poverty reduction through the delivery of 
basic services. 
 
For many developing countries, the challenge faced in decentralisation is how to 
balance central-local relations in a way that improves the provision of basic services. 
A second challenge is how to strengthen partnerships with non state actors to expedite 
the delivery of services. 
 
Decentralisation can sometimes lead to pluralism or to distributed institutional 
monopoly. Pluralism refers to a situation where decentralisation ensures that roles are 
shared by two or more organisations or institutions. Distributed monopoly refers to a 
situation where roles are distributed spatially (from the centre to the local government 
level), but concentrated in one organisation or institution. 
 
In this study we explore the reality of balancing central-local relations in the provision 
of basic services in Ghana; the type of decentralisation that has emerged since the 
introduction of economic and institutional reforms in the late 1980s; and, whether it is 
characterised by distributed monopoly or pluralism. We further examine whether 
plural central-local relations, where they exist, perform better than monopoly 
arrangements in the delivery of basic services, with and emphasis on water and 
sanitation.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
The theory on decentralisation provides a basis for formulating the hypotheses of the 
study. This theory clusters the analysis of decentralisation under the structure oriented 
Type Function Framework (TFF) by the Cheema-Nellis-Rondinelli-Silverman school; 
the roles oriented analysis of decentralisation through the Administrative Design 
Framework (ADF) by the Cohen-Peterson school; and the Enablement Framework 
(EF). The argument of the TFF is that various combinations of the main forms of 
decentralisation, political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation result in types of 
decentralisation - deconcentration, delegation and devolution. The argument of the 
ADF is that various combinations of roles in service provision result in monopoly, 
distributed monopoly or pluralism at centralised or decentralised levels of 
governance. The argument of the EF is that local governments can perform better if 
they play an enabling rather than direct service provision role.  
 
Based on a combination of the three frameworks a conceptual framework for the 
study is developed (see Figure 5.1) indicating that the features of central-local 
relations are revealed by the forms and types of decentralisation as well as by the 
distribution of roles. These combine to determine whether service provision is mainly 
through monopoly or plural arrangements. The resulting institutional arrangement 
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influences performance of local governments in the provision of services. The 
hypotheses of the study are formulated in this context. 
 
The first hypothesis for the study is that decentralisation in practice in Ghana does 
not reflect what is specified by the country’s laws as devolution, but rather a mixture 
of deconcentration and delegation.  This hypothesis is tested for Ghana in general and 
for the water and sanitation in particular.  
 
The second hypothesis is that when pluralism emerges at the decentralised level of 
government, it yields better performance than the case of distributed monopoly. The 
underlying idea is that decentralised decision-making can contribute considerably to 
improving the provision of water and sanitation. 
 
Research strategy and analytical framework 
 
Primary and secondary data are used to test the hypotheses. Two districts in Ghana 
are selected for this purpose - Tamale and Savelugu-Nanton districts. Tamale and 
Savelugu-Nanton have similar economic and social characteristics and are 
neighbours. Tamale is a one-town district whereas Savelugu-Nanton is a semi-urban 
district with a mix of small towns and rural settlements. Primary data was obtained 
from a survey of 402 and 364 households in Tamale and Savelugu-Nanton 
respectively as well as from 30 key informants from the two districts, their partners 
and central government agencies.  
 
An analytical framework was developed (Figure 5.2) to define in a logical manner the 
way decentralisation influences the delivery of basic services: underlying legislation 
and policies serve as inputs; the emerging type of decentralisation and distribution of 
roles as the immediate effects; emerging institutional approaches to service delivery 
(monopoly, distributed monopoly, pluralism) at the decentralised level of governance 
as the outputs; and, improved performance in the delivery of services as the outcomes.  
 
A set of indicators is selected for the levels of the analytical framework: at the level of 
immediate effects and outputs, indicators of the main forms of decentralisation 
(political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation) as well as indicators of the 
concentration/distribution of roles in service delivery; and at the level of outcomes, 
indicators of performance in service delivery – mainly from the perspective of users 
through assessing the effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, sustainability and 
possible influence on health that decentralisation is expected to bring in the provision 
of water and sanitation. These indicators are applied to the two study districts using 
data from the household survey, the key informants’ interviews and an examination of 
official records.  
 
Findings 
 
Analysis of the data revealed that that there are differences in the type of 
decentralisation as well as in the distribution of roles for the delivery of water and 
sanitation in the two districts. In terms of inputs, the Constitution and various laws 
define what type of decentralisation should be pursued, namely devolution. However, 
laws and policies that guide the delivery of water and sanitation present different 
types of decentralisation. Policies on provision of water, in particular emphasise the 
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role of a public enterprises, the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) in urban 
districts like Tamale, and that of Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) 
in semi-urban districts like Savelugu-Nanton. 
 
Overall, the immediate effects of legislation and policies in Savelugu-Nanton are seen 
in a more decentralised and plural approach to the delivery of water and sanitation 
than in the case of Tamale. This is particularly so for water, where GWCL has a 
deconcentrated approach to service delivery and has no partnership arrangement with 
local government, the Tamale Municipal Assembly (TMA); and where the TMA has 
also not initiated any partnership arrangement with the GWCL to improve the 
delivery of water. Regarding sanitation, both Savelugu-Nanton and Tamale have 
similar approaches to the delivery of sanitation – more towards decentralisation, but 
with responsibilities for staffing and in a partial way, funding, managed from above. 
We also ascertain that pluralism is beginning to emerge in the provision of sanitation 
in Savelugu-Nanton more than in Tamale, which has roles for service provision 
largely concentrated in the government structure. 
 
In terms of outputs, the analyses show that the provision of water and sanitation in 
Savelugu-Nanton is through delegation and pluralism at the decentralised level of 
government. Roles are shared by more than one governmental institution, NGOs, 
private sector firms and community organizations. Roles are also spatially 
decentralised. This has resulted in Savelugu-Nanton reaping the benefits that plural 
arrangements for service delivery have brought - in the form of skills and resources 
from other actors who are not controlled by government.  
 
In Tamale, water provision is through a combination of distributed monopoly and 
deconcentration. Roles are concentrated in the structure of the GWCL, but spatially 
distributed from its headquarters in Accra to Tamale. Provision of sanitation in 
Tamale is through delegation and distributed monopoly within the government 
structure. Extremely limited fiscal decentralisation as well as control by the centre of 
local government staff are disincentives for devolution in the two districts.  
 
The first hypothesis is therefore confirmed - that decentralisation in practice in Ghana 
does not reflect what is specified by the country’s laws as devolution. The design and 
implementation of reforms have led to a hybrid of types of decentralisation for the 
provision of each service. Furthermore, the distribution of roles differs in each of the 
two districts, even for the same service. 
 
Regarding the second hypothesis, overall, the more decentralised and plural Savelugu-
Nanton has performed better (from 1998 to 2003) in terms of effectiveness, efficiency 
and accountability. The findings are however not conclusive regarding sustainability 
and influence on health. Thus, the second hypothesis is partially confirmed. 
 
Savelugu-Nanton is more effective than Tamale (for the 1998-2003 period of the 
study), particularly in increasing the coverage and reliability of water to the benefit of 
users. Savelugu-Nanton is also generally more efficient in the provision of water and 
sanitation, particularly in minimising water loss and in mobilising both local and 
external resources for investment. Savelugu-Nanton also performs better than Tamale 
in terms of local accountability. Savelugu-Nanton promotes more participation and 
better flow of information in the provision of services. This is essentially due to the 
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plural arrangement that has been adopted by the district for the provision of services. 
On the other hand, the Tamale approach promotes concentration of information and 
roles in the government structure, a feature that restricts accountability to consumers.  
 
Sustainability appeared to be a challenge for both Tamale and Savelugu-Nanton 
approaches. The Savelugu-Nanton approach has the strength of using local skills for 
operation and maintenance, unlike Tamale, which relies heavily on skills from outside 
the district. Both cases also rely extensively on foreign support to expand their 
systems.  
 
The picture regarding possible influence on health is not conclusive. Savelugu-Nanton 
has performed better in the prevention of the deadly cholera. Tamale on the other 
hand has performed better in the reduction of guinea worm.  
 
Using more qualitative techniques, including key informants interviews and focus 
group discussions with experts as well as users, it was explored why Savelugu-Nanton 
is doing better in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and accountability; and why it is 
not lagging behind Tamale in terms of sustainability and possible influence on health.  
 
A distinctive feature of the performance of two cases is the role that local 
governments play in operationalising decentralisation policies. We identified three 
roles that underlie the performance of the more successful Savelugu-Nanton district. 
These are leadership, brokerage and oversight roles. 
 
We conclude that Savelugu-Nanton draws its strengths from the following: 
 
a. A local government that plays leadership, brokerage and oversight roles in the 
provision of services and that has instruments to pool skills and funds from other 
actors;  
b. Adoption of manageable scale and technology for providing services within the 
context of available local capacity (capacity available in the area, both in and out 
of government);  
c. Service provision that is decentralised to the lowest level of governance on the 
basis of efficiency considerations, which include the ability of the Savelugu Water 
Board to collect user charges and to promptly repair broken down facilities. 
d. Formulation of a clear objective of deepening local accountability of the service 
provider through the design of a water system that is accountable to local 
government and not to a distant national public utility. Through this arrangement, 
the Savelugu Water Board is able to convince consumers to pay more than user 
charges approved by the national Public Utility Regulatory Commission (but less 
than cost of vendor services). Thus, the Savelugu Water Board fully finances its 
operation and maintenance and increasingly, its component of expansion costs. 
Accountability to local government is also promoted by the adopted scale of 
service provision. 
e. Setting up of well defined plural arrangements for mobilising technical assistance 
and funds from NGOs, private consultants, central government and international 
aid agencies. Local managers indicate that Savelugu-Nanton had no choice but to 
“open up” to a variety of actors, including non state actors to provide safe water 
due to its lack of skills and funds. 
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Conclusions 
 
The conclusion is that despite the same decentralisation framework for the entire 
country of Ghana, there is a great deal of diversity in the form the framework takes in 
the provision of services at the district level. National policies for delivery of basic 
services have all not been revised to support the objective of decentralisation. In the 
case of water, for which two central government agencies, the GWCL and CWSA 
have oversight responsibility, the decentralisation framework has had some influence 
on the approach used by one agency, the CWSA which was established in the heat of 
the reforms; and no influence on the other, the GWCL which was established long 
before the current wave of decentralisation reforms started. While the CWSA 
approach seeks a central role for local government in service delivery and thereby 
provides mainly policy and funding roles to local governments, the GWCL operates 
in a deconcentrated manner having almost no institutional links with local 
government. By operating under GWCL, Tamale for example, does not enjoy the 
benefits that decentralisation and pluralism bring, unlike Savelugu-Nanton, which has 
significantly increased coverage and reliability of services in recent years. 
  
There is also diversity even where just one central agency has oversight 
responsibility. In the case of provision of sanitation, the two districts use decentralised 
approaches for service delivery due to the existence of one central government 
agency, the Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development, which is 
responsible for policy guidance for all districts. Nevertheless, Savelugu-Nanton has 
adopted more plural institutional approaches for service delivery. 
 
The conclusion is that despite a pull from the centre, local governments are able to 
deepen decentralisation through the roles they choose to play. A passive local 
government, as in the case of Tamale regarding water provision, neither positions 
itself nor develops instruments to work with centralised agencies (like the GWCL) for 
better services for its people. 
 
There is also no consistency in ensuring that all forms of decentralisation, political, 
fiscal and administrative decentralisation are mutually supportive of each other. All 
three forms are occurring at very different paces. Central government agencies have 
no guidance on how they can proceed with all forms of decentralisation either at the 
same time or in a clearly sequenced manner. The focus has been on establishing 
District Assemblies and not on reforming central government agencies. 
 
Moreover, there appears to be little consideration for the outcomes of decentralisation 
in terms of better services. It appears that the goals of Ghana’s decentralisation 
reforms are not linked directly to improvements in provision of basic services. 
Reforms have focussed more on the government administrative structure and less on 
service delivery agencies and their performance. 
 
Revisiting the theoretical frameworks 
 
The findings of the study have a bearing on frameworks that are used to analyse 
decentralisation. The research has indicated the need to emphasise the following 
elements in such frameworks:  
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 The dynamic interactions that are at play in central-local relations and not only 
the static types that are usually characterised (for example as deconcentration, 
delegation and devolution); 
 Decentralisation as an evolution of relationships and not a one-time transfer of 
authority; 
 Deeper analysis of the process of decentralisation and of approaches to 
sequencing reforms; 
 Analysis of the outcomes of decentralisation reforms in terms of whether more 
basic services are being provided to citizens in a better way; 
 Local governance rather than local government due to the effects of pluralism 
in service provision; 
 Deeper analysis of the essential roles for local government in the provision of 
services, particularly leadership, brokerage, oversight roles; 
 Analysis of the role of pluralism in deepening decentralisation.  
 
Furthermore the study proposes four steps for the analysis of central-local relations in 
a logical way. These are demonstrated in Tables 12.5 and 12.6. The four steps enables 
analysis in a simultaneous and logical way the: (a) features of decentralisation, 
including distribution of roles; (b) role of local government; (c) sequencing of 
decentralisation reforms; and (d) performance of service delivery systems at the 
decentralised level of governance.  
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Samenvatting in het Nederlans 
 
Introduction 
 
De relaties tussen de centrale en de lokale overheid en de relaties met hun partners bij 
het verlenen van diensten zoals drinkwater en riolering zijn het onderwerp van dit 
proefschrift. Dit onderwrp is belangrijk om te begrijpen hoe instituties bijdragen aan 
ontwikkeling. Met name het argument dat decentralisatie helpt om de armoede te 
verlichten zal onder de loupe worden genomen. 
 
Voor veel ontwikkelingslanden is de uitdaging van decentralisatie hoe de relaties 
tussen de centrale en de lokale overheid in evenwicht te houden en daardoor de 
dienstverlening aan de burgers te verbeteren. Een tweede uitdaging is om partnerships 
aan te gaan met particuliere organisaties die kunnen helpen om de dienstverlening te 
verbeteren. 
 
Decentralisatie kan leiden tot pluralisme of tot distributed institutional monopoly. 
Pluralisme refereert aan een situatie waar decentralisatie er voor zorgt dat de rollen 
gedeeld worden door twee of meer organisaties. Distributed monopoly refereert aan 
een situatie waar de rollen ruimtelijk verdeeld zijn tussen de centrale overheid en de 
lokale overheid, maar geconcentreerd blijven in een organisatie. 
 
In deze studie wordt deze balanceer act tussen de centrale en lokale overheid met 
betrekking tot het verschaffen van basisvoorzieningen bestudeerd in een 
ontwikkelingsland, Ghana. Het gaat er om welk type decentralisatie er uiteindelijk 
uitgekomen is na de economische en institutionele hervormingen van de tweede helft 
van de jaren tachtig. Is dit pluarisme of distributed institutional monopoly? Verder 
wordt nagegaan of pluralistische relaties tussen de centrale en de lokale overheid 
resulteren in een betere prestatie dan monopoly arrangements als het gaat om het 
voorzien in basisvoorzieningen en met name drinkwater en riolering.  
 
Hypothesen 
 
Op grond van theiorieen over decentralisatie zijn enkele hypothesen geformuleerd. 
Deze theorieen zijn of meer structure oriented zoals het Type Function Framework 
(TFF) van de Cheema-Nellis-Rondinelli-Silverman school; of meer op de rollen van 
de actoren gericht zoals het Administrative Design Framework (ADF) van de Cohen-
Peterson school. Als derde theoretische stroom wordt het Enablement Framework 
(EF) van Helmsing gebruikt. Het argument van de TFF school is dat verschillende 
combinaties van de belangrijkste vormen van decentralisatie, politieke, 
administratieve en fiscale decentralisatie resulteren in verschillende types 
decentralisatie, namelijk: deconcentratie, delegatie en devolutie. Het argument van de 
ADF school is dat verschillende combinaties van rollen in de voorziening van 
diensten resulteert in een (machts) monopolie, een distributed (machts) monopolie of 
in pluralisme op het gedecentraliserde bestuursniveau. Tenslotte beweert de EF dat de 
lokale overheid betere prestaties kan leveren indien het zich toelegt op het faciliteren 
van de dienstverlening.  
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Gebaseerd op een combinatie van deze drie denkkaders is een conceptueel kader voor 
de studie ontwikkeld (figuur 5.1) dat de belangrijkste aspecten van de relaties tussen 
het centrale en lokale niveau weer geeft, als verschillende vormen en typen van 
decentralisatie en van de verdeling van de rollen tussen beide overheidsniveaus. 
 
De eerste hypothese voor de studie is dat decentralisatie in de Ghanese praktijk niet 
weer geeft wat gespecificeerd is in de wetten van het land, namelijk devolutie, maar 
veeleer een mengeling is van deconcentratie en delegatie. Deze hypothese is getest 
voor Ghana in het algemeen en voor de voorziening van drinkwater en riolering in het 
bijzonder. De onderliggende gedachte is dat gedecentraliseerde besluitvorming in 
aanzienlijjke mate bij kan dragen aan het verbeteren van de dienstverlening. 
 
De tweede hypothese is dat indien pluralisme zich manifesteert op het 
gedecentraliseerde niveau dit leidt tot betere prestaties wat betreft het voorzien van 
basisvoorzieningen dan in het geval van een (distributed) monopolie.  
 
De research strategie en het analytische kader 
 
Gebruik wordt gemaakt van zowel primaire als secondaire data om de hypothesen te 
toetsen. Twee districten, Tamale en Savelugu-Nanton zijn voor dat doel geselecteerd. 
Zij hebben vergelijkbare economische en sociale kenmerken en liggen dicht bij 
elkaar. Tamale is een district dat door een stad wordt gedomineerd, terwijl Savelugu-
Nanton een semi-urbaan district is met een mengeling van kleine steden en 
vestigingen op het platteland. Primaire data werden verkregen middels een survey van 
402 en 366 huishoudens in respectievelijk Tamale en Savelugu-Nanton en van sleutel 
informanten in de twee districten en in de centrale overheidsdiensten.  
 
Het analytische kader (zie figuur 5.2) geeft aan hoe decentralisatie de voorziening van 
basisvoorzieningen beinvloedt: de wetgeving en het beleid dienen als inputs; het 
resulterende type decentralisatie en de verdeling van rollen zijn de immediate effects; 
de gekozen insitutionele benadering (monopoly, distributed monopoly, pluralism) op 
het gedecentraliseerde bestuursniveau is de output; en de verbeterde performance in 
de dienstverlening is de outcome.  
 
Verder is een aantal indicatoren gekozen voor de verschillende niveaus van het 
analytische kader: op het niveau van de immediate effects en outputs, zijn de 
indicatoren de resulterende vormen van decentralisatie (politieke, administratieve en 
fiscale decentralisatie) en indicatoren van de concentratie of verdeling van de rollen 
met betrekking tot de dienstverlening; en op het niveau van de outcomes, zijn 
indicatoren voor performance gekozen vanuit het gezichtspunt van de gebruiker, door 
naar de effectiviteit, efficiency, accountability, duurzaamheid en mogelijke invloed op 
gezondheid te kijken die verwacht wordt van decentralisatie en met name door het 
verschaffen van drinkwater en riolering. Deze indicatoren worden in de twee 
districten gemeten door het huishoud survey, het bevragen van sleutel informanten en 
het raadplegen van de officiele verslagen.  
 
Resultaten 
 
De analyse van de data toont een verschil in het type decentralisatie als wel in de 
verdeling van de rollen voor het verschaffen van water en riolering in de twee 
 - 229 -  
districten. In termen van inputs, specificeert de grondwet en verschillende andere 
wetten welk type decentralisatie na gestreefd zou moeten worden, namelijk devolutie. 
Maar de wetten en het gevoerde beleid met betrekking tot de voorziening van water 
en riolering resulteert in andere typen decentralisatie. Beleid met betrekking tot 
drinkwater in het bijzonder benadrukt de rol van een publiek bedrijf, de Ghana Water 
Company Limited (GWCL) in stedelijke districten zoals Tamale, en dat van de 
Community Water en Sanitation Agency (CWSA) in semi-urbane districten zoals 
Savelugu-Nanton. 
 
De immediate effects van de wetgeving en het beleid in Savelugu-Nanton zijn een 
meer gedecentraliseerde en plurale benadering van drinkwater voorziening en de 
aanleg van riolering dan in het geval van Tamale, waar men eerder deconcentratie een 
een distributed monopoly aan treft. Dit is in het bijzonder zo voor water, waar GWCL 
een gedeconcentreerde benadering heeft en geen partnership arrangements met de 
lokale overheid, de Tamale Municipal Assembly (TMA) aangaat; en waar de TMA 
ook geen partnership arrangement met GWCL is aangegaan om de levering van water 
te verbeteren. Met betrekking tot riolering, volgen Savelugu-Nanton en Tamale 
dezelfde benadering. Dat komt meer met decentralisatie overeen, maar de 
verantwoordelijkheid voor het personeel en voor de financierig ligt bij hogere niveaus 
van de overheid. Ook werd vastgesteld dat pluralisme ontstaat bij het aanleggen van 
riolering in Savelugu-Nanton nog meer dan in Tamale, waar de rollen met betrekking 
tot dienstenverlening meer geconcentreerd zijn bij de centrale overheid. 
 
In termen van outputs toont de analyse dat de voorziening van water en riolering in 
Savelugu-Nanton verloopt middels delegatie en pluralisme. Rollen worden er meer 
gedeeld door overheidsinstellingen, NGOs, de particuliere sector en community 
organisaties. Rollen zijn er ook ruimtelijk gedecentraliseerd. Een transitie naar 
devolutie lijkt het geval te zijn wat betreft de aanleg van riolering. Savelugu-Nanton 
lijkt hier voordeel te hebben van de plurale benadering van de dienstenverlening in de 
vorm van het gebruiken van de bekwaamheden en resources van de andere actoren die 
niet door de centrale overheid gecontroleerd worden.  
 
In Tamale, vindt de drinkwater voorziening plaats door een combinatie van 
deconcentratie en distributed monopoly. De rollen zijn er geconcentreerd in de 
structuur van de GWCL, maar ruimtelijk verdeeld tussen het hoofdkwartier in Accra 
en Tamale. De voorziening van riolering in Tamale vindt plaats middels delegatie en 
distributed monopoly.  
 
Daardoor wordt de eerste hypothese bevestigd, dat decentralisatie in de praktijk in 
Ghana niet overeen komt met wat de wet voorschrijft, namelijk devolutie. De design 
en implementatie van de hervormingen hebben geleid tot een aantal hybride types 
decentralisatie voor de voorziening van elke dienst. Verder is de verdeling van rollen 
in elk van de twee districten, hetzelfde, zelfs voor dezelfde dienst. 
 
Met betrekking tot de tweede hypothese, werd vastgesteld dat in het meer 
gedecentraliseerde en plurale Savelugu-Nanton district dingen beter gingen (in de 
periode 1998 tot 2003) in termen van effectiviteit, efficiency en accountability. De 
restultaten zijn echter niet eenduidig voor duurzaamheid en de invloed op de 
gezondheid van de mensen.  
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Het Savelugu-Nanton district is effectiever dan Tamale (zelfde periode), in het 
bijzonder wat betreft de toename van de coverage en de betrouwbaarheid van de 
water toevoer. Tevens werd vast gesteld dat het Savelugu-Nanton district in het 
algemeen efficienter is in de voorziening van water en riolering, in het bijzonder in 
het minimaliseren van de water verliezen en in het mobiliseren van zowel lokale als 
externe investeringsbronnen. Het Savelugu-Nanton district doet het ook beter dan 
Tamale in termen van accountability. Savelugu-Nanton bevordert de participatie van 
de doelgroep en zorgt voor een betere informatiestroom over de betreffende diensten. 
Dit is het gevolg van de plurale benadering die in het district gekozen is voor de 
voorzieningen van basisbehoeften. Anderzijds bevordert de in Tamale gekozen 
benadering de concentratie van informatie en rollen bij de overheid, wat de 
accountability ten opzichte van de gebruikers beperkt.  
 
Duurzaamheid is een uitdaging zowel in Tamale als in het Savelugu-Nanton district. 
De Savelugu-Nanton benadering heeft als sterk punt dat lokale krachten gebruikt 
worden voor het laten functioneren en onderhouden van de voorzieningen, terwijl 
Tamale, in sterke mate afhankelijk is van expertise buiten het district. Beide districten 
zijn in belangrijke mate afhankelijk van steun van buiten voor het uitbreiden van hun 
voorzieningen.  
 
Het beeld met betrekking tot de invloed op de gezondheidszorg is niet geheel 
eenduidig. Savelugu-Nanton heeft het beter gedaan wat betreft de preventie van de 
dodelijke ziekte cholera. Anderzijds heeft Tamale het beter gedaan wat betreft het 
terugdringen van de guinea worm.  
 
Met behulp van meer kwalitatieve technieken (sleutel informanten en focus group 
discussies met experts en gebuikers) tonen aan waarom het Savelugu-Nanton district 
het beter doet in termen van effectiviteit, efficiency en accountability; en waarom het 
district niet achterloopt bij Tamale in termen van duurzaamheid en mogelijke invloed 
op de gezondheid van de mensen. De conclusie is dat het Savelugu water system zijn 
kracht ontleent aan de volgende factoren: 
 
f) De lokale overheid speelt de ‘leadership, brokerage en oversight’ rollen in de 
verlening van deze diensten en heeft instrumenten ontwikkeld om kennis en 
fondsen te mobiliseren van andere actoren;  
g) De lokale overheid heeft gekozen voor technologieen die aangepast zijn en de 
juiste schaal hebben, waardoor diensten verleend worden die de capaciteit van 
lokale overheid niet te boven gaan;  
h) Dienstverlening op het laagst mogelijke niveau betekent meer efficientie onder 
andere omdat de Water Boards er in staat zijn om de bijdragen van de 
gebruikers te verzamelen en snel kapotte facilieiten kunnen repareren. 
i) De lokale overheid heeft een duidelijke doelstelling namelijk het verbeteren 
van de lokale accountability omdat het systeem zo ontworpen is dat men 
verantwoording schuldig is aan de lokale overheid en niet aan nationale 
organisatie die ver weg in de hoofdstad huist. Door deze keuze is de Savelugu 
Water Board in staat de gebruikers te overtuigen dat zij meer moeten betalen 
dan de in Ghana gebruikelijke ‘user charges’ die goedgekeurd zijn door de 
nationale Public Utility Regulatory Commission (men betaalt nog steeds 
minder dan wat er aan een ‘water vendor’ betaald moet worden). Zodoende 
financiert de Savelugu Water Board haar activiteiten geheel, zowel het 
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normale functioneren als het onderhoud en in toenemende worden ook de 
uitbreidingskosten gedekt. Accountability aan lokale overheid wordt ook 
bevorderd door de gekozen schaal van de voorzieningen. 
j) De lokale overheid heeft voor een goed gedefinieerde plurale benadering 
gekozen om zo technische assistentie en fondsen te mobiliseren van NGOs, 
particuliere consultants, de centrale overheid en internationale 
hulporganisaties. Lokale managers gaven aan dat het Savelugu-Nanton district 
geen keuze had dan zich open te stellen voor het hele gamma van actoren, 
inclusief allerlei non state actoren. die konden helpen om veilig water voor de 
mensen te leveren omdat het verder zelf geen deskundigheid of fondsen ter 
beschikking had. 
 
Conclusions 
 
De conclusie is dat ondanks hetzelfde decentralisatie kader dat voor heel Ghana geldt, 
er een grote mate van verscheidenheid bestaat wat betreft de verlening van 
basisvoorzieningen op het districts niveau. Het nationale beleid voor de voorziening 
van basisvoorzieningen is niet aangepast om de doelstellingen van het 
decentralisatieproces te ondersteunen. In het geval van water, zijn er twee centrale 
overheidsinstanties verantwoordelijk, de GWCL en de CWSA. Het 
decentralisatiebeleid heeft alleen enige invloed gehad op een van de twee namelijk de 
CWSA, die in het kader van het hervormingsproces is opgericht, maar geen invloed 
op de GWCL die al veel eerder was opgericht. Terwijl de CWSA decentraal opereert, 
functioneert de GWCL op een gedeconcentreerde manier, bijna zonder institutionele 
relaties met de lokale overheid. Door van de GWCL afhankelijk te zijn heeft Tamale 
bij voorbeeld niet de voordelen van decentralisatie en pluralisme genoten, terwijl het 
Savelugu-Nanton district recentelijk wel de coverage en de betrouwbaarheid van de 
watervoorziening significant uitbreidde. 
  
Er is ook een diversiteit binnen een organisatie van de centrale overheid wat betreft de 
verantwoordelijkheid voor basisvoorzieningen. In het geval van rioleringen, volgen de 
twee districten een gedecentraliseerde benadering, omdat er maar een organisatie voor 
bestaat, namelijk het Ministerie of Local Government & Rural Development, dat 
verantwoordelijk is voor het beleid in alle districten. 
  
De conclusie is dat ondanks druk van het centrale niveau de lokale overheden 
decentralisatie kunnen verdiepen door de rol die zij voor zich zelf weg gelegd zien. 
Een passieve lokale overheid, zoals in het geval van Tamale als het om drinkwater 
gaat, plaatst zichzelf niet in de juiste positie en ontwikkelt geen instrumenten om met 
gecentraliseerde diensten (zoals de GWCL) te werken en zo betere dienstverlening 
voor de bevolking te realiseren. 
 
Er is ook geen poging gedaan om er voor te zorgen dat de verschillende vormen van 
decentralisatie (politieke, fiscale en administratieve decentralisatie) elkaar wederzijds 
ondersteunden. Alle drie vormen komen voor, maar hun ontwikkeling gaat in een 
geheel verschillend tempo. De centrale overheidsdiensten krijgen geen aanwijzingen 
hoe ze alle vormen van decentralisatie tegelijkertijd zouden kunnen bevorderen. De 
focus heeft gelegen op het in stellen van District Assemblies en niet op het hervormen 
van de diensten van de centrale overheid. 
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Tenslotte is er weinig oog voor de feitelijke uitkomst van het decentralisatieproces in 
termen van betere dienstverlening aan de burgers. Het lijkt er op dat de doelstellingen 
van Ghana’s decentralisatie poging niet gerelateerd zijn aan een directe verbetering 
van de basisvoorzieningen. De hervormingen hebben zich vooral gericht op het anders 
inrichten van de overheid en minder op het verbeteren van de dienstverlening door de 
overheid. 
 
Herziening van het theoretische kader 
 
De resultaten hebben ook consequenties voor de kaders die gebruikt zijn om 
decentralisatie te analyseren. Het onderzoek heeft aangegeven dat de volgende 
elementen belangrijk zijn voor zo’n kader:  
 
 Het gaat niet alleen om de statische interactie die gewoonlijk genoemd worden 
zoals deconcentratie, delegatie en devolutie, maar juist om de dynamische 
interacties tussen de centrale en lokale overheid; 
 Decentralisatie is een evolutie van relaties en niet een eenmalige overdracht 
van authoriteit; 
 Het is nodig om tot een diepere analyse van het proces van decentralisatie te 
komen en goed op de volgorde van de hervormingen te letten; 
 Analyseer het resultaat in termen van de uitkomsten bij voorbeeld of er sprake 
is van betere dienstverlening aan de burger; 
 De nadruk dient te liggen op de lokale bestuursstructuur (the local governance 
structure) en niet alleen op het functioneren van de lokale overheid sec; 
 Er is ook een dieper gaande analyse van de essentiele rollen van de lokale 
overheid in de voorziening van basisbehoeften nodig en in het bijzonder van 
rollen zoals ‘leadership, brokerage en oversight’; 
 Tenslotte moet de rol van pluralisme voor het verdiepen van het 
decentralisatieproces bestudeerd worden. 
 
De analyse van de relatie tussen de centrale en lokale overheid kan in vier stappen 
worden gedaan (zie tabel 12.5 en 12.6). Deze impliceren gelijktijdigheid en een 
logische volgorde: a) analyseer de kenmerken van decentralisatie, inclusief de 
verdeling van de rollen; b) focus op de rol van de lokale overheid; c) let op de 
volgorde van de hervormingen; en d) neem de performance betreffende de 
voorziening van diensten in beschouwing. 
